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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Multinationals and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment
In 1996, the municipality of São José do Pinhais in Brazil attracted an in-
vestment by the French car manufacturer Renault, involving the creation of
1,500 new jobs. In return, Renault was o¤ered a massive incentive package,
including direct nancial contributions up to $ 300 million, a series of tax
breaks, the donation of a 2.5 million square meter construction site, and
a number of favorable loan conditions. In direct nancial subsidies alone,
this investment package thus came at a cost of $ 200,000 per job created
(Charlton, 2003). Blomström and Kokko (2003) document similar numbers
for inter alia the attraction of Ford and Volkswagen subsidiaries in Portugal,
at a cost of $ 240,000 per job created.
These examples are by no means exceptions. On the contrary, they are
part of a general development during the past two decades, in which countries
world-wide have increasingly changed their investment regimes in favor of
attracting investments of multinational enterprises also known as Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) (UNCTAD; 2003, 2004). Inward FDI ows have
increased all around the world during the past 25 years, as illustrated in
Figure 1.1. Especially in the early 2000s a sharp increase in total inward
FDI can be observed. Nonetheless, developed countries remain the most
important benefactors of inward FDI and developing countries, notably on
the African continent, keep lagging behind.
Looking at FDI as a share of total GDP in Figure 1.2, a similar pic-
1
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Figure 1.1: Inward FDI ows 1980-2006 (source: UNCTAD, 2007)
ture arises: Inward FDI shares have increased all over the world, but again
developed regions deviate sharply from less developed ones. Countries in
Latin America have been catching up somewhat during the early 2000s, but
the African continent still remains underrepresented. As in Figure 1.1, we
again observe a sharp increase in FDI shares during the early 2000s for most
continents.
In sharp contrast, during the 1960s and 1970s many countries (home
and host countries alike) inclined towards restricting multinational activities
(Caves, 1974). In those years, many governments and the electorates they
represented blamed multinationals (MNEs) for inter alia depleting scarce re-
sources, exploiting host-country employees, and forming global monopolies
to the disadvantage of consumers all over the world. Hence, over the course
of the past four-and-a-half decade, governmentsattitudes towards MNE ac-
tivity or FDI have made a U-turn, with many countries competing to attract
FDI into their territories nowadays (UNCTAD, 2004).
The question naturally arises what has caused this remarkable change.
The answer to such a question is not likely to be found in one place, but the
rise of endogenous growth theory in the early 1990s (Romer, 1990; Grossman
and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1997) seems like a good starting
point. Following the endogenous growth tradition, research on economic
growth and development has increasingly focused on the role of knowledge
and technology as the key driver of the economic growth process. This in-
2
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terest in knowledge-based economics and growth has not been conned to
academic circles: The Lisbon goals, laid down in 2000 by the members of the
European Union (EU), testify of political awareness in this regard, as they
were aimed at making the EU the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-
based economy in the world. Simultaneously - and to some extent also as a
consequence of increased political interest - businesses all around the world
have put increasing e¤orts and resources into innovation and invention, as
witnessed for example by the increases in business Research and Development
(R&D) expenditures (OECD, 2007) and patent applications and grants (Ja¤e
and Trajtenberg, 2002).
A key feature of knowledge-based or innovation-based growth is the ex-
istence of knowledge spillovers (Romer, 1990). Simply stated, a knowledge
spillover is the "leakage" of knowledge from the party that generated it, to a
second party that is not directly involved in the generation of the knowledge
(a more appropriate denition in the context of this thesis is provided in
Chapter 2). Knowledge spillovers arise from the development and applica-
tion of knowledge, since knowledge is essentially a public good. This implies
that its use is both non-exclusive and non-rival: the application of an idea
by person A does not prevent person B from applying that same idea as well
(non-exclusivity). Moreover, once an idea is out there, the marginal cost of its
replication are negligible relative to the costs of its conception (non-rivalry).
3
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The fact that spillovers arise from the development and use of knowledge has
two major consequences: rst, it implies that some of the (economic) returns
to the development of knowledge are not appropriable by the innovator or in-
ventor. Second, the development of knowledge sets into motion a cumulative
chain of events, in which individuals can easily (and more or less costlessly)
build on existing knowledge to develop original ideas themselves. As such,
knowledge spillovers are a crucial mechanism in knowledge-based economic
growth and development.
Because of this importance of knowledge spillovers, a large amount of
literature has investigated their existence, the conditions under which they
arise, the mechanisms through which they occur and the (policy) implica-
tions that they entail. Two important contributors to this spillover literature
are Adam Ja¤e and Manuel Trajtenberg, who followed up on Zvi Grilliches
patent-project at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and
constructed a database containing the universe of all patents granted by the
United States Patent O¢ ce between 1960 and 1999, including all citations
made by and to these patents. Using patent citations as a (noisy) indica-
tor of knowledge spillovers, these authors demonstrated both the existence
and the spatial restrictiveness of knowledge spillovers (Ja¤e, Henderson and
Trajtenberg, 1993).
Given the importance of geography for knowledge spillovers, scholars be-
came increasingly interested in the mechanisms through which knowledge
might spill over between countries. In a seminal study on such international
knowledge spillovers, Coe and Helpman (1995) investigated the role of coun-
triesimports in mediating international knowledge spillovers between coun-
tries. The empirical methodology di¤ered markedly from the approach by
Ja¤e et al. (1993): instead of using patent citations as a measure of knowl-
edge spillovers, Coe and Helpman (1995) investigated changes in country-
level Total Factor Productivity (TFP) that resulted from increases in R&D-
related imports from abroad, while controlling for other (observable) deter-
minants of TFP. Their study demonstrated evidence of substantial import-
mediated international knowledge spillovers, as witnessed by increases in
TFP. Not only did this study spark a large empirical literature on interna-
tional knowledge spillovers, it also laid down the basic empirical methodology
on which much of the subsequent research would build.
4
1. Introduction
1.2 Foreign Direct Investment and knowledge
spillovers
After international trade had been shown to be an important mechanism for
international knowledge spillovers, it was only a matter of time before schol-
ars would focus their attention on the investments of MNEs as an alternative
conduit for knowledge spillovers. In general, MNEs are large, innovative and
R&D intensive companies (Markusen, 2002), which makes them very suit-
able as knowledge spillover mechanisms. Although earlier studies had already
picked up the issue in a limited amount of countries (Caves, 1974) or in case
studies (cf. Blomström and Kokko, 1998), large scale econometric investiga-
tions started to appear in the late 1990s and 2000s. Indeed, the (empirical)
literature on knowledge spillovers from FDI has taken an enormous ight in
recent years: a title-search on "spillovers from FDI" through google scholar
yields over 115 unique articles in the eld of business and economics at the
time of writing, more than half of which have appeared after 2000.
Given the enormous increase in FDI activity and the often large amounts
of money that governments spend on attracting it (as illustrated in Section
1.1), the obvious question is whether FDI indeed stimulates economic growth
and development through knowledge spillovers. Unfortunately, despite the
large amount of research on this topic, the academic literature has in general
not been able to provide an unambiguous and satisfactory answer to this
question. The extant literature paints a rather di¤use picture of the exis-
tence of knowledge spillovers from FDI: some studies have found evidence of
positive spillovers (Javorcik, 2004a), some do not nd any evidence (Van Pot-
telsberge de la Potterie and Lichtenberg, 1996)), and some even nd evidence
of negative spillovers (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Regular literature surveys
have conrmed this ambiguous state of a¤airs (Blomström and Kokko, 1998;
Görg and Greenaway, 2004), as we will see in Chapter 2.
This general lack of empirical evidence on the knowledge spillover e¤ects
of FDI is rather disturbing, given the large sums of money that governments
invest in attracting FDI. It could be argued that even if FDI does not gener-
ate knowledge spillovers, it at least entails other host-country benets, such
as the creation of new jobs, the generation of high-quality demand and supply
for local industries, and signaling e¤ects to potential other future MNE in-
vestors. Nonetheless, from a neoclassical economics standpoint, none of these
factors warrant government FDI policy, as they do not reect market failures
5
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that inuence MNE behavior. For instance, the lack of new job creation
might be the result of rigidities in the local labor market so that engaging
in FDI policy in order to create new jobs is not the rst-best solution in this
case. The same holds for solving problems of inter-industry linkages, and
the unattractiveness of countries or regions within countries due to regional
underdevelopment.
On the contrary, the existence of knowledge spillovers from FDI does
provide a legitimate reason for active FDI policy, since knowledge spillovers
create a gap between the private returns to FDI on the one hand, and the
social returns on the other. Specically, if a MNE is considering to invest
in a particular country, it only takes into account the returns it gets itself
on that investment (the private return), and not the additional returns that
the domestic economy may receive from it through knowledge spillovers (the
social return). If (positive) knowledge spillovers indeed occur, this implies
that the social return to FDI exceeds the private return. Accordingly, from
a social planners point of view, the MNE will in general invest too little,
or not at all, because it does not take into account the social returns. In
this case, active FDI policy which stimulates MNEs to engage in (more)
investment is warranted, as it aims to bridge the gap between private and
social returns. It is exactly because of this reason that the question whether
or not knowledge spillovers from FDI exist is such an important issue, not
only from a development perspective, but also from a policy point of view.
So indeed, the ambiguity regarding the empirical evidence on knowledge
spillover e¤ects from FDI is rather disturbing. In a nutshell, the primary
aim of this thesis is to resolve part of this ambiguity by considering the e¤ect
of an important but often ignored factor: heterogeneity between MNEs.
1.3 Thesis outline
Chapter 2 of this thesis will review some important recent contributions in
the literature on knowledge spillovers from FDI and conclude inter alia that
a number of these recent studies have started to acknowledge that MNEs
and their FDIs di¤er from each other in many di¤erent respects. More im-
portantly, these di¤erences appear to signicantly inuence the occurrence
and extent of knowledge spillovers from FDI, indicating that not taking them
into account may be a source of the empirical ambiguity. Given the promis-
ing results that existing studies in this area have yielded so far, combined
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with the fact that there still are many unexplored dimensions of MNE het-
erogeneity, the rest of the thesis sets out to investigate several forms of MNE
heterogeneity and their inuence on the occurrence of knowledge di¤usion.
Chapter 3 considers MNE heterogeneity in terms of their ownership share
in foreign subsidiaries and extends a vertical linkages model by Markusen and
Venables (1999) to include (a) di¤ering degrees of multinational (MNE) own-
ership in their foreign a¢ liates and (b) knowledge di¤usion, in addition to
demand and supply linkages. It investigates the intra- and inter-industry
e¤ects of changes in MNE ownership on local rmsproductivity via demand
linkages, price e¤ects and knowledge di¤usion. Moreover, it also considers
the mediating inuence of national intellectual property rights protection
(IPP). Given the ambiguous predictions of our model, we also investigate
these issues empirically in a panel of 1,549 large rms spread out over 20
countries and 18 manufacturing industries during the period 2000-2005. We
nd that in countries with low IPP, the occurrence of intra-industry pro-
ductivity e¤ects is conditional on the cost structure of local rms. Moreover,
inter-industry productivity e¤ects are largely absent. Conversely, in countries
with high IPP, both intra-industry and inter-industry productivity e¤ects are
high. Also, the relationship between productivity e¤ects and MNE ownership
varies both within and between industries, as well as between conditional and
unconditional productivity e¤ects.
In Chapter 4 we consider a second dimension of MNE heterogeneity, which
is the market orientation of MNEsforeign subsidiaries. Using data of US
MNEs operating in 8 industries and 13 OECD countries during 1987-2003,
we compare the productivity e¤ects of local-market-oriented FDI (horizontal
FDI) versus export-oriented FDI, with the latter being split into FDI oriented
at the parent rm (in the home country) on the one hand (vertical FDI),
and that at una¢ liated parties in third countries on the other hand (export
platform FDI). Given the expected di¤erential e¤ects of regional integration
on these di¤erent FDI types, we also consider their productivity e¤ects within
two regional agreements: The Canadian United States Free Trade Agreement
(CUSFTA) and the European Union (EU). The results demonstrate some
evidence of positive productivity e¤ects of horizontal FDI that are larger
than those of vertical FDI, but smaller than those of export-platform FDI.
There are also substantial di¤erences in e¤ects of these FDI types between
CUSFTA and the EU.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we follow up on a rather extensive literature on
heterogeneity in FDI motives, particularly in technology exploiting versus
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technology seeking FDI. Many earlier studies have argued that technology
exploiting FDI FDI aimed at exploiting a technological or competitive ad-
vantage  is undertaken by high-productivity leader rms, and technology
seeking FDI  FDI aimed at acquiring external knowledge or technology
abroad by low-productivity laggard rms. If this is indeed the case, the
implication is that FDI with a technology exploiting motive is more likely
to generate knowledge spillovers than technology seeking FDI. We start out
by constructing a model to investigate optimal technology seeking strategies
for leader and laggard rms. Our theoretical results indicate a large range of
equilibria in which leader rms seek technology through Foreign Direct In-
vestment (FDI) whereas laggard rms do so through exports. These results
are mainly explained by the fact that laggard rms are not only less pro-
ductive than leader rms, but also have less absorptive capacity and are less
skilled in transferring technology across rm units. Confronting these theo-
retical results with case studies, recent econometric evidence and some orig-
inal exploratory industry-level analysis, we nd broad overall support. This
nding thus implies that technology seeking FDI may just as well generate
knowledge di¤usion as technology exploiting FDI, given that both strategies
are followed by leader rms. We continue by empirically testing this propo-
sition, (again) using a new industry-level dataset of US MNEssubsidiaries,
active in 13 OECD countries over the period 1987-2003. Our results provide
support to the fact that both technology exploiting and seeking FDI lead to
knowledge di¤usion.
Alongside, the thesis also aims to address two other issues that arise in
the literature. The rst is the important but often neglected distinction
between knowledge spillovers on the one hand, and knowledge transfers on
the other hand. A knowledge spillover, as explained above, is essentially
an externality that arises from a market failure (i.e. the inability of the
innovator or developer of the knowledge to fully appropriate its returns).
Consequently, a knowledge spillover is an unintentional di¤usion of knowledge
which cannot be internalized by the di¤using party and therefore will result
in less than optimal investment in knowledge. In this case, government policy
intervention is warranted. In contrast, a knowledge transfer is an intentional
di¤usion of knowledge, often induced by an optimizing motive on behalf of
the di¤using party. For example, a MNEs foreign a¢ liate may intentionally
transfer knowledge or technology to its local suppliers in order to increase the
quality of its inputs, so that eventually the quality of its own products are
enhanced. In this case, there is no market failure as the MNE internalizes
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the knowledge di¤usion. Consequently, there is also no ground for policy
intervention. Throughout this thesis, we will stick to these two distinct
denitions of knowledge spillovers and knowledge transfers. We will refer to
both these processes collectively as knowledge di¤usion.
Second, as will also become clear in Chapter 2, much of the literature on
FDI knowledge spillovers has been empirical in nature. Theoretical contri-
butions have been heavily underrepresented. In those instances where theory
has been developed (Rodríguez-Clare, 1996; Glass and Saggi, 1998; Markusen
and Venables, 1999; Müller and Schnitzer, 2006), knowledge spillovers are
usually not the phenomenon of interest. Instead, many of these studies focus
on inter alia competition e¤ects, demand linkages, pecuniary spillovers or
knowledge transfers. Therefore, next to shedding more light on the empiri-
cal relevance of MNE heterogeneity in the knowledge di¤usion process, this
thesis will also develop and adapt economic theory to provide a theoretical
basis for these empirical exercises.
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Chapter 2
Collecting the pieces of the FDI
knowledge spillovers puzzle
2.1 Introduction
"In the face of di¢ culties associated with capturing spillover ef-
fects and the multitude of factors that can inuence the extent of
spillovers in each economy, we caution researchers about drawing
generalized conclusions about the existence of externalities asso-
ciated with FDI [...]." (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005: p. 47)
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the past decade or so has witnessed a huge
amount of research devoted to the investigation of knowledge spillovers from
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). At several points along the way, schol-
ars have paused to review the current state of a¤airs and take stock of the
evidence (Blomström and Kokko, 1998; Saggi, 2002; Görg and Greenaway,
2004). The verdict has usually been that we simply do not know. Expla-
nations for this diversity in results have mainly focused on methodological
and measurement issues (Görg and Strobl, 2001), but such an approach has
recently been disputed (Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2005). Indeed, the empirical
inconclusiveness has become so infamous that virtually every paper reviewed
in this chapter starts with this observation as its main motivation.
The literature has been developing into several directions in order to come
up with more detailed evidence that may help to explain the ambiguity in
0This chapter is an adapted version of Smeets (2008).
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Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of the FDI knowledge spillover process
earlier literature. The aim of this chapter is to review these contributions,
both theoretical as well as empirical, by structuring them around three com-
mon themes.1 By doing so, we hope to provide some structure in a rapidly
expanding eld of research, while at the same time trying to identify which
(combination of) approaches may yield promising research avenues. More-
over, more insight into the conditions under which knowledge spillovers from
FDI are most likely to arise is of crucial importance for developing countries
governments seeking these benets from FDI. Given the highly ambiguous
evidence on the existence of knowledge spillovers from FDI so far, the large
sums of money spent by governments to attract FDI (cf. Chapter 1) seem
highly dubious. Obviously, inward FDI can generate other benets such
as additional employment increases and knowledge transfer through e.g. li-
censes, but none of these e¤ects warrant active government policy as they
take place through market mechanisms. Accordingly, obtaining more insight
in the conditions under which knowledge spillovers from FDI occur (if they
occur) is also highly relevant from a policy perspective.
1Methodological developments in the empirical FDI spillover literature, such as ad-
vances in productivity estimation or methods to deal with the endogeneity of FDI, are not
considered in this chapter. However, they will be discussed when relevant in the subse-
quent chapters. Chapter 5 in Castellani and Zanfei (2006) contains a useful overview of
recent methodological advances.
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This chapter will be structured around Figure 2.1. This gure shows the
schematic FDI knowledge spillover process, together with the di¤erent pieces
of the puzzle that may a¤ect this process. We start out in Section 2.3 by
discussing research that has focused on the three arrows in the gure, which
represent three knowledge spillover channels. We then proceed to review the
evidence on the inuence of mediating factors in Section 2.4, focusing mainly
on absorptive capacity and spatial proximity, but also on intellectual property
rights protection and the extent of host-country competition. Section 2.5
deals with the e¤ect of FDI heterogeneity, and presents an overview of studies
that have investigated the role of ownership structure, parent rm nationality
and FDI motives as factors inuencing the extent of knowledge spillovers.
Section 2.6 concludes by pointing out how this thesis contributes to the
existing literature, and in particular how it relates to some of the ndings
presented in this chapter. However, we rst begin by briey reiterating and
illustrating the motivation for this thesis in Section 2.2.
2.2 Setting the stage
"Much econometric work has been done in this area [on knowl-
edge spillovers from FDI ], but the results on the importance of
spillovers are mixed at best." (Görg and Greenaway, 2004: p.
172)
The discussion in Chapter 1 suggests the following denition of a knowl-
edge spillover in the context of this thesis: Knowledge created by one rm
(i.c. a multinational enterprise - MNE), which is used by a second rm (i.c.
a local host country rm), and where the latter does not (fully) compensate
the former for this use (cf. Javorcik, 2004b: p. 607).2 Note that this deni-
tion does not include any pecuniary spillovers (nominal gains resulting from
the fact that quality increases are not fully reected in prices) or competition
e¤ects (changes in market structure due to MNE entry). More importantly,
it is also distinct from a knowledge transfer, which is purposeful or intended
di¤usion of knowledge from one rm to the other and as such represents no
externality.
2The terms FDI and MNE will be used interchangeably in this chapter, as a FDI
is essentially what distinguishes a multinational from a national rm (cf. Chapter 1).
However, note that this does not imply that FDI is also the best proxy to measure MNE
activity (Beugelsdijk et al., 2009)
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The literature has distinguished three main channels along which knowl-
edge may spill over from the MNE to a local rm (Saggi, 2006): demonstra-
tion e¤ects, which means that local rms imitate or reverse engineer MNEs
products or practices; worker mobility from the MNE to the local rm, so that
employees trained by the MNE can apply their knowledge in local rms; and
vertical linkages (upstream and downstream), which means that the MNE
spills over knowledge to its suppliers and customers (cf. Figure 2.1 above).
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, a lot of empirical research has tried to
identify the direction, size and scope of knowledge spillovers from MNEs on
local (host country) rms. A major problem for many of the econometric
studies in this eld is how to measure knowledge spillovers. The usual ap-
proach following Coe and Helpman (1995 - cf. Chapter 1) has been to
assume that knowledge spillovers will mainly a¤ect the receiving rms pro-
ductivity, so that they are often measured by changes in the receiving rms
productivity induced by MNE activity, while controlling for other (observ-
able) determinants of productivity.3
The rst major review of this empirical literature appeared in 1998 by
Blomström and Kokko. Many of the studies reviewed in their paper are
(multiple) case studies. One general nding is that most studies consider
the e¤ects of knowledge spillovers from MNEs through backward linkages,
i.e. to supplier industries. Knowledge spillovers across the other channels
are much less investigated. A second nding is that (multiple) case studies
tend to nd evidence of the existence of knowledge spillovers more often than
econometric studies do.
This observation is also made by Görg and Strobl (2001), who conduct
a meta-analysis of 21 econometric studies investigating knowledge spillover
e¤ects of FDI, in order to nd out if the ambiguity in results can (partially)
be explained by di¤erences in research designs, methodology and data. In
general, the econometric studies that are included in the analysis estimate
models of the following form:
yijt = 0 + 1FDIjt + 2Xit + 3Zjt + "ijt (2.1)
where yijt is some measure of productivity of rm i active in sector j at
time t, FDI is a measure of FDI presence, X is a vector of rm-level control
3Although this way of measuring knowledge spillovers may already raise a lot of ques-
tions and objections, these are not the focus of this chapter. Instead, we take standard
empirical practice as given and proceed from there.
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variables that are known to a¤ect y (such as own investments in R&D and
human capital) and Z is a vector of industry-level control variables (e.g.
market concentration).4
Görg and Strobls ndings indicate that cross-section studies in general
nd more signicant evidence of positive knowledge spillovers than panel
studies do, that the exact measurement of FDI inuences the results, and
that there exists a publication bias in favor of studies nding evidence of sig-
nicant positive knowledge spillovers.5 However, Lipsey and Sjöholm (2005)
demonstrate that when employing similar estimation techniques, on similar
data over similar time-periods but for di¤erent countries, results tend to di-
verge. This leads them to conclude that heterogeneity in host-country factors
are the most likely source of the inconclusiveness in empirical research (cf.
Section 2.4 below).
The most recent comprehensive survey of empirical research on knowledge
spillovers from FDI is by Görg and Greenaway (2004). These authors survey
no less than 40 econometric studies, mainly at the microeconomic level of
analysis. Their review clearly indicates that the empirical evidence is am-
biguous at best, with 20 cases nding evidence of positive spillovers, about
17 cases nding insignicant results and 8 cases nding evidence of signif-
icant negative knowledge spillovers.6 The studies that they review cover a
variety of di¤erent periods and countries, and applied research designs are
both cross-sectional and panel.7
4A couple of notes apply to model (2.1). First, di¤erent studies use di¤erent mea-
sures of productivity: Some look at total factor productivity while others consider labor
productivity, making comparisons more di¢ cult. Second, the endogeneity issue of FDI in
model (2.1) (i.e. FDI may be attracted to more productive countries, regions or sectors,
reversing the causal mechanism) is not always properly taken care of, which could bias the
estimation results.
5The fact that cross-section studies tend to nd more evidence of knowledge spillovers
than panel studies could indicate that unobserved rm heterogeneity is interfering with
the results in the studies of the former type.
6These add up to more than 40 cases because some studies contain more than one
empirical test.
7Keller (2004) provides an excellent survey of the wider literature on international
technology di¤usion, including knowledge spillovers from FDI.
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2.3 Opening the black box of FDI knowledge
spillover channels
"One of the drawbacks of these [empirical FDI spillover ] studies
is that they treat the specic mechanisms by which the spillovers
are supposed to occur as a black box." (Görg and Strobl, 2005:
p. 695)
As became apparent in the review of Blomström and Kokko (1998), apart
from (case) studies investigating knowledge spillovers from FDI through back-
ward linkages, none of the other spillover channels (the arrows in Figure 2.1)
have been explicitly considered in the empirical literature. Indeed, the gen-
eral empirical model as specied in (2.1) is the one mostly encountered in
econometric tests of knowledge spillovers from FDI. As has been argued by
other authors (e.g. Görg and Strobl, 2005), such an empirical specication
completely disregards the di¤erent knowledge spillover channels. As such,
it could very well be that FDI in (2.1) picks up a net e¤ect of FDI, e.g.
including adverse competition e¤ects (Aitken and Harrison, 1999).8 Conse-
quently, empirical research has increasingly been trying to take into account
the di¤erent spillover channels explicitly.
2.3.1 Vertical linkages
Many of the studies opening the black box of knowledge spillovers from FDI
have focused on knowledge spillovers through vertical linkages (cf. Hoekman
and Javorcik, 2006. See Lin and Saggi, 2005 and Saggi, 2006 for brief re-
views). When determining knowledge spillovers through backward linkages
we have to distinguish between knowledge transfer, i.e. purposeful knowledge
transmission from the MNE to its suppliers or customers, versus knowledge
spillovers, i.e. the pure knowledge externality. Most likely, the latter will
be a consequence of the former, since the local supplier or customer rm
can exploit the knowledge it has received from the MNE in its (vertical)
relationships with other rms.
8Of course, the existence of adverse competition e¤ects assumes that the MNE goes
abroad mainly to produce for the local market. I.e. it assumes that the market orientation
of FDI is mainly local instead of export-oriented, in which case adverse competition e¤ect
is less likely to occur, or in any case will be less severe (cf. Protsenko, 2003 and Chapter
4 of this thesis).
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Two relatively early theoretical contributions in this eld are Rodríguez-
Clare (1996) and Markusen and Venables (1999). Rodríguez-Clare focuses
on input demand-e¤ects of MNEs: He constructs a model with monopolistic
competition in the intermediates sector, which nationals rms and MNEs use
as inputs in their nal goods production. He further assumes that MNEs
nal goods are more complex (i.e. require a larger variety of inputs) and that
all rms have love-of-variety for inputs. Accordingly, the entry of a MNE
induces an increased demand for intermediate inputs, which establishes the
backward linkage. Due to monopolistic competition in this sector, the variety
of available inputs produced increases, and nal goods producers benet
due to the love-of-variety for inputs, which establishes the forward linkage
e¤ect.9 The Markusen and Venables model (discussed in greater detail in
the next chapter) has a similar setup. However, they explicitly consider the
intra-industry competition e¤ect (next to the linkage e¤ect) that a MNE
induces upon entry, whereas this is e¤ectively absent in Rodríguez-Clare,
who considers situations in which MNEs are the only rms producing in one
of the two countries. These two studies thus only look at pecuniary spillovers
and competition e¤ects of FDI, not at knowledge spillover e¤ects.
Lin and Saggi (2007) do explicitly consider vertical technology transfer
(VTT) through backward linkages, i.e. from MNEs to their local suppliers.
They assume that upon entry, a MNE can negotiate an exclusivity contract
with a number of local suppliers, implying that these suppliers are not allowed
to supply any of the local rms anymore. Only then will the MNE engage
in VTT. Yet applying our understanding of knowledge spillovers from FDI
through vertical linkages, this model does not consider knowledge spillovers
either.
Despite this apparent lack of theoretical research on pure knowledge
spillovers, there exist quite a number of empirical studies in this particu-
lar area. In general, all these studies estimate a modied version of model
(2.1):
9Hence, the forward linkage is conditional on the backward linkage. The extent to
which the backward linkage takes place largely depends on the input demand of the MNEs,
relative to that of the domestic rms they displace. This depends on the fraction of inputs
that is obtained from the host country (instead of imported from the home country), which
in turn depends on the complexity of the nal good, the ease of communication between
HQ and subsidiary, and the degree of similarity between the host and home country.
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yijt = 0 + 1FDIjt + 2k 6=j(
O
jkt  FDIkt) (2.2)
+3k 6=j(
I
jkt  FDIkt) + 4Xit + 5Zjt + "ijt
where y, X and Z are dened as in (2.1), Ojk is the share of output sold by
inudstry j to industry k, and Ijk is the share of inputs bought by industry
j from industry k. Furthermore, i indexes rms, j (k) indexes industry and
t indexes time.10 In this model, 2 thus captures the e¤ect of FDI in sector
k on the productivity of rm i in sector j , weighted by the share of output
owing from sector j to k, i.e. 2 captures backward linkages. By similar
reasoning, 3 captures forward linkages. 1 measures the e¤ect of FDI in
rm is own sector, which can be interpreted inter alia as a demonstration
e¤ect (cf. Section 2.3.3 below).
Javorcik (2004a) analyzes knowledge spillovers from MNEs through back-
ward and forward linkages in a panel of approximately 4000 Lithuanian rms.
She nds evidence of positive knowledge spillovers through backward link-
ages, but not through forward linkages. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) also
nd evidence of positive knowledge spillovers through backward linkages, but
only from MNEs that share ownership with local rms. Kugler (2006) ana-
lyzes inter-industry spillovers from FDI for eight Colombian manufacturing
sectors, and nds strong and robust evidence of backward linkages, whereas
forward linkages are largely absent. A similar result is obtained by Bwalya
(2006) for a sample of 125 Zambian manufacturing rms. Schoors and van
der Tol (2002) also nd evidence of positive knowledge spillovers through
backward linkages in Hungary, but negative spillovers through forward link-
ages. Moreover, they nd that these intersectoral e¤ects are statistically
more important than the intrasectoral e¤ect (1).
However, it is questionable whether these empirical studies actually mea-
sure knowledge spillovers and not knowledge transfer. Indeed, in a study of
over 100,000 Indonesian manufacturing establishments, Blalock and Gertler
(2007) nd evidence of local rm productivity increases through vertical
linkages with MNEs, which they motivate by explicitly referring to knowl-
edge transfers rather than spillovers from the MNE. Javorcik and Spatareanu
(2005) and Javorcik (2008) use survey data on the perceptions of managers in
10Although here we subscript the s with t as well, most studies do not have time
series data on input-output matrices, and instead use s for one xed year. Blalock and
Gertler (2007) is an exception.
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local Latvian and Czech rms and nd that intentional MNE assistance is an
important factor inuencing these local rmsproductivity. Pack and Saggi
(2001) provide a theoretical treatment of vertical technology transfer. These
studies clearly demonstrate the importance of knowledge transfer vis-à-vis
knowledge spillovers.
2.3.2 Worker mobility
A second channel through which knowledge spillovers can ow from MNEs
to local host country rms is through labor turnover. The line of reasoning
here is that the MNE is likely to provide (part of its) host country workforce
with a higher degree of training, education and valuable working experience
than the average local rm. If (part of) this workforce at some point in
time chooses to work in a local rm, or start up its own local company, it
can apply knowledge acquired in the MNEs subsidiary to the local rms
benet. Since the MNE is not compensated for this, it indeed constitutes a
knowledge spillover as dened above.
Fosfuri, Motta and Ronde (2001) were one of the rst to formally model
this channel of MNE knowledge spillovers. They construct a model in which a
rm has to choose between FDI and exports to serve the foreign market, and
needs to train a host country worker if it chooses the former. When training
is completed, both the MNE and a local rm can make a bid to acquire
the services of the trained local worker. Knowledge spillovers occur if the
local rm makes the higher bid. Such a situation is most likely to happen if
market competition is low and knowledge is easily transferable. The intuition
behind this qualication is that in this case there is a lot to gain for the local
rm by obtaining the knowledge, whereas the costs of training an additional
worker for the MNE are relatively low. Markusen and Tromenko (2009)
model worker mobility as a channel for knowledge spillovers in a general
equilibrium setting, in which they model the development of wages paid by
rms that attract experts from MNEs.
In empirical research on knowledge spillovers through worker mobility,
two models are generally encountered. The rst one is a rather straightfor-
ward extension of (2.1) and looks as follows:
yijt = 0 + 1S
M
it + 2Xit + 3Zjt + "it (2.3)
where i, j and t again index rm, sector and time respectively. In this case,
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SM denotes some measure of the presence of foreign workers, i.e. workers
that were previously employed by a MNEs subsidiary. If knowledge spillovers
di¤use through worker mobility, we would expect 1 to be positive.
A second empirical specication analyzes knowledge spillovers through
worker mobility at the individual level, by looking at wages. The general
specication in this case is:
wijt = 0 + 1S
M
jt + 2Xit + 3Zjt + "ijt (2.4)
where i, j and t index individual, rm and time respectively. w denotes
the (log of) the individual wage level. The underlying assumption is that
wages are strongly correlated with (marginal) productivity. Hence, positive
knowledge spillovers through worker mobility imply that 1 is positive.
Markusen and Tromenko (2009) empirically test their model predictions
along the lines of the model in (2.4), using plant-level data on a sample
of 304 Colombian manufacturing establishments employing ten workers or
more. Their empirical results largely support their model, showing that
hiring foreign experts increases the (real) wages of the hiring plant. This
e¤ect is both instantaneous (i.e. it occurs during the period of hiring) and
persistent (it remains even after the foreign expert has left the plant).
Other papers empirically testing knowledge spillovers through worker mo-
bility are scant. Görg and Strobl (2005) estimate a model similar to the one in
(2.3) in a panel of 228 Ghanaian manufacturing rms. Their results indicate
that an owners (of a local rm) previous experience with a MNE indeed in-
creases the local rms productivity, but only if that MNE is operating in the
same sector as the local rm. Moreover, having an owner that also received
explicit training in the MNE does not contribute signicantly to rm-level
productivity.11 Poole (2008) analyzes knowledge spillovers through worker
mobility at the worker-level, using data on Brazilian formal-sector workers
in a model similar to the one in (2.4). She nds that an increase in SM in-
creases wages, indicating that knowledge is spilling over from former MNEs
employees to national rms. Hale and Long (2006) investigate spillovers from
FDI in a sample of 1500 rms in ve Chinese cities. These authors also nd
evidence that an increase in SM increases rm productivity.
11Of course the question arises to what extent this result reects the more general
situation in which any foreign employee (not just the owner) hired by a local rm can spill
over knowledge.
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2.3.3 Demonstration e¤ects
Various denitions of demonstration e¤ects can be found in the literature
(cf. Cheung and Lin, 2004; Moran, Graham and Blomström, 2005). Here,
we follow Saggi (2002) who denes demonstration e¤ects as occurring through
the imitation and reverse engineering of MNEs products and practices by
local (host country) rms. This denition largely ts our understanding of
knowledge spillovers.
Many of the studies reviewed by Görg and Strobl (2001) and Görg and
Greenaway (2004) implicitly deal with knowledge spillovers through demon-
stration e¤ects, since the majority is looking for horizontal (i.e. intra-industry)
knowledge spillovers. By (Saggis) denition, demonstration e¤ects will mainly
occur through these horizontal spillovers. Hence, the general empirical spec-
ication looks like the one in (2.1). As discussed in Section 2.2, these studies
yield very conicting empirical results.
One problem in this respect is that none of these studies actually hy-
pothesize or specify in what way demonstration e¤ects take place. A study
by Cheung and Lin (2004) sheds a bit more light on this issue. They study
the e¤ect of FDI presence on patent applications in 26 provinces in China,
and distinguish between three types of patents: Invention patents (concern-
ing new technical solutions), utility patents (new technical solutions relating
to the shape or structure of a product) and design patents (new design of
shape or pattern). Their results show that increased FDI in a province has a
positive e¤ect mainly on design patents. Since the content of such patents is
most easily copied, they interpret this as evidence of demonstration e¤ects.
Moreover, this e¤ect is strongest in the coastal region, where the amount of
inward FDI is highest as well. The paper by Hale and Long (2006) discussed
in the previous section also nds some circumstantial evidence of demonstra-
tion e¤ects through network externalities.
2.3.4 Taking stock & discussion
The work on opening the black box of knowledge spillovers from FDI seems
a promising strand of research. Besides obtaining more detailed insights in
the exact mechanisms along which knowledge spillovers may come about, the
empirical results also seem to agree much more with each other than previous
black box research, as witnessed by Table 2.1. Nonetheless, a few concerns
remain.
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2. Collecting the pieces of the FDI knowledge spillovers puzzle
First, following our understanding of knowledge spillovers, theoretical
work on knowledge spillovers through vertical linkages is virtually absent.
Most studies consider only pecuniary spillovers, or knowledge transfer. Con-
tributions in this eld are much needed. As far as the empirical literature in
this eld is concerned, it is not always clear that they are actually measuring
knowledge spillovers instead of knowledge transfers. Although the distinction
may seem irrelevant from the host-countrys perspective, the policy implica-
tions in either of the two cases diverge heavily (Blalock and Gertler, 2005;
2007). If anything, empirical studies in this eld should at least be aware of
this potential bias.
Second, much of the inferred knowledge spillover e¤ects in the worker
mobility literature are based on wage developments, which assumes a very
strong relationship between (marginal) worker productivity and wages. To
the extent that workers are able to collectively bargain over their wages, de-
velopments in wage structure may be a misleading indicator of productivity
and knowledge spillovers. Moreover, to the extent that local rms are explic-
itly hiring and paying former MNE employees to provide training to their
own employees, any subsequent productivity e¤ect cannot be considered a
knowledge spillover according to the denition that we apply in this thesis
(cf. Castellani and Zanfei, 2006: Ch. 5). Hence, in this area too, scholars
should at the least be more aware of this issue.
Finally, research regarding the existence of demonstration e¤ects is less
developed, that is, without considering the extensive black box literature
on intra-industry knowledge spillovers from FDI. There are no real theo-
retical contributions in this eld, conceptually nor formally, and denitions
of demonstration e¤ects vary. This makes an empirical assessment rather
di¢ cult, since it is not clear ex ante through which mechanisms such demon-
stration e¤ects should take place. Therefore, more theorizing or conceptu-
alization on this topic seems necessary before anything substantial can be
expected from empirical research.
2.4 Mediating factors
"An explanation [for the diverse conclusions in FDI spillover
studies] that seems plausible is that countries and rms within
countries might di¤er in their ability to benet from the presence
of foreign-owned rms and their superior technology." (Lipsey
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and Sjöholm, 2005: p. 23)
A strand of literature, that has been around for some time now, has tried
to identify those mediating factors that are required for an e¤ective trans-
mission of knowledge spillovers. Such factors can thus be seen as necessary
conditions for knowledge spillover potential to turn into actual knowledge
spillovers. As such, absence (or presence) of these factors may crucially in-
uence observed knowledge spillovers, and not taking them into account can
bias empirical results.
Usually, these factors pertain either to the receiving party (i.e. the host
country, sector, region or rm) or to the relationship between the parties
involved. Probably the most well-known concepts in this eld are those
of absorptive capacity and spatial proximity. We will discuss these in the
following two subsections, followed by a brief review of some other mediating
factors.
2.4.1 Absorptive capacity & backwardness
In the general literature on the role of a rms, regions, industrys or coun-
trys own technology or productivity in capturing knowledge spillovers, two
alternative views exist. On the one hand, there are those that claim that
increased (technological) backwardness should enhance knowledge spillovers,
since the potential for knowledge spillovers is large in that case (Findlay,
1978; Wang and Blomström, 1992). On the other hand, it has been claimed
that rms need some minimum amount of absorptive capacity to be able to
capture knowledge spillovers (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990; Glass and
Saggi, 1998). Such absorptive capacity is created by investments in R&D or
human capital, and provides a basis of (fundamental) knowledge or technol-
ogy, necessary to assimilate and exploit external knowledge.
Some early contributors in this eld (implicitly) suggest a complemen-
tary relationship between backwardness (BW ) and absorptive capacity (AC).
Findlay (1978) argues that "[the] greater the backlog of available opportuni-
ties [...] the greater the pressure of change within the backward region [...].
Of course, the disparity must not be too wide for the thesis to hold" (p. 2).
This nal remark hints at the importance of some minimum level of AC.
Abramovitz (1986) states that "[...] a countrys potential for rapid growth is
strong not when it is backward without qualication, but rather when it is
technologically backward but socially advanced" (p. 388). Hence, he condi-
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tions the benets of BW on the presence of social capabilities. Although he
also states that such capabilities are hard to identify, again this hints at the
importance of some form of AC.
In the empirical literature on knowledge spillovers from FDI, the following
general model is encountered, although a lot of variations on this specication
exist:
yijt = 0 + 1FDIjtACit + 2FDIjtBWit + 3Xit + 4Zjt + "ijt (2.5)
where AC and BW are measures of absorptive capacity and backwardness,
respectively. Note that AC and BW are not always included simultaneously
in the model.
Gri¢ th, Redding and Simpson (2002) only consider the mediating e¤ect
of BW on knowledge spillovers from FDI in a sample of 13,000 UK manu-
facturing establishments They measure BW as frontier level TFP relative
to local establishment is TFP . Frontier level TFP is dened either as the
highest establishment level TFP at the 4-digit industry level at time t, or as
the average of the top 3 establishments with the highest TFP . Hence, an in-
crease in BW implies that establishment i is becoming more backward. Their
2 in model (2.5) is positive and signicant for both measures of BW , illus-
trating the importance of backwardness. Gri¢ th, Redding and Van Reenen
(2004) use a similar measure of BW at the country-industry level, but also
consider the e¤ect of AC. Their empirical results demonstrate that both BW
and AC show up positively and signicantly, indicating their simultaneous
importance.
Another study applying a similar measure of BW is Castellani and Zanfei
(2003), who dene BW as the ratio of the average TFP level of foreign rms
in 2-digit industry j, over rm is TFP level. AC is measured as rm is
TFP level. Estimating a model as in (2.5) they nd that only 2 shows up
positively and signicantly.
In a study of 7,516 UK companies, Girma (2005) specically investigates
the role of AC in capturing knowledge spillovers from FDI. His measure
of AC is a rms TFP level at time t   1, relative to the maximum level
of TFP in the rms 4-digit level industry in that period. So in fact, it
is more or less the inverse of the BW measure used in the three studies
above. He specically investigates non-linear e¤ects of AC in interaction
with FDI, inter alia by applying threshold regression analysis, and nds an
inverted U-shaped e¤ect: The knowledge spillover mediating e¤ect of AC is
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maximized at intermediate levels of AC. This nding is explained by the
fact that rms with very low AC are not able to absorb knowledge spillovers,
whereas those with very high AC are too close to the technological frontier to
benet from knowledge spillovers. This suggests an interior optimum value
of AC. However, using the same measure of absorptive capacity in a panel of
British rms in the electronics and engineering industries, Girma and Görg
(2007) instead nd evidence of a U-shaped e¤ect of absorptive capacity. This
nding is rationalized by referring to the interaction of positive knowledge
spillover e¤ects and negative competition e¤ects from FDI: At low levels of
AC local rms experience neither, but as AC starts to increase, rst only
the negative competition e¤ect will start to work. This intially depresses
productivity. Only after some threshold AC level has been reached will
the positive knowledge spillover e¤ect start to work, and gradually outweigh
the negative competition e¤ect. Grünfeld (2006) corroborates this result
theoretically.12
What, then, is the general conclusion regarding the mediating e¤ect of
BW and AC on knowledge spillovers from FDI? Comparing studies is di¢ -
cult, because they use di¤erent empirical specications and employ di¤erent
measures of BW and AC. Moreover, many of these studies disregard the
relation between backwardness and absorptive capacity.
An exception is Castellani and Zanfei (2003), who explicitly investigate
the correlation between BW and AC at the industry level. Recall that their
denition of BW is the ratio of the average TFP level of foreign rms in 2-
digit industry j, over rm is TFP level, whereas AC is measured as rm is
TFP level. Hence, AC is the denominator ofBW . Not surprisingly, they nd
an overall negative relationship between BW and AC. Unfortunately, when
running their empirical regressions they nonetheless ignore this relationship.
In terms of the model in (2.5), this implies that the marginal e¤ect of ACit
on yijt, is given by:
dyijt
dACit
= FDIjt

1 + 2
dBWit
dACit

(2.6)
This total derivative of yijt with respect to ACit shows that the marginal
12A nal noteworthy study is by Falvey, Foster and Greenaway (2007) who consider the
simultaneous e¤ect of BW and AC at the country level. However, they essentially estimate
an empirical growth model and focus on trade-related knowledge spillovers. Generally,
their results hint at the importance of BW over AC, although the results tend to vary
with the preferred specication and estimation method.
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e¤ect of ACit on yijt has both a direct component (1) as well as an indirect
component (through its e¤ect on BW ). Given that AC is the denominator
of BW , this implies that an increase in AC will work to reduce BW (i.e.
dBWit=dACit < 0). Hence even if the direct e¤ect of ACit (1) is positive,
its indirect e¤ect through BW (2  [dBWit=dACit]) is clearly negative (for
2 > 0).
The empirical disregard for the relationship between BW and AC applies
to all studies that simultaneously include measures of both. In general, if
BW is measured in terms of relative TFP levels and AC is measured in
terms of absolute TFP levels, R&D stocks, human capital, and so forth, the
knowledge production function literature (Griliches, 1979) suggests that a
relationship probably exists between BW and AC, which should be taken
into account empirically.
A simple way out of this problem is to use the AC measure of Girma
(2005) and Girma and Görg (2007), who measure absorptive capacity as the
inverse of backwardness: an increase in backwardness implies a simultaneous
and proportional decrease in absorptive capacity and vice versa. Absorp-
tive capacity as a relative concept also seems to make sense intuitively: as
Castellani and Zanfei (2003) show, high absolute levels of TFP (AC) may
still be accompanied by large technology gaps if foreign rms in the sector
also exhibit extremely high (average) TFP levels. In such a situation ab-
solute measures of AC probably do not capture actual absorptive capacity.
Finally, some studies estimate BW relative to frontier-level TFP , where
the frontier is the highest (average) TFP level of the relevant sector in gen-
eral. Because knowledge spillovers from FDI are investigated, however, it
seems more appropriate to consider the TFP of the relevant multinational
enterprises as the frontier.
2.4.2 Spatial proximity
A by now well-established empirical literature has been arguing that spa-
tial proximity (i.e. being geographically close to the MNE) is an important
condition for capturing knowledge spillovers from FDI. Reasons for the al-
leged relevance of geography can be traced back to the individual knowledge
spillover channels dealt with in Section 2.3. It has been argued (e.g. Girma
and Wakelin, 2007) that many of these channels have a clear spatial compo-
nent: e.g. the limited geographical mobility of labor implies that knowledge
spillovers through worker mobility are strongly localized.
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2. Collecting the pieces of the FDI knowledge spillovers puzzle
Theoretical work on the spatial dimension of knowledge spillovers from
FDI is sparse. Martin and Ottaviano (1999) and Baldwin, Martin, and Ot-
taviano (2001) introduce spatially bounded knowledge spillovers in a new
economic geography setting. Combining a two-region new economic geogra-
phy model (Krugman, 1991) with a Romerian-type endogenous growth model
(Romer, 1990), they investigate the inuence of spatially bounded knowledge
spillovers on growth rates in the two regions. Their results show that geog-
raphy (rm location) matters only for growth when knowledge spillovers are
spatially bounded. If spillovers are global, both regions grow at similar rates
in long-run equilibrium. Knowledge spillovers from multinational enterprises
are absent in these frameworks.
Ja¤e et al. (1993) and Ja¤e and Trajtenberg (2002) have made seminal
empirical contributions on the spatial dimension of knowledge spillovers (not
necessarily from FDI). By looking at patent citations while controlling for the
fact that innovation activity itself may be localized, they show that knowl-
edge spillovers are localized at various levels (country, state, and metropoli-
tan statistical areas). Audretsch and Feldman (1996) show that geographic
clustering of innovative activity is more pronounced in knowledge-intensive
industries.
Keller (2002) attaches a number to the spatial decay of knowledge spillovers
from R&D in the group of ve large industrial countries to nine European
countries. He nds the half-lifeof knowledge spillovers (i.e. the distance
it takes for half of total knowledge spillovers to be eroded) to be about 1,200
kilometers. Bottazi and Peri (2003) nd an even stronger localization ef-
fect of knowledge spillovers in the EU-15, where the e¤ect of regional R&D
(inputs) on the number of patents (outputs) vanishes beyond 300 kilometers.
Although a wide body of literature exists on the spatial dimension of
knowledge spillovers, specic applications to knowledge spillovers from FDI
are still relatively limited. The empirical specication in (2.1) can be ex-
tended to incorporate a regional e¤ect:
yirt = 0 + 1FDIrt + 2 [wsFDIst] + 3Xit + 4Zrt + "irt s.t. r 6= s (2.7)
where r and s index region. Hence, 1 measures the e¤ect of FDI within
the same region as rm i, whereas 2 measures the e¤ect of FDI located in
other regions than rm i. Sometimes, the e¤ect of this latter type of FDI is
weighted by a matrix w incorporating the distance between region r and s.
Zrt is a vector with region-specic characteristics (e.g. region size in terms of
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population or GDP). If knowledge spillovers from FDI are spatially bounded,
we would expect 1 to be positive, and 2 to be insignicant.
Barrios, Bertinelli, and Strobl (2006) construct an index that measures
the extent to which local rms and multinational enterprises coagglomerate
within counties in Ireland. They nd that productivity e¤ects of FDI are
positive and signicant only in counties that show a positive and signicant
degree of coaglommeration.
Girma and Wakelin (2007) distinguish 10 regions that roughly correspond
to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 1 (NUTS 1) classica-
tion in the European Union.13 Their results indicate that the productivity
of domestic plants is positively a¤ected by FDI within but not outside the
region (both weighted and unweighted by distance).
Nicolini and Resmini (2007) document positive knowledge spillover e¤ects
on regional (domestic) TFP from multinational enterprises located in the
same region and negative spillover e¤ects from the presence of multinational
enterprise in other regions.
2.4.3 Intellectual Property Rights
Two o¤setting e¤ects make the relation between the strength of intellectual
property rights and the extent of knowledge spillovers from FDI ambigu-
ous. Strong intellectual property rights induce multinational enterprises to
transfer more and higher quality knowledge to their subsidiaries, thereby
increasing knowledge spillover potential, but they make it more di¢ cult to
capture knowledge spillovers (for example, through imitation). The net e¤ect
is not clear a priori.
Markusen (2001) studies the e¤ect of changes in intellectual property
rights protection on welfare and spillovers in a host developing country. He
nds that if the multinational enterprise cannot write an enforceable contract
with a local agent, increased intellectual property right protection makes
spillovers less likely. Glass and Saggi (2002) show that increased intellec-
tual property right protection in developing countries has a similar e¤ect on
multinational enterprises and national rms in industrial countries, so that
FDI does not become relatively more attractive.
13NUTS provides a single uniform breakdown of territorial units for the production of
regional statistics for the European Union. NUTS 1 denotes the broadest level, NUTS 3
denotes the most disaggregated one.
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Most empirical research considers only the e¤ect of intellectual property
rights on the volume or composition of FDI or on the incentives for intrarm
technology transfer. Javorcik (2004a) investigates the e¤ect of intellectual
property rights on the composition of inward FDI in the Russian Federation
and ve countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Branstetter, Fisman, and
Foley (2006) analyze the e¤ect of intellectual property rights protection on
technology transfer from 1,000 U.S. multinational enterprises to about 5,000
of their foreign a¢ liates in 16 developing countries. The implication of their
results for FDI knowledge spillovers are not clear.
Feinberg and Majumdar (2001) analyze the knowledge spillover e¤ects
of FDI in a sample of 65 domestic rms and 30 multinational enterprises
operating in the pharmaceuticals sector in India during the 1980s and early
1990s, when intellectual property rights protection in the sector was report-
edly weak. They nd virtually no evidence of knowledge spillovers. This
nding could be considered circumstantial evidence that weak intellectual
property rights protection does not stimulate knowledge spillovers from FDI.
Indeed, Allred and Park (2007) conclude that there exists an optimal and
positive degree of intellectual property rights protection that stimulates dif-
fusion of knowledge from multinational enterprises.
2.4.4 Competition in the host country or sector
Blomström, Globerman and Kokko (2001) argue that greater competition
may induce multinational enterprises to transfer more (high-quality) tech-
nology to their subsidiaries, increasing the potential for knowledge spillover.
Theoretical models by Glass and Saggi (1998), Wang and Blomström (1992),
and others show that this may be the case. Empirical studies do not appear
to have explicitly studied the mediating e¤ect of host-sector competition on
knowledge spillovers from FDI.14
2.4.5 Taking stock & discussion
Research on the knowledge spillover-mediating roles of absorptive capacity
and technology gaps remains inconclusive. Comparing studies is di¢ cult be-
14Kathuria (2002) examines the e¤ect of liberalization of Indian industries between 1989
and 1997 on knowledge spillovers from FDI. Although liberalization increased competition
in general, the reforms applied mainly to trade liberalization. The e¤ect on knowledge
spillovers occurred mainly through higher FDI.
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cause of di¤erences in methodologies and measurement. Future empirical
research might benet from convergence in denitions of absorptive capacity
and backwardness. It may also be useful to start thinking about absorptive
capacity as a relative concept (Girma 2005; Girma and Görg 2007). Inves-
tigating the nonlinear mediating e¤ects of these factors also seems to be a
promising direction for future research (Girma 2005; Girma and Görg 2007;
Falvey et al., 2007).
Specic applications regarding the spatial dimension of knowledge spillovers
from FDI remain limited; more theoretical work on this topic is needed. Are
there reasons to believe that the spatial dimension of knowledge spillovers
from FDI will di¤er from that of knowledge spillovers in general? The an-
swer hinges on the specic spillover channel being considered. Knowledge
spillovers transmitted through worker mobility are likely to be restricted
geographically. The implications are less obvious for knowledge spillovers
through vertical linkages and demonstration e¤ects, because both supplier
and customer relations and imitation and reverse engineering may easily
cross national or regional borders. Studies investigating the spatial dimen-
sion of knowledge spillovers from FDI might benet from clearly spelling
out the spillover channels of interest and carefully considering their spatial
dimension.
The inuence of intellectual property rights regimes on FDI knowledge
spillovers seems to be an important but neglected issue. More theoretical and
empirical research is needed that analyzes the impact of intellectual property
rights regimes directly on knowledge spillovers rather than indirectly through
intrarm technology transfer. Since the e¤ect of intellectual property rights
on knowledge spillovers is not clear a priori (because of o¤setting mechanisms
on spillover potential and appropriability), a great deal of insight can still be
gained.
2.5 Multinational heterogeneity
"To advance the literature on FDI spillovers, the questions "What
kind of FDI?" and "What is the nature of MNC activity in the
local market?" need to be addressed." (Feinberg and Keane, 2005:
p. 269)
A third stream of research acknowledges the heterogeneity of multina-
tional enterprisesforeign activities and the e¤ect on FDI knowledge spillovers.
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Some studies examine the relation between multinational enterprise owner-
ship and knowledge spillovers. Others examine the relation between the
nationality of the foreign investor or FDI motives and knowledge spillovers.
2.5.1 Ownership of the MNE
Müller and Schnitzer (2006) study the theoretical relation between knowledge
spillovers and MNE ownership when the MNE engages in an international
joint venture (IJV) with the host-country rm. They document a trade-
o¤ in which a larger ownership share induces the multinational enterprise
to transfer more technology to its subsidiary, increasing spillover potential
but reducing the extent to which the host-country rm is exposed to the
technology. The actual relation between multinational enterprise ownership
and knowledge spillovers may turn out to be an empirical matter
Empirical research usually distinguishes between minority FDI (the MNE
holds a minority share in the foreign a¢ liate) and majority FDI (the MNE
holds a majority share in the foreign a¢ liate):
yijt = 0 + 1Min_FDIjt + 2Maj_FDIjt + 3Xit + 4Zjt + "ijt (2.8)
where Min_FDI andMaj_FDI measure the amount of minority and ma-
jority FDI in sector j. Some empirical studies (see below) use a distinction
between Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) versus shared subsidiaries, and
sometimes the intersectoral e¤ects of di¤erent types of FDI are investigated
as well.
Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) were among the rst researchers to con-
sider this relation empirically. Their study of 13,663 Indonesian manufac-
turing rms reveals that both minority and majority FDI lead to spillovers,
with no statistical di¤erences between the estimated e¤ects.
Dimelis and Louri (2002) consider a sample of 4,056 Greek manufacturing
rms. In separate regressions they analyze the relation between multinational
enterprise ownership and knowledge transfer (to the local a¢ liate) and the
relation between multinational enterprise ownership and knowledge spillovers
(to other local rms). The results broadly conrm the theoretical predictions
of Müller and Schnitzer (2006): only majority-owned foreign a¢ liates experi-
ence increases in productivity as a result of knowledge transfer, and minority
FDI is more likely than majority FDI to produce knowledge spillovers.
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Javorcik (2004b) analyzes a panel of about 4,000 rms in Lithuania, dis-
tinguishing between horizontal (intra-industry) and vertical (interindustry)
spillovers. She nds that rms that are owned by both the foreign investor
and a local rm create backward knowledge spillovers (to supplying indus-
tries), while wholly owned subsidiaries do not. She nds no evidence of
horizontal or forward knowledge spillovers or statistical di¤erences between
the e¤ects of minority and majority FDI.
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) analyze a panel of 13,129 Romanian
rms. They nd that shared foreign and domestic ownership induces pos-
itive vertical spillovers and negative horizontal spillovers. Wholly owned
subsidiaries do not induce vertical spillovers and induce larger negative hori-
zontal spillovers. These negative e¤ects are explained by adverse competition
e¤ects.
Abraham, Konings, and Slootmaekers (2007) analyze the relation between
minority- and majority-owned FDI and knowledge spillovers in an unbalanced
panel of 17,645 plants in China. Their results show that minority FDI has a
negative (competition) e¤ect on locally owned enterprisesproductivity and
that majority FDI has no e¤ect. The e¤ect of minority FDI on foreign-owned
enterprises is positive and larger than that of majority FDI.
2.5.2 Nationality of the parent company
Some recent studies argue that the nationality of the foreign investor a¤ects
the knowledge spillover e¤ects of FDI. Most studies in this eld consider
FDI in China, comparing the e¤ects of FDI from Hong Kong, China; Macau,
China; and Taiwan, China, (HMT_FDI) on the one hand and fromWestern
countries (OTHER_FDI) on the other hand. The specication is similar
to the one in model (2.8), with Min_FDI and Maj_FDI replaced by
HMT_FDI and Other_FDI.
Buckley, Clegg, and Wang (2007b) argue that HMT_FDI is less tech-
nologically advanced than FDI from outside China. As a result, although ini-
tial increases in such FDI may induce positive spillover e¤ects, beyond some
threshold level the negative competition e¤ect starts to dominate. They
therefore predict a nonlinear spillover e¤ect of increased FDI from these
sources. This contrasts with the positive linear e¤ect of FDI from Western
countries (the knowledge spillover e¤ect is expected to dominate, because
it carries more advanced technology). Their empirical analysis of 130 Chi-
nese industries conrms their expectations: FDI from outside China has the
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expected (linear) positive e¤ect (albeit only in high-technology sectors).
Buckley, Clegg, and Wang (2007a) investigate the relation betweenHMT
_FDI and OTHER_FDI and productivity in a sample of 158 Chinese
industries, taking into account receiving rmsand industriescharacteris-
tics. They nd that such FDI generates more knowledge spillovers in labor-
intensive industries and that FDI from outside China generates more knowl-
edge spillovers in technology-intensive industries.
Abraham, Konings, and Slootmaekers (2007) show that the spillover ef-
fects of both minority and majority FDI from Hong Kong, Macau and Tai-
wan on locally owned enterprises are larger than those from FDI from other
countries. The opposite holds for knowledge spillovers to foreign-owned en-
terprises.
Javorcik, Saggi, and Spatareanu (2004) compare the upstream knowledge
spillover e¤ects of FDI from Asian, European, and American (North and
South) enterprises in a panel of 50,957 Romanian rms. They posit three
reasons to expect weaker knowledge spillover e¤ects from FDI from the Euro-
pean Union: the European Union is located closer to Romania, Romania was
engaged in a preferential trade agreement with the European Union during
the period of investigation, and inputs sourced from home-country suppli-
ers by EU subsidiaries comply with Romanias rules of origin, which is not
the case for Asian or American subsidiaries. All these mechanisms make
knowledge spillovers through vertical linkages less likely for EU subsidiaries,
because they stimulate imports of intermediate inputs from the European
Union. The results conrm their expectations: FDI from Asia and Amer-
ica has positive vertical (upstream) knowledge spillover e¤ects on Romanian
rms. The e¤ect is negative for FDI from the European Union, which the au-
thors explain by pointing to increased competition in the downstream sector
in which multinational enterprises are operating.
Girma andWakelin (2007) distinguish between inward FDI into the United
Kingdom from Japan, which accounts for the majority of R&Dintensive in-
ternational companies in the electronics industry; from the United States,
which has long invested in the British manufacturing industry; and from
other countries. Their results indicate that Japanese and other international
rms produce signicant and positive knowledge spillover e¤ects, whereas
U.S. rms do not have a discernible spillover e¤ect. The authors hint at
the relatively high R&D-intensity of Japanese FDI as an explanation for this
result.
In sum, many of the studies distinguishing between the nationality of sub-
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sidiariesparent companies are in fact looking at relative home-host country
or industry characteristics, such as R&D intensities, or labor and capital
intensities of production. They then theorize about the expected e¤ects of
such di¤erences on the existence and extent of knowledge spillovers from
FDI, and investigate these expectations empirically. Consequently, the fo-
cus on the MNEs nationality is somewhat misleading, and potentially less
informative than the characteristics that are actually investigated.
2.5.3 Motives for FDI
Most of the studies discussed above assume that FDI has knowledge spillover
potential, i.e. that the rms engaging in FDI do so to exploit a technolog-
ical or other ownership advantage abroad, part of which may spill over to
the host country. This type of FDI is known as technology-exploiting FDI
(Kuemmerle, 1999; Le Bas and Sierra, 2002). Most of the traditional litera-
ture on FDI refers to this type of investment (Hymer, 1960; Dunning, 1977;
Markusen, 2002).
Scholars have recently pointed out a di¤erent type of FDI - technology-
seeking FDI - which is motivated by a desire to source or seek external
foreign knowledge (Dunning and Narula, 1995; Kuemmerle, 1999; Fosfuri
and Motta, 1999; Siotis, 1999; Le Bas and Sierra, 2002). Firms engaging in
technology-seeking FDI try to capture knowledge spillovers from rms in the
host countries in which they invest. Knowledge spillovers are expected to
ow from local rms to the multinational enterprise instead of the other way
around.
A few studies investigate knowledge spillovers by distinguishing between
these types of FDI. The empirical model is similar to that in model (2.8), with
technology-exploiting and technology-seeking FDI substituted forMin_FDI
and Maj_FDI. In a panel study of 11 manufacturing sectors in the United
Kingdom, Dri¢ eld and Love (2007) nd that technology-sourcing FDI did
not generate knowledge spillovers, whereas technology-exploiting FDI did.
Girma (2005) obtains similar results.
FDI can also be classied as horizontal (Markusen, 1984), vertical (Help-
man, 1985), or export platform (Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen, 2007). Hor-
izontal FDI is usually motivated by market-seeking incentives, vertical FDI
by e¢ ciency- or resource- seeking incentives, and export-platform FDI by the
desire to nd an e¢ cient location from which to export more protably to
third countries. The extent of knowledge spillovers from these types of FDI
36
2. Collecting the pieces of the FDI knowledge spillovers puzzle
may di¤er (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005; Dri¢ eld and Love, 2007).
Protsenko (2003) examines the spillover e¤ects of horizontal and verti-
cal German FDI in the Czech Republic. He nds that vertical FDI gener-
ates positive knowledge spillovers, whereas horizontal FDI has e¤ects largely
through increased competition. These results suggest that the distinction be-
tween horizontal, vertical, and export-platform FDI is potentially important
in determining the extent of knowledge spillovers.
2.5.4 Taking stock & discussion
The work on the relation between multinational enterprise ownership and
knowledge spillovers has strong intuitive appeal, because it seems likely that
not all types of subsidiaries (minority, majority) generate the same knowledge
spillovers. Theoretical work in this area is scant, however; more insights are
needed to guide empirical work.
The empirical results obtained so far are di¢ cult to compare, because they
take slightly di¤erent approaches. A fruitful extension in this area, particu-
larly in theoretical work, would be to consider the inuence of multinational
enterprise ownership along a continuum. Instead of analyzing the spillover
e¤ect of di¤erent categories of subsidiaries (minority, majority), researchers
might analyze the inuence of actual ownership shares (0100 percent) on lo-
cal rmsproductivity. Such an approach would allow researchers to analyze
nonlinear e¤ects.
Studies distinguishing between the country-origin of FDI often do so
based on a variety of economic rationales (such as di¤erences in expected
R&D intensities, or di¤erences in local input sourcing). Future research
should investigate whether these more general underlying economic ratio-
nales can be used to distinguish di¤erent types of FDI, instead of the more
specic country of origin. Such an approach may both stimulate the devel-
opment of more theoretical research in this area, as well as a more general
empirical application.
Distinguishing FDI motives may contribute to a better understanding
of the likelihood of knowledge spillovers from FDI. Theoretical models in
this eld have looked only at the relation between FDI motives and rm
heterogeneity. A useful extension would be a model in which the extent of
knowledge spillovers is endogenously determined by rmsmotives in pursu-
ing FDI. Also more empirical research is needed that directly investigates this
relation: Although the few studies reviewed above indicate that technology-
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seeking FDI does not generate knowledge spillovers, more recent empirical
research indicates that this type of FDI may at least have a large potential
of doing so (Feinberg and Gupta 2004; Cantwell and Mudambi 2005).
Finally, more research investigating the di¤erential knowledge spillover
e¤ects of horizontal, vertical, and export-platform FDI, or more generally,
the di¤erences in market orientation of FDI, is also warranted. Not only do
di¤erences in market orientation have di¤erent implications for potentially
adverse competition e¤ects, they may also a¤ect the input sourcing decisions,
thereby a¤ecting the extent of knowledge di¤usion through backward link-
ages. Furthermore, given that export-market oriented FDI is by denition
aimed at producing for foreign markets, its subsequent knowledge di¤usion
e¤ects through forward linkages are by denition largely absent.
2.6 Conclusion
"If country and industry di¤erences are important to the im-
pact of inward FDI on host countries, the main lesson might be
that the search for universal relationships is futile." (Lipsey and
Sjöholm, 2005: p. 40)
With so many dimensions and so many factors at the country, sector,
regional, and rm level inuencing the relation between FDI and knowledge
spillovers, the search for universal relations may well be futile. This does not
imply that the search for knowledge spillovers from FDI is futile, however.
The studies surveyed in this chapter that explicitly investigate the indi-
vidual knowledge spillover channels identied in Figure 2.1 (and summarized
in Table 2.1) all seem to conclude that knowledge spillovers from FDI do
occur through these channels (except through forward linkages). Explicitly
taking into account these knowledge spillover channels seems to be an im-
portant step forward in this literature.
The literature on mediating factors and FDI heterogeneity is inconclusive,
at least partly because of the lack of comparability across studies caused by
di¤erences in methodologies and measurement. Several changes could im-
prove results. First, researchers could move toward convergence, for example,
by uniformly measuring absorptive capacity as a relative concept or measur-
ing multinational enterprise ownership along a continuum rather than as a
categorical variable.
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Second, any study of knowledge spillovers should specify the channels
analyzed. Such an approach would clearly delineate the possible role of
mediating factors or FDI heterogeneity. For example, the relevance of the
spatial dimension as a mediating factor for knowledge spillovers strongly
depends on the spillover channels considered; di¤erent types of FDI may
work through di¤erent channels to di¤erent extents.
Third, deeper insight into the (conditional) existence of knowledge spillovers
from FDI is not likely to come from any of the outlined approaches individu-
ally. Spillover channels, mediating factors, and FDI heterogeneity coexist and
interact in determining the extent of knowledge spillovers. Theoretical and
empirical research should therefore try to address them simultaneously (Wei
and Lui, 2006; Liang, 2008). Does the importance of absorptive capacity for
capturing knowledge spillovers through demonstration e¤ects vary with the
degree of multinational enterprise ownership? Is the spatial dissipation of
knowledge spillovers through backward linkages di¤erent for horizontal and
vertical FDI? These kinds of interrelated questions should guide future work
on this topic, and they will also underly the next chapters of this thesis as
far as the data allow.
Specically, this chapter has demonstrated that the interest for the het-
erogeneity of MNEs and its implications for knowledge spillover e¤ects is a
timely and promising strand of research. In Section 2.5 we have identied
a number of questions and issues that so far have remained unaddressed
in the literature, and that we will pick up in the remainder of this thesis.
Chapter 3 considers the relationship between MNE ownership over its foreign
subsidiaries and the productivity e¤ects it generates, with MNE ownership
measured on a continuum. Here, we will also investigate whether di¤erences
in MNE ownership a¤ect the extent of horizontal and vertical productivity
e¤ects di¤erently, and in which way the strength of Intellectual Property
Rights protection impacts on these relationships. Given the limited work
on the market-orientation of MNEs and the associated productivity e¤ects
as identied in Section 2.5.3 (horizontal, vertical and export platform FDI),
Chapter 4 investigates this dimension of MNE heterogeneity. Again, we will
consider both the horizontal and the vertical productivity e¤ects of FDI,
and additionally, we will also investigate the mediating impact of geography
through Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) on these e¤ects. Finally,
in Chapter 5 we contribute to the literature linking FDI motives for tech-
nology exploitation and sourcing to the productivity e¤ects it generates. We
make both a theoretical contribution by allowing for alternative technology
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exploiting and seeking strategies, as well as an empirical contribution by
introducing alternative ways of distinguishing between the FDI types.
Two important overarching issues need to be noted. First, empirical work
too often ignores the conceptually important distinction between intentional
knowledge transfers and unintentional knowledge spillovers. As Blalock and
Gertler (2005, 2007) and Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) clearly show, many
of the estimated e¤ects are more likely related to knowledge transfer than
knowledge spillover. From a policy perspective this distinction is very impor-
tant: whereas the existence of knowledge spillovers (which are externalities)
clearly warrants interventionist government policy, the existence of knowl-
edge transfer (which takes place through market mechanisms) clearly does
not.15 Mistakenly assigning the benecial productivity e¤ects of FDI to
knowledge spillovers may convince governments of many developing coun-
tries to undertake costly and wasteful FDI policies. Future empirical work
on this topic should be very careful in labeling estimated positive e¤ects of
FDI as spillovers and even more careful in deriving far-reaching (costly) pol-
icy implications from them. In the remainder of this thesis, we will always
be explicit about the distinction between the pure knowledge spillover and
the other e¤ects generated by FDI that together make up the productivity
e¤ect.
Second, a wide gap remains between theoretical and empirical research
(one exception is Alfaro and Rodríguez-Clare, 2004). Theory and empirics
have developed more or less independently. In many of the areas reviewed
above, more theoretical work is needed. The denition and functioning of
demonstration e¤ects, the spatial dimension of knowledge spillovers from
FDI in interaction with di¤erent spillover channels, and the relation between
various motives for FDI and knowledge spillovers are just a few of the areas
in which theory to guide future empirical work has been lacking. Chapters
3 and 5 will try to ll this gap by developing explicit formal theoretical
frameworks.
15If backward knowledge transfers increase competition in supplying industries, reduc-
ing prices on intermediate goods and end products, the wealth of consumers in the host
country rises, so that the social returns of knowledge transfer exceed the private returns.
In this case interventionist government policy could be warranted, as Blalock and Gertler
(2007) note.
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Chapter 3
Multinational Ownership,
Intellectual Property Rights
and Knowledge Di¤usion from
Foreign Direct Investment
3.1 Introduction
As noted in the previous chapter, academic research has increasingly taken
into account the heterogeneity of multinationals (MNEs) and their foreign
subsidiaries, attempting to better disentangle the conditions under which
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) induces knowledge spillovers. Whereas FDI
used to be treated as a rather bulky and homogeneous concept, scholars have
started to acknowledge the heterogeneity of MNEs in inter alia investment
motives, market orientation and country of origin, and the subsequent con-
sequences for host-country knowledge spillovers.
As discussed in Section 2.5.1, a particularly promising strand of research
has considered di¤erences in MNE ownership over foreign a¢ liates as a de-
termining factor of knowledge spillovers. There are several theoretical and
empirical grounds on which the extent of MNE ownership in its subsidiaries
might inuence the host-country productivity e¤ects in generates. For in-
stance, internalization theory suggests that increased MNE ownership over
a foreign a¢ liate induces the parent to transfer more proprietary knowledge
15This chapter is based on Smeets and De Vaal (2008).
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or technology abroad, thus increasing the potential for knowledge di¤usion
(Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982; Davies, 1992). Moreover, studies on MNE
input sourcing suggest that increased MNE ownership has consequences for
the extent of local input sourcing, thus a¤ecting the extent of backward link-
ages (Tavares and Young, 2006; Javorcik, 2008).
The empirical studies discussed in Section 2.5.1 usually distinguish mi-
nority from majority ownership (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999; Dimelis and
Louri, 2004), or shared ownership from fully owned subsidiaries (Javorcik,
2004a; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008) and indeed nd that the distinction
matters. However, as mentioned in Section 2.5.4, none of these studies con-
siders the e¤ect of MNE ownership as a continuous parameter, which veils a
lot of the potential variation. Moreover, we also found that although some
theoretical studies investigate the relationship between intra-rm knowledge
transfer and MNE ownership (Müller and Schnitzer, 2006), theoretical con-
tributions on the relationship between MNE ownership and intra and inter-
industry knowledge di¤usion are largely absent.
This chapter rst deals with the latter shortcoming in the literature: We
introduce shared ownership between a MNE and a local (host-country) part-
ner in the foreign subsidiary as a variable of interest in a theoretical model by
Markusen and Venables (1999), and then consider its host-country intra and
inter-industry e¤ects. Specically, in addition to considering only pecuniary
externalities, as is common in most theoretical models, we also consider ac-
tual knowledge di¤usion. In doing so, the analysis explicitly considers two
forms of knowledge di¤usion: First, knowledge spillovers, which are unin-
tended knowledge ows (i.e. externalities) from the MNE to its host-country
environment. Second, knowledge transfers, which are intended (and internal-
ized) ows of knowledge from the MNE to its host-country environment. A
nal contribution of this chapter is that it also considers institutional hetero-
geneity - notably intellectual property rights protection (IPP) - and how this
interacts with the two types of knowledge di¤usion just mentioned. As such,
it deals with yet another caveat in the literature, as mentioned in Section
2.4.3.
Our theoretical results demonstrate the opposing inuences of pecuniary
e¤ects, direct and indirect demand e¤ects, and knowledge di¤usion on domes-
tic rms, following from an increase in MNE ownership in foreign a¢ liates.
Nonetheless, we are able to derive some (conditional) unambiguous predic-
tions: We nd that forward or downstream host-country e¤ects following
an increase in MNE ownership are generally positive, provided that there is
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su¢ cient downstream competition. In this way, our ndings also add to the
relatively limited literature on the mediating e¤ects of host-country compe-
tition (cf. Section 2.4.4). Backward or upstream e¤ects are also positive in
countries with high IPP, provided that inter alia downstream demand elas-
ticities and local input shares are su¢ ciently high. The intra-industry e¤ects
are generally positive in low-IPP countries, provided that the share of xed
costs in total costs of domestic rms is su¢ ciently high.
This chapter also takes these theoretical predictions to the data. It em-
ploys a rm-level panel dataset, containing 1,222 large domestic rms and
327 foreign subsidiaries with varying degrees of MNE ownership, active in 20
countries and 18 industries during the period 2000-2005. Unlike earlier em-
pirical studies, we treat MNE ownership as a continuous parameter instead
of as a dichotomous concept. Our theoretical ndings on the inter-industry
e¤ects are largely conrmed by the data. The empirical results on the intra-
industry e¤ects are not entirely in line with the theoretical expectations,
which we argue might be due to specic assumptions in the model. Gener-
ally speaking, the empirical results suggest that high-IPP countries are better
able to reap the benets of MNE investment than low-IPP countries.
The empirical part of the chapter also provides two methodological ad-
vantages over some of the earlier studies already undertaken in this area (cf.
Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999; Dimelis and Louri, 2002; Javorcik, 2004a;
Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008). First, unlike earlier studies, we utilize a
cross-country sample which allows us to investigate how institutional hetero-
geneity (such as di¤erences in IPP regimes) interacts with the relationship
between MNE ownership and host-country productivity e¤ects. Second, in
stead of considering dichotomous or discrete di¤erences in MNE ownership
(e.g. minority versus majority, or shared ownership versus full ownership),
we treat MNE ownership as a continuous variable in the empirical part as
well. Given the ex ante theoretical ambiguity of the relationship between
MNE ownership and knowledge di¤usion, next to the usual parametric re-
gression techniques we also employ semi-parametric regression techniques
which allows us to refrain from specifying a specic functional form regard-
ing the relationships of interest.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 develops
the theoretical model, based on Markusen and Venables (1999) and extends
it with the theoretical elements mentioned above. Section 3.3 analyzes the
within and between industry-e¤ects of changes in MNE ownership on local
rms, and how these e¤ects depend on the extent of IPP. Section 3.4 outlines
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the empirical method and gives an overview of the data used in this chapter.
Section 3.5 presents the estimation results of the empirical model. Finally,
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The model
Before discussing the setup of the model, it is instructive to consider Figure
3.1 below, which presents a schematic representation of the theoretical model.
A MNE sets up a shared foreign subsidiary in sector k in the host economy
to produce for and sell to the local market. As such, it competes with local
rms that are also active in sector k, but at the same time it also spills over
knowledge to these rms. These are intra-industry or horizontal knowledge
spillovers. The industry the MNE invests in may be a downstream industry
receiving inputs from local rms in j as indicated by situation A or an
upstream industry delivering inputs to rms in industry l as indicated by
situation B. If situation A is at hand, local rms active in sector j supply
the foreign subsidiary and local rms in sector k with intermediates, but at
the same time also receive knowledge transfer from the foreign subsidiary,
e.g. through supplier assistance (Javorcik, 2008). This type of knowledge
transfer is called backward or upstream knowledge transfer. If situation B
is relevant, the foreign subsidiary and local rms in sector k function as
input suppliers themselves, selling intermediates to local rms in sector l. Si-
multaneously, these local sector l rms may receive knowledge transfer from
the foreign subsidiary, e.g. in the form of increased input quality (Javor-
cik, 2008). Whichever situation occurs, these types of knowledge transfer
are inter-industry or vertical in nature. In addition to vertical knowledge
transfer, changes in the demand and supply of goods along the input and
output linkages will cause backward and forward demand e¤ects, leading to
pecuniary spillovers.
In what follows we will rst focus on part A of Figure 3.1. That is, we
will rst consider the situation in which the MNE has a shared subsidiary in
the downstream sector (k) of the host economy and receives supplies from
the upstream sector (j). After having derived the model for this setup, we
will also indicate how the model changes when considering part B, where the
foreign subsidiary is active in the upstream sector (k), supplying local rms
in the downstream sector (l).
In our model there are two types of rms: Multinationals (m) and na-
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Figure 3.1: Schematic representation of horizontal and vertical linkages
tional rms (n), where the latter can be further classied as local partners
(lp), downstream rms (d) and upstream rms (u). We assume that MNEs
require a local partner to set up a foreign subsidiary in the host country:
The resulting shared subsidiary can be thought of as an International Joint
Venture (IJV ).16 This IJV competes with the downstream rm d, and both
of them are supplied by the upstream rm u.
The theoretical model below builds on and extends Markusen and Ven-
ables (1999). These authors develop a multi-sector partial equilibrium model,
where they analyze the e¤ect of MNE entry in a downstream industry on the
number of local rms active in upstream and downstream industries. The
e¤ects of MNE entry work via competition e¤ects and demand linkages (lead-
ing to pecuniary externalities). Our setup resembles theirs in a number of
16A couple of remarks apply here: First, note that we assume that the MNE needs
a local partner, i.e. we do not model the decision between a greeneld versus a shared
subsidiary nor the search process for a suitable partner. Second, even though the shared
subsidiary may be thought of as an IJV , we assume that the national rm is completely
absorbed in the partnership and does not have any remaining operations of its own. From
that perspective, the partnership may have more resemblance to a partial acquisition.
Third, we assume that there is always a su¢ cient supply of local partners.
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ways: We also utilize a two industry setup, in which each industry is char-
acterized by Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition. Further, we also look
at pecuniary externalities via demand linkages between the upstream and
downstream industries. Yet our model also di¤ers from theirs on several im-
portant aspects: First, we introduce shared ownership between the MNE and
a local partner in the foreign subsidiary, as investigating the e¤ect of a change
in MNE ownership on the productivity of local rms is the primary focus of
this paper. Second, next to pecuniary spillovers, we also introduce direct and
explicit knowledge di¤usion. Moreover, we disentangle these knowledge dif-
fusion e¤ects into knowledge spillovers (horizontal) and knowledge transfers
(vertical), and consider their contingency on IPP protection. Finally, we do
not consider the e¤ect of MNE entrance or ownership on the entry or exit
of local rms, by keeping the number of rms constant when taking total
derivatives (cf. Section 3.3).
Recall that we rst consider part A of Figure 3.1, where IJV s are active
in the downstream industry (together with local downstream rms d) and
are supplied by local upstream rms u. We model the price index of the
inputs produced by local upstream rms in CES fashion and denote it by:
PU =
 
nup
1 
u
1=(1 )
(3.1)
where nu are the number of local upstream rms, pu are individual prices of
upstream inputs and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two
input varieties. Suppose for the moment that total demand for inputs from
the downstream sector is given by I. Then, multiplying PU by I gives total
costs of input supply, or equivalently, total expenditures on inputs. Hence,
we can apply Shephards lemma to derive demand for individual inputs xu:
xu = p
 
u IP

U (3.2)
In the downstream sector we have a similar industry structure, but here
both national rms and IJV s are active. Hence, the price index in the
downstream sector is given by:
PD = (ndp
1 "
d + nIJV p
1 "
IJV )
1=(1 ") (3.3)
where nd (nIJV ) is the number of local rms (IJV s) active in the downstream
sector, pd (pIJV ) are the prices these rms charge, and " > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution between any two varieties. The volume of total consumer
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demand for these downstream products is given by Y and total expenditure
on downstream goods is given by Y P D where  is the elasticity of demand
with respect to the price index PD. Similar to Markusen and Venables (1999),
we assume that " >  > 1. Again applying Shephards lemma we obtain
individual demands:
xd = p
 "
d Y P
" 
D (3.4)
xIJV = p
 "
IJV Y P
" 
D
On the production side of the economy we have IJV s and national rms,
of which the latter are active both in the same sector as the IJV , as well
as in upstream and downstream sectors (Figure 3.1 - part A). First consider
the prot function of the IJV which is given by:
IJV = pIJV xIJV   (FIJV + IJV xIJV ) [PU + (1  )w] (3.5)
where p denotes price, x denotes output, F are xed costs,  are marginal
production costs, w is the wage rate of labor, and  is the share of inputs
sourced from the upstream sector (0    1). Note that the amount of
inputs sourced from the upstream sector depends on the amount of xed
costs and variable costs. The remaining share (1 ) is spent on labor as an
additional production factor.
As mentioned, the IJV is a partnership between a MNE (m) and a local
partner (lp). We assume that the contribution of both rms in terms of
technology and knowledge to the IJV is proportional to their ownership
shares in the IJV, which is given by  for the MNE and (1   ) for the
local partner. These contributions translate into the xed and marginal
production costs of the IJV and are modelled as follows:
FIJV = Fm + (1  )Fn (3.6)
IJV = m + (1  )n
where we assume Flp = Fd = Fu  Fn, i.e. xed costs of all national rms
are equal, regardless of their type, and similarly for . In line with earlier lit-
erature (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999; Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004),
as well as with the rm characteristics in our own sample (see Section 3.5.1),
we assume that Fm < Fn and m < n i.e. the MNE is more productive
than a national rm, both in terms of xed costs as well as marginal costs.
Hence, the larger the ownership share of the MNE in the IJV , the lower
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IJV xed and marginal costs will be, which is in line with the literature on
internalization or transaction costs and technology transfer (Davies, 1992).
A key issue of this chapter is the nature and extent of knowledge di¤usion
from the IJV to the national rms. As explained at length in Chapters 1 and
2, we make an explicit distinction between unintended knowledge spillovers
on the one hand, and intended knowledge transfer on the other. This distinc-
tion is especially important in the present context, since we conjecture that
the type of knowledge di¤usion is contingent on the direction of di¤usion,
i.e. horizontal or vertical.
Specically, we argue that knowledge spillovers from the IJV are most
likely to ow horizontally, i.e. to downstream rms d active in the same sec-
tor, for the IJV has nothing to gain from intentionally transferring knowledge
or technology to its competitors. Moreover, since these rms are active in
the same sector, their absorptive capacity can be expected to be relatively
high. Intentional knowledge transfers on the other hand, are more likely to
ow vertically, i.e. from the IJV to local upstream rms u (in situation A
of Figure 3.1), since the IJV will benet from this by increased quality or
decreased prices of inputs. Indeed, there exists ample evidence of MNEs that
assist their suppliers in terms of technology transfer, or transfer of best prac-
tices or quality standards (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005; Javorcik, 2008).17
In the context of knowledge di¤usion, the extent of IPP also becomes
relevant (Branstetter, Fisman and Foley, 2006) since the purpose of IPP is to
reduce knowledge spillovers. As a consequence we may expect opposite e¤ects
of IPP on (horizontal) knowledge spillovers on the one hand, and (vertical)
knowledge transfer on the other hand: if IPP functions properly, horizontal
knowledge spillovers should be reduced. At the same time however, due to
the decreased risk of expropriation of knowledge, this increases the incentives
for the IJV to (vertically) transfer knowledge. Hence, upstream knowledge
transfer should increase with IPP.18
As we have assumed that MNE knowledge transfer to the IJV takes e¤ect
through xed and marginal costs, it is only natural to assume that knowledge
di¤usion from the IJV to downstream and upstream rms will also a¤ect
their xed and marginal cost structures. Hence, for local downstream rms,
17We do not consider explicit learning within the IJV by any of the two parties involved
(for an analysis of this type, see Müller and Schnitzer, 2006).
18Apart from the theoretical relevance of introducing IPP in this manner, its opposite
e¤ects on knowledge spillovers and transfers also help us to interpret our hypothesized
di¤erence between horizontal and vertical knowledge di¤usion empirically.
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we model xed and marginal costs after spillovers as:
F Sd = Fd + (1  )FIJV (3.7)
Sd = d + (1  )IJV
where  is a parameter capturing the strength of Intellectual Property Rights
protection (IPP), with  = 1 denoting perfect protection and  = 0 no pro-
tection whatsoever. Hence, spillovers are maximized when  = 0, implying
that the xed and marginal cost structures of IJV s can be copied perfectly.
For intentional knowledge transfers from the IJV to upstream local rms
we then have:
F Tu = (1  )Fu + FIJV (3.8)
Tu = (1  )u + IJV
Note that because knowledge transfer is intentional (as opposed to spillovers)
the IJV is more willing to transfer its technology as the extent of IPP in-
creases ( increases), since the risk of expropriation is very small in that case
(Branstetter et al., 2006).
The local upstream rm has the following formulation for prots:
u = puxu   (F Tu + Tuxu)w (3.9)
We can derive the equilibrium price for the upstream rm by substituting
equilibrium demand (3.2) into (3.9) and maximize prots, which yields:
pu =
Tuw
(   1)
It directly follows from this expression that MNEs benet from technology
transfer to upstream rms, since this decreases Tu and hence decreases input
prices pu.
Local downstream rms have the following prot function:
d = pdxd   (F Sd + Sdxd)(PU + (1  )w) (3.10)
the interpretation of which is similar to that of the IJV.19 The equilibrium
19Note that we assume (unlike Markusen and Venables, 1999) that IJV = d = :
Although it has been argued that MNEs (or IJV s) will potentially source less of their
inputs in the host-country, we have no way of distinguishing between IJV and d in
the empirical part of the paper, so that we prefer the current specication. However, we
will come back to the implied relationship between  and  when discussing the empirical
results in Section 3.5.
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pricing condition is found by substituting xd from (3.4) into (3.10) and max-
imizing prots:
pd =
"Sd (PU + (1  )w)
("  1)
Note that on top of the knowledge spillovers through Sd , the backward de-
mand linkage fromMNEs to upstream rms poses an additional benet to the
local downstream rm as it serves to decrease PU as well, which constitutes
an (indirect) forward linkage.
Finally, for the IJV we obtain a similar pricing condition:
pIJV =
"IJV (PU + (1  )w)
("  1)
We can now close the model by also writing down derived demand for the
upstream rms products, which is generated by the input demand from the
IJV and the domestic rm in the downstream sector:20
I = nIJV (FIJV + IJV xIJV ) + nd(F
S
d + 
S
dxd) (3.11)
So far, we have only considered part A of Figure 3.1, i.e. the situation
in which the IJV is active in the downstream sector generating horizontal
intra-industry e¤ects as well as upstream or backward e¤ects through inter-
industry linkages. In order to analyze downstream or forward linkages, we
also consider the situation in which the IJV is active in the upstream indus-
try (together with local rms) and supplying local rms in the downstream
industry. That is, part B of Figure 3.1.21 Because the model remains largely
20Coming back to our earlier remark, we again note that we refrain from deriving free
entry (i.e. zero prot) conditions, but instead assume that these are fullled in both
sectors. A potential problem in this case is that the cost structure of the two rm types
in the downstream sector (IJV s and ds) di¤er. Specically, given that IJV s are more
e¢ cient than ds, imposing a zero-prot condition for ds would imply positive prots for
IJV s. In order to prevent this situation from ocurring, we assume that any resulting
positive prots from IJV s are absorbed by added coordination costs between the MNE
and its local partner.
21We already noted above that in the model setup discussed so far, we do have indirect
forward linkages to the downstream local rms which are contingent on the upstream
linkage, since they will be a¤ected by changes in PU induced by changes in MNE ownership
in the IJV (). However, in the empirical section, we will also investigate the direct
forward linkages, i.e. the linkage e¤ects of an IJV directly supplying local rms, so that
we also have to consider this case theoretically.
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the same, except for the fact that the IJV switches industries, we will not
fully write it down here (see Appendix A to this chapter). However, note that
in this case it is the upstream rm that benets from knowledge spillovers,
whereas the downstream rm benets from knowledge transfer. This also
implies that the moderating e¤ects of IPP change accordingly. In the next
section we will analyze the comparative static e¤ects of a change in MNE
ownership in the IJV () on the prots of local rms for both situations A
and B.
3.3 Intra and inter-industry e¤ects of MNE
ownership
3.3.1 IJVs in the downstream sector
Since our main interest in this chapter concerns the e¤ects of MNE ownership
in the IJV () on local rms through demand linkages, price e¤ects and
knowledge di¤usion, we investigate the e¤ect of  on local rms prots.
In order to do this, we compute total derivatives with respect to  while
assuming that all other variables remain unchanged. First consider the e¤ect
of MNE ownership in the downstream industry on upstream rmsprots:
du
d
=
p1 u P

U

BL1|{z}
?0
+
pu

PE1|{z}
<0
+KT1|{z}
>0
(3.12)
where BL1, PE1 and KT1 are a backward linkage e¤ect, a price e¤ect and a
knowledge transfer e¤ect respectively, the full expressions of which are given
in Appendix B1.
The knowledge transfer e¤ect KT1 is straightforward: An increase in
MNE ownership in the IJV increases explicit knowledge transfer to the up-
stream rm by decreasing xed and variable costs, increasing upstream rms
prots. Moreover, the larger the IPP (i.e. the larger ), the larger is this
positive e¤ect.
The negative upstream price e¤ect PE1 is due to our assumption of homo-
geneity of upstream rms and their interrelationships, so that all upstream
rms are a¤ected by an increase in  in the same way. Specically, the
decrease in Tu following an increase in  decreases upstream prices pu. Al-
though that would ceteris paribus increase demand for upstream products,
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this positive e¤ect is o¤set by the reduction in the price index of the up-
stream industry PU following a decrease in pu. The only e¤ect that remains
are lower operating prots per rm, since marginal costs and hence prices
have decreased. This e¤ect is stronger the larger is  due to increased knowl-
edge transfer.
The e¤ect of  through the backward demand linkage (BL1) has three
components in du=d (see Appendix B1). First, there is a negative indirect
knowledge spillover e¤ect, which occurs because of the increase in knowledge
spillovers to the local downstream rm as a result of an increase in , making
downstream rms more e¢ cient. This implies less demand for xu since less
inputs are needed to produce the same output. Also note that the negative
e¤ect of knowledge spillovers is moderated by the extent of IPP: The larger
, the smaller knowledge spillovers to the local downstream rm and hence,
the smaller its negative inuence on demand for intermediate inputs. This
adds to the positive direct e¤ect of  through KT1.
Second, there are positive downstream demand e¤ects, induced by the
change in demand for downstream rm products after an increase in . Since
xed and marginal costs of downstream rms are reduced, as well as the fact
that input prices PU go down, prices for downstream products fall, inducing
an increase in demand for downstream products and accordingly also for up-
stream inputs. The impact of  on this e¤ect is twofold: On the one hand, an
increase in  decreases knowledge spillovers to local downstream rms, thus
limiting the price decrease of these rms and limiting the increase in derived
input demand. On the other hand, an increase in  raises knowledge transfer
to the upstream rm, lowering input prices and hence downstream prices,
thus increasing derived demand for inputs again. However, this latter e¤ect
is a second order e¤ect (i.e. it only takes place after the knowledge transfers
to upstream rms have found their way into higher demand for downstream
products) so that in this case, IPP will most likely exert a negative e¤ect on
u.
The third e¤ect which takes place through the backward demand link-
age (BL1) is a downstream price e¤ect. As we will see below as well (when
analyzing dd=d) an increase in  decreases individual prices of all down-
stream rms, and thereby also the price index PD. That is to say, an increase
in  eventually decreases per rm revenue in the downstream sector. This
in turn has a negative impact on derived demand for upstream inputs and
accordingly on upstream prots.
We now turn to the national rm in the downstream industry (i.e. the
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competitor of the IJV ). Recall that two clear di¤erences with the upstream
rm are that (i) the downstream rm is not vertically linked with the IJV
and (ii) knowledge di¤usion occurs through knowledge spillovers rather than
knowledge transfer. Computing the total derivative of d with respect to 
yields:
dd
d
= ("  )pd
"
xd
PD
PE2|{z}
<0
+KS1|{z}
>0
+ IDL1| {z }
>0
(3.13)
where PE2, KS1 and IDL1 are a price e¤ect, a knowledge spillover e¤ect,
and an indirect demand linkage e¤ect respectively (the explicit expressions
are relegated to Appendix B2).
First, the price e¤ect (PE2) works through the price index PD. Due to
the increase in , IJV cost structures improve because of increased intra-
rm knowledge transfer, making IJV s more competitive. Moreover, since
the increase in  also increases horizontal knowledge spillovers, contingent
on the lack of IPP (1  ), each individual national rm in the downstream
industry is confronted with a decrease in PD, a decrease in per rm revenue,
and hence a decrease in prots.
Second, there is the direct knowledge spillover e¤ect (KS1), occurring
through the xed and marginal cost structure and again contingent on the
absence of IPP protection (1  ). This e¤ect is obviously positive.
Finally, the downstream national rm also prots from the vertical linkage
between the IJV s and the upstream rms, albeit in an indirect way via PU
(IDL1). Indeed, since backward knowledge transfer from the IJV to the
upstream rm increases with  (see above), national downstream rms are
confronted with lower input prices PU . The extent of this positive indirect
linkage is contingent on the input share  as well as on the extent of IPP .
Regarding the latter, this poses a counteracting force to the direct knowledge
spillovers from the IJV to the downstream rm: To benet more from these
spillovers, the downstream rm requires a lower  (rst-order), but to benet
from lower input prices, it requires a higher  (second-order).
3.3.2 IJVs in the upstream sector
Now we will consider the situation in which the IJV s (and local rms) are
active in the upstream sector, hence supplying local rms in the downstream
sector (situation B in Figure 3.1). The analysis is similar to the one before,
but recall that in this situation the local upstream rms benet from knowl-
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edge di¤usion through knowledge spillovers, whereas the downstream rms
receive MNE knowledge through knowledge transfer. First consider the e¤ect
of an increase in  on local upstream rmsprots (the explicit formulations
are relegated to Appendix B3):
du
d
=
pu

(IDL2| {z }
<0
+ PE3|{z}
<0
) +KS2|{z}
>0
(3.14)
As before, there are three e¤ects: An indirect demand linkage e¤ect (IDL2),
a price e¤ect (PE3) and a knowledge spillover e¤ect (KS2). First, the in-
direct demand linkage takes e¤ect as a result of an increase in knowledge
transfer from the IJV to the local downstream rms. As they become more
e¢ cient, the derived input demand decreases, lowering upstream rmsprof-
its. Moreover, the higher IPP (i.e. the higher ), the more knowledge is
transferred downstream and the larger the negative e¤ect on u. Second,
and similar as before, the price e¤ect occurs because knowledge spillovers to
local upstream rms and knowledge transfer by the MNE to the IJV a¤ect
all rms in the upstream sector simultaneously. This lowers the price index
PU and thus also per rm revenue. Moreover, the extent to which knowl-
edge spillovers add to this e¤ect is larger the lower . Third, the knowledge
spillover e¤ect obviously increases upstream prots, and this e¤ect becomes
stronger the lower is .
Finally, for local downstream rms we now have (the explicit formulations
are relegated to Appendix B4):
dd
d
= PE4|{z}
<0
+KT2|{z}
>0
+ FL1|{z}
>0
(3.15)
We can distinguish a price e¤ect (PE4), a knowledge transfer e¤ect (KT2)
and a forward linkage e¤ect (FL1). The negative price e¤ect occurs because
all downstream rms are similarly a¤ected by knowledge transfer and de-
creased input prices. That is, they all become more productive and charge
lower prices, thus decreasing per rm revenue. Note that  has an ambigu-
ous e¤ect on this mechanism: On the one hand, it magnies the negative
e¤ect through increased knowledge transfer, but on the other hand it reduces
it through decreased knowledge spillovers to upstream rms (and hence, a
smaller decrease in input prices). The knowledge transfer e¤ect obviously
increases downstream rm prots, and the more so the higher is . Finally,
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the forward linkage e¤ect occurs because knowledge spillovers from the IJV
to local upstream rms, as well as knowledge transfer from the MNE to the
IJV , decrease input prices for downstream rms, thus increasing their prof-
its. In this case, an increase in  has an unambiguously negative e¤ect, as it
serves to decrease knowledge spillovers.
3.3.3 Signing the e¤ects
All total derivatives derived contain e¤ects that are opposite in sign. More-
over, as can be seen from the expressions in the Appendix, deriving condi-
tions under which their sign is unambiguous is not straightforward for most
of these derivatives. A lot of this ambiguity is caused by the often opposing
e¤ects of IPP (). Indeed, as it turns out, many of the expressions sim-
plify substantially when considering the extreme cases, i.e. when  = 0 or
 = 1. In Table 3.1 below we summarize the signs of the total derivatives,
also considering the cases in which  = f0; 1g. The derivations can be found
in the relevant Appendices. After deriving the signs of the various expres-
sions, we will empirically explore the insights regarding the horizontal and
vertical e¤ects of MNE ownership on local rms in the remainder of the chap-
ter. Moreover, the cross-country nature of our rm panel also allows us the
empirically investigate the derived e¤ects of di¤erences in IPP.
First consider the e¤ects through backward linkages, i.e. du=d with
MNEs downstream in (3.12). When  is variable or when  = 0, the e¤ect of
a change in  on upstream prots is indeterminate in (3.12). However, given
that the conditions in Table 3.1 are met, the e¤ect is unambiguously positive
for  = 1. Obviously,  = 1 indicates perfect IPP and upstream knowledge
transfer by the MNE is at its maximum, ceteris paribus maximizing the posi-
tive e¤ect of KT1 in (3.12). Moreover, the condition implies that the positive
e¤ect is more likely (i) the smaller are total variable costs relative to total
xed costs in the downstream industry (the LHS of the condition), (ii) the
larger is  and (iii) the larger is . The latter e¤ect is caused by the fact that
a higher  - implying a more price-sensitive demand for downstream products
- translates the downstream price decrease (due to a decrease in PU following
increased knowledge transfer) into higher demand for downstream products,
and thus also higher derived demand for upstream intermediates. This e¤ect
in turn is larger, the larger is the intermediate input share of downstream
rms . The rst e¤ect occurs through the backward demand linkage BL1:
since downstream xed costs are only a¤ected through knowledge spillovers,
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whereas marginal costs both through knowledge spillovers and price e¤ects,
the total negative e¤ect on upstream rms of these combined e¤ects will be
lower, the smaller are variable costs relative to xed costs.
Next consider the e¤ects through forward linkages, i.e. dd=d with
MNEs upstream in (3.15). The table shows that in all cases, " > 2 is a
su¢ cient condition for this derivative to be positive. The reason for this is
that although the negative price e¤ect PE4 in (3.15) becomes more severe
when downstream products become better substitutes (i.e. when " is higher),
at the same time also the positive impact of both KT2 and FL1 are relatively
more pronounced; the resulting downstream price decreases that follow from
them have a larger impact on rm prots when " is higher. These two positive
e¤ects consistently outweigh the negative e¤ect of PE4 when " > 2.
Finally, in order to consider the intra-industry e¤ects of a change in ,
we have to consider both dd=d with MNEs downstream, as well as du=d
with MNEs upstream. In our model, we have looked at these two cases
separately, but in reality MNEs will simultaneously serve as downstream
(customer) rms for some local companies, and as upstream (supplier) rms
for others. First consider dd=d with MNEs downstream: We see that in
both the extreme cases ( = 0; 1) its sign is unambiguously positive. The
reason is that in both cases, one of either two positive e¤ects in (3.13) is
maximized, which more then compensates the remaining negative e¤ect of
PE2. Specically, when  = 0, KS1 is maximized and when  = 1, IDL1 is
maximized. For du=d with MNEs upstream, we see a conditional positive
e¤ect when  = 0 and an unconditional negative e¤ect when  = 1. The
latter is obvious: If  = 1, KS2 in (3.14) is zero, so that only the negative
e¤ects of IDL2 and PE3 remain. When  = 0, the negative e¤ect of IDL2
disappears and the e¤ect of KS2 is maximized. The condition states that the
larger xed costs are relative to marginal costs (or more precisely: the more
important the e¤ect of knowledge di¤usion on xed rather than marginal
costs) the more likely it is that du=d > 0. The reason is that the negative
price e¤ect PE1 only works through marginal costs, whereas the positive
knowledge spillover e¤ect KS2 works both through xed and marginal costs.
Taken together, these e¤ects imply that horizontal (intra-industry) e¤ects of
increasing  are positive if  = 0 and xed costs are large relative to marginal
costs, whereas they are ambiguous if  = 1.
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3.4 Data and methodology
3.4.1 Method
Although our theoretical model derives predictions regarding the relationship
between rm prots and MNE ownership, the extant literature on knowledge
di¤usion from FDI usually considers the e¤ect of MNE presence on local
rmsproductivity. In order to enhance comparability of our results, we also
follow this approach in the empirical section of the paper. Moreover, from
the prot functions in Section 3.2 it is clear that there exists a positive and
proportional relationship between rm productivity and rm prots.
The empirical model that we will estimate takes a form similar to model
2.2 in Chapter 2:
yijkt = 0 + 1Horizontaljkt + 2Backwardjkt + 3Forwardjkt(3.16)
+4Xit +Dj +Dk + "ijkt
where i, j, k and t index rm, industry, country and time (year) respectively,
y is rm level productivity, Horizontal is a measure of intra-industry MNE
presence, Backward (Forward) is a measure of MNE presence in customer
or downstream (supplier or upstream) industries, X is a vector of rm level
control variables, Dj and Dk are two sets of industry and country dummies,
" is an error term which is clustered at the industry level and assumed to be
normally distributed, and the s are the parameters to be estimated. The
precise measurement of these variables is explained below.
A well-known problem with empirical models such as the one in (3.16)
is the measurement of the dependent variable. Productivity is usually com-
puted as the error term of a production function. However, to the extent
that (expected) changes in productivity are observed or anticipated by rms
managers, the requirement of independence between the error term and the
independent variables is violated, since managers may adjust variable in-
puts and production factors (such as labor) in anticipation of productivity
changes.
Olley and Pakes (1996) suggest a robust estimator to tackle this issue.
The underlying idea is that there exists a relationship between unobserved
productivity on the one hand, and observable investment and capital on the
other hand. Using this relationship, one can control for productivity in the
production function estimation, by adding the function of investment and
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capital in addition to labor and capital (and material) inputs.22 Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) extend this approach to situations in which there are a lot
of zero observations on rm level investment, in which case it is not possible to
invert the investment function, and hence to derive the productivity function.
Since virtually all of our rms have positive observations on investment, we
will use the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure to estimate productivity.23
One important additional issue we need to tackle is the fact that our
theoretical model does not suggest a clear functional form regarding the
relationship between MNE ownership in its subsidiary and local rm prots
(and productivity). This can be noted from the expressions of the total
derivatives (cf. Appendix), which themselves are polynomial functions of
MNE ownership . Moreover, the degree of the polynomial in  depends on
the elasticities of substitution and demand. A second issue in this regard is
that some parameters in our model may be functions of  themselves, such as
the di¤erent elasticities of substitution or the input and output shares, which
further induces the di¤erent total derivatives to be (polynomial) functions of
. Hence it would be inappropriate to specify a functional form empirically
ex ante. Fortunately, we can use (semiparametric) partial linear regression
analysis to get a clue regarding the proper empirical specication.
Specically, the generic partial linear regression model in our case takes
the following form:
yi = g(zj) + Xi +Dj +Dk + i (3.17)
where i and j again index rm and industry respectively, g(z) is the nonpara-
metric component of the model for which the functional form is determined
using a Kernel estimator, X is a vector of (rm level) variables that en-
ter the model in the usual parametric fashion, and  is an error term. In
the context of the present paper, the Horizontal, Backward and Forward
variables would enter the non-parametric component, whereas the control
variables enter the parametric component.
The model in (3.17) can be estimated by using a di¤erence estimator
(Robinson, 1988). Lokshin (2006) proposes the following estimator of the
22Since the appropriate functional form of the function of investment and capital is not
known, Olley and Pakes (1996) use a third-order polynomial expansion in both variables
to proxy the function. We follow this procedure in our production function estimation.
23In order to empirically implement the estimator, we use a program developed by
Arnold (2003).
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model, based on Yatchew (1997), where the observations are ordered as z1 <
z2 < :: < zN :
mX
k 1
dkyi k =
mX
k 1
dkg(zi k) + 
 
mX
k 1
dkxi k
!
+
mX
k 1
dki k (3.18)
wherem is the order of di¤erencing and the ds are the di¤erencing weights.24
When optimal weights d are chosen, OLS estimation can be consistently
applied to (3.18) in order to obtain estimates for the parametric part of the
model. If we denote the resulting estimator by ^diff we can retrieve the
nonparametric component in (3.17) as follows:
yi   ^diffxi = g (zj) + (   ^diff )Xi + i ' g(zj) + i
We can then use a nonparametric estimator to estimate the nonparametric
component g(zj). Here we again follow Lokshin (2006) who proposes the
use of a Locally Weighted Scatterplot Smoother (lowess). Lowess belongs to
the class of Nearest Neighbors Estimators: it estimates local polynomials to
derive a functional form for g(:), based on the distribution of the observations
in a zy-scatterplot. The local polynomial estimation is repeated over small
parts of the distribution, where the partitioning (in so-called bandwidths) is
variable. This results in a smoothed t of the relationship between z and y,
which can be depicted in zy space.
Finally, we need a way to determine whether or not the nonparametric
component in (3.17) makes a signicant contribution to the model. Obvi-
ously, since we are not estimating any parameter values, we cannot use regu-
lar test statistics to determine signicance. Instead, Lokshin (2006) proposed
the following test statistic:
V =
p
mN(s2res   s2diff )=s2diff  N(0; 1) (3.19)
where s2res is the mean square residual of the parametric regression and s
2
diff
the squared residual of the semi-parametric regression. Hence, if this test
statistic surpasses the standard normal critical values at usual signicance
24These weights have to satisfy two conditions: (i)
Pm
k 1 dk = 0 , which assusres that
the nonparametric component in (3.17) is removed since g() is assumed to be smooth,
single-valued and to have a bounded rst derivative; (ii)
Pm
j 1 d
2
j = 1 which assures that
the residuals in (3.17) have variance 2.
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levels, we can conclude that the nonparametric component contributes sig-
nicantly to the model in (3.17).
Despite the attractive property of not having to specify an explicit func-
tional form between productivity e¤ects and MNE ownership, there are some
other caveats of partial linear regression analysis. The most important of
these is that the method of Lokshin (2006) is only applicable to cross-section
samples, so that we loose a lot of information contained in the time-series
dimension of the data. The second drawback is that this method does not
allow for clustering of the error term, which is problematic when estimating
rm-level productivity e¤ects while using rm and sector level explanatory
variables. Third, because of the need for a fairly large sample to consistently
estimate the partial linear model (the so-called curse of dimensionality in
semiparametric and non-parametric regression analysis), it is unwarranted
to split up the sample according to IPP levels, as this would heavily reduce
the size of the resulting subsamples. Because of these drawbacks, we use the
semiparametric approach mainly for exploratory purposes, and revert to a
more standard parametric specication to tackle these three issues.
Summarizing, in order to obtain a proper estimate of our dependent vari-
able in model (3.16) we use the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure. Moreover,
since we have no clear theoretical indications regarding the proper functional
form of the relationship between rm productivity and MNE ownership, we
use semiparametric regression analysis to nd the best parametric specica-
tion for this relationship. We will then take the functional forms suggested by
the partial linear regression models and impose it in a standard parametric
regression model like the one in (3.16).
3.4.2 Data
Our sample contains a short panel of 1,549 large, publicly traded rms that
are active in 20 countries and 18 sectors during the period 2000-2005. Of
these rms, 327 are partly owned by a foreign company.25 In order to obtain
the production function parameters with the Olley and Pakes (1996) proce-
dure, we estimated production functions at the two-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level.
A full list of countries and sectors is included in the Appendix.
Our main variable of interest, i.e. the extent of intra-industry MNE
25We thank Radislav Semenov for collecting and cleaning a large part of the ownership
data. More information on these data can be found in De Jong and Semenov (2006).
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presence, is computed as follows (cf. Javorcik, 2004a):
Horizontaljt =
Pnj
i=1(i  Salesit)PNj
i=1 Salesit
s.t. 0  i < 1 (3.20)
where nj is the number of foreign-owned subsidiaries present in sector j, Nj
is the total number of rms in sector j, i is the share of MNE ownership
in the subsidiaries, and Salesi are the amount of rm-level sales. As with
most empirical studies using MNE ownership, we only have observations for
 in one year (2004), which we also use to compute Horizontal in the other
years.
In line with Javorcik (2004a), we use input and output shares (constructed
fromOECD I-O tables) to compute forward and backward linkages.26 Specif-
ically, if jk denotes the output share of sector j owing to sector k (with
j 6= k) backward linkages are computed as:
Backwardjt =
X
k 6=j
(jk Horizontalkt) (3.21)
where Horizontalkt is dened as in (3.20). Hence, in line with the theoretical
model developed in Section 3.2, the extent of backward linkages is proxied
by the amount of inter-industry sales from industry j to k.
Forward linkages are computed in an analogous manner:
Forwardjt =
X
j 6=k
(jk Horizontalkt) (3.22)
where jk is the share of inputs that sector j obtains from sector k. Javor-
cik (2004a) nets out exports from the host country to other countries from
Horizontalkt in this case, since such exports are obviously not destined for
local sector j. However, due to lack of data we are not able to follow this
approach, and have to settle with the computation in (3.22) (see Chapters 4
and 5 for an explicit treatment of this issue).
As explained in the previous section, our dependent variable is the (log
of) productivity of local rms, computed using the Olley and Pakes (1996)
methodology, and using data on net sales and revenue, employment, net
26Although our data pertain to the period 2000-2005, the most recent I-O tables avail-
able are from 2002, so that we use these data to compute input-output shares for the entire
period.
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Table 3.2: Pairwise correlations
1 2 3 4 6 7
1. (Log) Productivity
2. Horizontal 0.15
3. Backward 0.16 0.16
4. Forward 0.17 0.39 0.22
6. (Log) Size 0.17 -0.04 0.08 -0.00
7. Market share 0.18 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.52
Mean 5.03 4.40 0.50 1.46 12.8 0.07
St. Dev. 1.88 8.66 0.77 3.65 1.87 0.14
Notes: * correlation is insignicant p < .05
xed capital stocks and total investment for the years 2000-2005. The log of
this variable was taken since the distribution of productivity across rms is
heavily skewed.
We add two control variables: First, we use a measure of rm size, mea-
sured by (the log of) total assets of the rm (the log of this variable was
taken since the distribution of total assets across rms is heavily skewed).
The expected sign of this variable is unclear: Some authors have argued that
large rms are conducive to innovation and hence productivity, because of
economies of scale (Cohen and Klepper, 1996). Yet others argue that re-
sources are not easily and e¢ ciently allocated in large rms, hence wasting
productive resources and decreasing productivity (Acs and Audretsch, 1990).
The sign of this variable is thus an empirical matter. Second, in order to also
incorporate a relative measure of rm size, we use the share of rm-sales
in total industry-sales (i.e. market share) as an additional control variable.
Again, the sign of this variable is not clear ex-ante. Table 3.2 presents some
summary statistics and pairwise correlations between the variables.
We also have to construct variables that enable us to test the conditions
in Table 3.1. For this purpose, we follow earlier research (Javorcik, 2004b;
Allred and Park, 2007) and use the Ginarte and Park (1997) dataset contain-
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ing data on the strength of national IPP systems.27 The most recent set of
observations relate to the year 2000, which are the ones we have used in the
empirical part of the paper. The IPP index consists of ve di¤erent compo-
nents, all rated on a 0 to 1 scale (cf. Ginarte and Park, 1997 for a detailed
description of this index). Taken together, the IPP index is measured along
a 5 point scale, where a value of 0 indicates very weak IPP and 5 indicates
very strong IPP.
Regarding the horizontal productivity e¤ects, we noted that they are more
likely to be positive under  = 0 when xed costs make up a relatively large
share of total costs (i.e. xed and variable costs). We use data on net xed
assets F (property, plant and equipment) to capture rm-level xed costs,
and data on salaries and benet expenses L to capture variable costs. We
then construct a variable (F + L)=L which corresponds with the condition
in Table 3.1.28
For forward productivity e¤ects (dd=d with MNEs upstream) we estab-
lished that if the elasticity of substitution " between downstream products
is large enough, this e¤ect will be positive. If we interpret " as a measure
of downstream competition (with higher " indicating more substitution and
hence more competition) we can construct a Herndahl index to measure
the inverse of ". Hence, for each country-industry-year combination in our
sample, we construct a Herndahl index which captures all our sample-rms
which belong to a particular sector. The values of this index vary between
0.05 and 1 in our sample.
Finally, the condition regarding backward productivity e¤ects (du=d
with MNEs downstream) depends inter alia on  and .  is already in-
corporated in the computation of (3.21). Since we do not have the data to
compute proper estimates of , we will just focus on  in the empirical part
of the paper.
27We thank professor Park for sharing the updated dataset.
28Concerns could arise about multicollinearity between rm size (proxied by total as-
sets) and our variable proxying cost structure (as it is partly composed by net xed assets).
Further inspection reveals an (insignicant) correlation of -0.00.
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Table 3.3: Semiparametric model esimates
(1) Horizontal (2) Backward (3) Forward
(log) Size
0:124
(:042)
0:163
(:025)
0:162
(:023)
Market Share
0:634
(:397)
0:387
(:160)
0:280
(:156)
V 2:85 2:61 2:67
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0:29 0:53 0:52
N 1; 195 2; 462 2; 462
Dependent variable is log of rm productivity. Notes: (a) * p<0.1;
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; (b) Estimator based on Lokshin (2006) with
1st-order di¤erencing. V is the test-statistic in (3.19), indicating
the signicance of the non-parametric model component.
3.5 Empirical results
3.5.1 Semiparametric results
Before turning to the regression results, we rst briey consider the pro-
ductivity di¤erence between local rms and IJV s, since the presumed pro-
ductivity superiority of MNEs and hence IJV s vis-à-vis local rms lies at
the heart of our model, and as such at the hart of the knowledge di¤usion
process. Comparing the log of productivity levels of the 327 IJV s in our
sample versus the 1,222 local rms, the former have an average productivity
of 5.80 and the latter of 5.02. A paired t-test strongly rejects the equality of
these two means (t = 14:3). Hence, the superiority of IJV s with respect to
local rms on productivity as assumed in our theoretical model is conrmed
in our sample.
First we consider the results of the semiparametric partial linear regres-
sion model. We will investigate the e¤ect of the three di¤erent MNE presence
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variables separately, in order to obtain the empirical functional relationship
between productivity and the relevant MNE ownership share. As explained
in the previous section, the partial linear regression estimator we use is only
applicable in cross-sections. Thus all results reported in this subsection per-
tain to the year 2004, which is the year in which the MNE ownership shares
were observed. The results of the partial linear regression model are reported
in Table 3.3. Figure 3.2 contains the resulting non-parametric relationship
between productivity and each of the MNE presence variables.
The rst column in Table 3.3 adds the horizontal variable from (3.20) to
the non-parametric component of the model. As indicated by the test sta-
tistic V from (3.19), the non-parametric component enters the model highly
signicantly. Panel (a) in Figure 3.2 depicts the implied relationship. We
nd that an increase in MNE ownership in the IJV increases local rms
productivity. However, it is also clear that this relationship is not linear,
but characterized by decreasing returns to MNE ownership at low levels of
MNE ownership, and increasing returns to MNE ownership at high levels.
Hence, the semiparametric model suggests a cubic relationship between intra-
industry MNE ownership and local rmsproductivity.29
In the second column we put the backward variable from (3.21) in the
non-parametric component. The test statistic V again indicates that the
non-parametric component enters the model highly signicantly, and panel
(b) in Figure 3.2 depicts the relationship between the downstreamMNE own-
ership share and upstream local rmsproductivity. The gure demonstrates
a quadratic relationship, although the 95% condence interval around this
relationship is quite large.
Finally, in column three of Table 3.3 we put the forward variable from
(3.22) in the non-parametric component of the model. Forward spillovers en-
ter the model highly signicantly and from panel (c) in Figure 3.2 we see that
the relationship between upstream MNE ownership and downstream produc-
tivity of local customers is again characterized by a quadratic relationship.
But also in this case, the 95% condence interval is rather wide.
Both rm size and market share are signicant and positive, indicating
that both absolute rm size as well as rm size relative to the market are
conducive to productivity. In terms of model t, the models perform rather
29In the parametric setup in the next section, we also experimented with a piecewise
linear regression model, with breakpoints around 5% and 35% of MNE ownership, as
suggested by panel (a) in Figure 3.2. The results were clearly outperformed by a cubic
specication both in terms of signicance and t.
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Figure 3.2: Semiparametric relationship between rm productivity and MNE
ownership
well, indicating that the industry and country xed e¤ects also absorb a lot
of the variation in rm productivity (i.e. the relatively high R-squares in the
models are not solely induced by the three regressors). However, in order to
tackle the three problems described in the previous section, we have to revert
to parametric regression analysis. In doing so, we can use the outcomes
of the semiparametric models as a guide regarding the parametric model
specication. Specically, the semiparametric results suggest that we need
quadratic and cubic specications to capture the relationship between rm
productivity and MNE ownership. Hence, we construct two new variables:
Horizontal2jt =
Pnj
i=1(
2
i  Salesit)PNj
i=1 Salesit
s.t. 0  i < 1 (3.23)
Horizontal3jt =
Pnj
i=1(
3
i  Salesit)PNj
i=1 Salesit
s.t. 0  i < 1 (3.24)
These two variables - in combination withHorizontal from (3.20) - should
be able to capture the intra-industry productivity e¤ects in a parametric
setup. Using these, we can also construct two additional variables to para-
metrically proxy the quadratic relationship between downstream (upstream)
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MNE ownership and upstream (downstream) productivity:
Backward2jt =
X
k 6=j
(jk Horizontal2kt) (3.25)
Forward2jt =
X
j 6=k
(jk Horizontal2kt) (3.26)
3.5.2 Parametric results
Table 3.4 below species parametric regression models, including all three
di¤usion variables, as well as the two control variables, while exploiting both
the cross-section and the time variation of the data and splitting up the
sample in high and low IPP countries in columns (2) and (3). The standard
errors are robust and have been allowed to cluster at the industry level.30
The results for the total sample in the parametric model are reported
in column (1) and are rather di¤erent from the semiparametric results. Re-
garding the horizontal productivity e¤ects, instead of a cubic relationship
we actually observe a squared relationship. Specically, there appear to be
decreasing returns to MNE ownership, as depicted in panel a of Figure 3.3:31
after an initial increase in intra-industry productivity e¤ects following an in-
crease in , the relationship becomes negative around 30% of MNE ownership.
Regarding the backward and forward e¤ects, none of them are signicant.
30An alternative to this specication would be to cluster standard errors at the coun-
try level. By choosing to cluster at the industry-level rather than the country-level, we
implicitly assume that any shocks in the error term of the model are more likely to simulta-
neously a¤ect rms wihtin the same industry than rms within the same country. We also
tried clustering the standard errors at the country-level, but most of the results became
insignicant in that case. A third strategy that we pursued was to cluster standard errors
at the industrycountry-level. Although this leaves most of the results below intact, the
coe¢ cients are less precisely estimated.
31All the panels in Figure 3.3 are constructed with generic formulas y = (ax + bx2 +
cx3)  z, where y is productivity, x is MNE ownership (between 0 and 100) and z is the
mean value of either Horizontal, Backward or Forward, computed without correcting
for MNE ownership shares (these are 0.1, 0.01 and 0.03 respectively). The coe¢ cients a,
b and (if applicable) c are the coe¢ cient estimates from Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Parametric model esimates
(1) Total Sample (2) Low IPP (3) High IPP
Horizontal
0:047
(:017)
0:100
(:053)
0:057
(:022)
Horizontal Squared
 0:001
(:001)
 0:004
(:002)
 0:001
(:001)
Horizontal Cubed ( 100) 0:000
(:000)
0:002
(:001)
0:000
(:000)
Backward
0:168
(:146)
0:014
(:340)
0:420
(:203)
Backward Squared
 0:003
(:002)
0:001
(:004)
 0:008
(:003)
Forward
0:004
(:073)
 0:087
(:058)
0:100
(:220)
Forward Squared
0:000
(:001)
0:001
(:001)
 0:002
(:004)
(log) Size
0:205
(:050)
0:183
(:076)
0:206
(:046)
Market Share
0:847
(:265)
1:24
(:492)
0:785
(:359)
Constant
0:138
(:643)
 1:60
(:847)
2:74
(:574)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.79 0.78 0.79
N 6,579 1,855 4,724
Dependent variable is log of rm productivity. Notes: (a) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05;
*** p<0.01; (b) Robust standard errors with industry-level clustering; (c) Low
IPP < 4.19 on Ginarte and Park (1997) index.
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3. Multinational Ownership, IPP and Knowledge Di¤usion from FDI
We proceed by splitting up the sample in two groups: those with a rela-
tively high IPP index and those with a relatively low IPP index. We use the
median IPP level in the total sample as the cuto¤ point: this level is 4.19.32
Column 2 in Table 3.4 presents the result for the low-IPP sample. In contrast
to the total sample results in column (1), we now observe a cubic relationship
between MNE ownership and intra-industry productivity e¤ects. As shown
in panel b of Figure 3.3, between 0%-20% of MNE ownership there is a pos-
itive relationship with intra-industry productivity e¤ects, but this becomes
negative after 20%. The subsequent decline in total productivity is larger
than in the total sample. The minimum in this relationship is beyond the
relevant domain (i.e. the minimum of the function in panel 3.3b lies beyond
100% MNE ownership). As before, both the backward and forward e¤ects
are insignicant.
Column (3) in the table repeats this model for the high-IPP countries.
The horizontal productivity e¤ects change back to a quadratic form, with
the turning point from a positive to a negative relationship at 55% (panel c
of Figure 3). We now also observe signicant backward productivity e¤ects,
for which there appear to be decreasing returns to MNE ownership as well.
As shown in panel d of Figure 3, the turning point of the relationship lies
around 30%. Also note that the backward e¤ect is similar in magnitude as
the horizontal e¤ect.
Both control variables are signicant as in the semiparametric regres-
sions. Firm size is consistently positive, indicating that larger rms are more
productive, and market share is consistently positive as well, indicating that
large rm size relative to market size is generally also conducive to rm pro-
ductivity. Regarding model t, all three models perform rather well with R2s
around 80%.
In Table 3.5 we repeat these regressions, now taking into account the
conditions derived in Table 3.1. Specically, for all three regressions we
interact the forward variable with a Herndahl index. Additionally, in the low
IPP sample we interact the horizontal variable with our (F +L)=L variable.
As mentioned before, the e¤ect of  on the backward variable is already
32Note that this median value pertains to the country-level rather than the industry
or rm-level, so that the number of (rm-year) observations is not equally split between
the two groups. Admittedly, a median value of 4.19 is rather high, which is caused by the
fact that we have mainly high-developed countries in our sample. Also, it implies that
the variation in IPP is much higer in the low-IPP sample (from 2.9 to 4.19) than in the
high-IPP sample (from 4.19 to 5).
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included by construction. For reasons of space, we do not report the control
variables (and the constant) but note that their coe¢ cient estimates are
similar to those in Table 3.4.
Column (1) shows that the horizontal productivity e¤ects are virtually
similar as in column (1) of Table 3.4. However, we now also observe signif-
icant e¤ects of our forward variable, interacted with the Herndahl index.
Panel a of Figure 3.4 shows the individual forward productivity e¤ect: the
relationship is positive up to 50% of MNE ownership and then becomes neg-
ative. Panel b depicts the interacted relationship, where we have taken the
extreme case (i.e. a Herndahl index of 1). As can be seen, the e¤ects
are almost reversed now, with a negative relationship up to 40% of MNE
ownership.
In column (2) we also interact the horizontal variable with (F + L)=L.
Both the individual and interacted e¤ects are highly signicant. Panel c in
Figure 4 shows the individual e¤ects, which di¤er heavily from those in panel
b of Figure 3.3. In this case, the relationship is positive for MNE ownership
below 30% and above 60%, and negative in between. In stark contrast, the
interacted e¤ects shown in panel d of Figure 3.4 demonstrate a consistently
negative relationship between MNE ownership and intra-industry productiv-
ity.33 Regarding the forward e¤ects, we now only observe a signicant e¤ect
of the interaction terms. The e¤ects are similar to those in panel b of Figure
3.4, although the turning point now lies around 50%.
33The variable (F +L)=L was evaluated at its mean of 14 when constructing the graph.
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Table 3.5: Parametric model esimates - Interactions
(1) Total Sample (2) Low IPP (3) High IPP
Horizontal
0:046
(:018)
0:145
(:062)
0:061
(:020)
Horizontal  [(F + L)=L] -  0:014

(:004)
-
Horizontal Squared
 0:001
(:001)
 0:004
(:002)
 0:001
(:000)
Horizontal Squared  [(F + L)=L] - 0:0004

(:0001)
-
Horizontal Cubed ( 100) 0:000
(:000)
0:003
(:001)
0:0006
(:0003)
Horizontal Cubed  [(F + L)=L]
( 100)
-
 0:0003
(:0001)
-
Backward
0:147
(:147)
 0:183
(:375)
0:437
(:192)
Backward Squared
 0:003
(:002)
0:011
(:006)
 0:009
(:003)
Forward
0:189
(:102)
0:274
(:255)
0:466
(:263)
Forward  Herndahl  0:550

(:146)
 1:15
(:506)
 1:05
(:326)
Forward Squared
 0:002
(:001)
 0:003
(:003)
 0:008
(:005)
Forward Squared Herndahl 0:007

(:002)
0:013
(:006)
0:016
(:006)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.79 0.80 0.79
N 6,579 1,404 4,724
Dependent variable is log of rm productivity. Notes: (a) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***
p<0.01; (b) Robust standard errors with industry-level clustering; (c) Low IPP <
4.19 on Ginarte and Park (1997) index.
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3. Multinational Ownership, IPP and Knowledge Di¤usion from FDI
Finally, column (3) repeats the model in column (1) for the high IPP
sample. In contrast to Table 3.5, there now is a cubic relationship between
MNE ownership and intra-industry productivity, shown in panel e of Figure
3.4. The relationship is now positive over the entire domain, with decreasing
returns to  up until 70%, after which there are increasing returns. As before,
backward productivity e¤ects are signicant, showing a similar pattern as in
panel c of Figure 3.3. The individual forward productivity e¤ect is now linear
and positive, whereas the interaction e¤ect shows an e¤ect similar to panel
b in Figure 3.4, with the turning point at 20%. With R2s of around 80% all
the models perform well.
3.6 Discussion and conclusion
In this chapter we have theoretically and empirically investigated the rela-
tionship between horizontal and vertical productivity e¤ects fromMNEs with
varying degrees of foreign ownership to local (host-country) rms. Theoreti-
cally, we have established the ambiguity in this relationship due to the simul-
taneous interplay of (sometimes) opposing knowledge di¤usion, price and di-
rect and indirect demand and supply linkage e¤ects, and the mediating e¤ect
of intellectual property right protection (IPP). We have also distinguished be-
tween unintentional knowledge spillovers and intentional knowledge transfers,
where we argue the former mainly occur intra-industry, whereas the latter
dominate inter-industry knowledge di¤usion. Eventually we derived a num-
ber of conditions under which some of the ambiguous productivity e¤ects are
more likely to be positive or negative.
We then empirically investigate the relationship between horizontal and
vertical MNE ownership in foreign a¢ liates and local rms productivity,
using a panel of 1,222 local rms and 327 MNEs in 20 countries and 18
industries during the period 2000-2005. We utilize semiparametric partial
linear regression analysis for exploratory purposes, and standard parametric
panel data techniques to derive the empirical results.
Regarding horizontal (intra-industry) productivity e¤ects, we initially
nd that there are decreasing returns to MNE ownership. I.e. although
productivity e¤ects rst increase with MNE ownership, at some point the
relationship becomes negative. From our theoretical model, we can derive
that for low degrees of MNE ownership, the positive knowledge spillover and
indirect upstream demand linkages dominate, whereas for increased degrees
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of MNE ownership, the negative price e¤ect and indirect downstream de-
mand linkages dominate. One implication is that increased MNE ownership
a¤ects input and output shares asymmetrically: it appears that local input
demand decreases faster with increased MNE ownership than local output
supply, which may cause the shift from positive indirect upstream demand
linkages to negative indirect downstream demand linkages. Moreover, we
observe that the optimum in the relationship between rm productivity and
MNE ownership occurs at higher degrees of MNE ownership in high-IPP
systems relative to low-IPP systems. This may be a reection of the fact
that MNE owners feel more secure in transferring knowledge upstream in
high-IPP systems than in low-IPP systems, as we already conjectured in our
theoretical setup.
However, these results change quite a bit when we consider the interaction
e¤ect between our measure of horizontal foreign presence and the inverse
share of variable costs in total costs of local rms. Our theoretical model
predicts that in low-IPP systems, an increase in this inverse share should
increase the likelihood of positive productivity e¤ects. The reason for this is
that the negative price e¤ect in our model only works through marginal costs,
whereas the positive knowledge spillover e¤ect works both through xed and
marginal costs. However, our empirical results reach exactly the opposite
conclusion: for higher inverse shares (indicating a larger share of xed costs
in total costs), the productivity e¤ects from increased MNE ownership are
actually negative, whereas for lower inverse shares they are largely positive.
The implication is that positive knowledge spillover (and upstream indirect
demand linkage) e¤ects work more through marginal or variables costs than
through xed costs. The fact that our model predicts exactly the opposite
is due both to an assumption (i.e. that both xed and marginal costs are
a¤ected equally by knowledge spillovers and transfers) as well as the Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competition setup (which makes prices a function of
marginal costs only). Our empirical results indicate that these modelling
artefacts may be at odds with reality.
Regarding backward productivity e¤ects, our theoretical model demon-
strates opposing positive e¤ects of upstream knowledge transfer, and negative
e¤ects of upstream price e¤ects. Additionally, there is an ambiguous e¤ect
of backward linkages. We also nd that at least in high-IPP countries, an
increase in the input share will increase the likelihood of a positive e¤ect,
as it serves to make the backward linkages positive and hence tilt the bal-
ance in favor of the positive e¤ects. Our empirical results are very consistent
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with this prediction. Indeed, in none of the total sample or low-IPP sample
results do we nd signicant backward productivity e¤ects, indicating the
theoretical ambiguity. However, in the high-IPP samples we nd a consis-
tently signicant e¤ect. Moreover, we again nd decreasing returns to MNE
ownership, with a positive relationship only for relatively low degrees of MNE
ownership. If we link this result with the literature on international input
sourcing by MNEs (Taveres and Young, 2006), this result is very consis-
tent with our theoretical predictions: according to this literature, increased
MNE ownership increases the extent to which a subsidiary sources its inputs
internationally instead of locally, hence decreasing the (local) input share.
According to our model, this would eventually induce a negative relationship
between MNE ownership and backward productivity e¤ects for larger degrees
of MNE ownership, which is exactly what we observe.
Finally, our model indicates that in all cases, forward productivity e¤ects
will only take e¤ect if there is a su¢ cient degree of downstream competition,
the reason being that in that case positive forward linkages and knowledge
transfer e¤ects outweigh negative demand e¤ects. Indeed, when we just con-
sider forward productivity e¤ects separately (i.e. without simultaneously
considering downstream competition) we nd no e¤ects whatsoever. Only
after interacting this e¤ect with a Herndahl index of downstream compe-
tition do we nd consistently signicant e¤ects. The positive relationship
between MNE ownership and forward productivity e¤ects in a highly com-
petitive context is most pronounced in the high-IPP sample, where the e¤ect
is positive and linear. In the low-IPP sample there essentially is no e¤ect in
this case, whereas the relationship in the total sample is quadratic, reaching
an optimum around 50%. These results are thus partly in accordance with
our theory. Regarding the e¤ects in low-competitive environments, we indeed
nd a negative relationship between MNE ownership and forward productiv-
ity e¤ects for low degrees of MNE ownership. Nonetheless, for a large range
of MNE ownership degrees, the relationship is positive, contrary to what our
model predicts. One possible explanation for this is that there exists a re-
lationship between upstream MNE ownership and downstream competition,
which we have not modelled, but which does not seem unlikely.
So what does all of this imply for the e¤ectiveness and usefulness of a
well-developed IPP system? One thing that both our model and our empir-
ical results suggest, is that a strong IPP system stimulates the intentional
inter-industry transfer of knowledge from MNEs to local rms, the extent of
which depends on the amount of MNE ownership. Indeed, only in the high
79
Multinational Heterogeneity and Knowledge Di¤usion
IPP samples do we nd signicant and positive e¤ects of backward productiv-
ity e¤ects for low degrees of MNE ownership. Also for forward productivity
e¤ects, we nd a positive relationship with MNE ownership in the high-IPP
sample, given that downstream competition is su¢ cient. Even for horizon-
tal productivity e¤ects, we nd an unconditional positive relationship with
MNE ownership in high-IPP countries, which is again probably due to the in-
creased willingness of intentional inter-industry knowledge transfer, inducing
positive indirect demand linkage e¤ects (although we cannot separate these
empirically). In sum, it seems that developing well-functioning IPP regula-
tions is only to the benet of the country involved: even though rms (with
a relatively large share of variable costs in total costs) in low-IPP countries
may also benet from positive horizontal productivity e¤ects, the positive
inter-industry e¤ects are largely absent. This result corresponds to ndings
by Javorcik (2004b).
Finally, this study is characterized by some limitations, the most impor-
tant of which is the fact that our sample only consists of large and publicly
traded rms. As such, the results of this study cannot be readily gener-
alized beyond the specic characteristics of our sample, and moreover, a
direct comparison to most of the earlier empirical one-country studies is not
possible either. However, a trade-o¤ exists between encompassing multiple
countries in the analysis, versus increasing the rm-sample beyond only the
largest rms, which inhibits investigating country-level e¤ects on the knowl-
edge spillover or transfer process. Another limitation is the fact that our
sample mainly contains developed countries, which translates into a limited
variation on our IPP variable. Increasing the sample to include also (large
and traded) rms from less developed countries and emerging markets would
be a valuable extension of this study, again specically with regard to inves-
tigating country-level determinants or moderators of the knowledge di¤usion
process. Additionally, some studies suggest a relationship between IPP on
the one hand and the organization of foreign activities on the other. For ex-
ample, Hagedoorn, Cloodt and Van Kranenburg (2005) nd that when IPP is
low, rms are more likely to engage in IJVs than in contractual relationships
when partnering for R&D collaboration, in order to forestall appropriability
problems. In our setup, the implication of these ndings might be that MNEs
tend to favor high ownership shares over low ones in low IPP host-countries,
which might go some way in explaining e.g. the absence of any backward pro-
ducitivy e¤ects in our low IPP sample. Investigating the interplay between
these relationships would be an interesting avenue for future research.
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Appendix A
Here we consider the case in which the IJV (and its local competitors) are
active in the upstream industries, supplying other local rms in downstream
industries. That is, we now consider part B of Figure 3.1. This allows us
to investigate the direct e¤ect of demand and supply e¤ects and knowledge
di¤usion through forward linkages (rather than indirectly, via backward link-
ages).
The analysis is very similar to the one in the main text considering part
A of Figure 3.1. The upstream industry price index is now given by:
PU = (nup
1 
u + nIJV p
1 
IJV )
1=(1 )
As before, demand for intermediate products (which will be derived below) is
denoted by I so that applying Sheppards lemma yields demand for individual
upstream rmsproducts:
xu = p
 
u IP

U
xIJV = p
 
IJV IP

U
Prot functions for upstream rms are given by:
u = puxu   (F Su + Suxu)w
IJV = pIJV xIJV   (FIJV + IJV xIJV )w
In this case, the upstream rm benets from MNE knowledge di¤usion
through spillovers rather than transfers, since it is a direct competitor of
the IJV. Substituting the individual demands and maximizing prots yields
the equilibrium pricing conditions:
pu =
Suw
(   1)
pIJV =
IJVw
(   1)
In the downstream, the price index is given by:
PD = (ndp
1 "
d )
1=(1 ")
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As before, total demand for downstream products is denoted by Y P D so
that we can derive demand for individual downstream products:
xd = p
 "
d Y P
" 
D
Downstream rm prots are expressed as:
d = pdxd   (F Td + Td xd)(Pu + (1  )w)
where  is the share of inputs that the downstream rm obtains from the
upstream rms. Again note that in this case, the downstream rm benets
from knowledge di¤usion through knowledge transfer rather than knowledge
spillovers. Substituting demand into the prot function we can once more
derive prot maximizing equilibrium prices:
pd =
"Td (Pu + (1  )w)
("  1)
We can now also write down an explicit function for derived demand for
intermediate inputs:
I = nd(F
T
d + 
T
d xd)
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Appendix B
B1 IJVs in the downstream sector - du=d
First consider the elements of du=d:
BL1  ( @I
@FIJV
+ (1  ) @I
@F Sd
)(Fm   Fn) + ( @I
@IJV
+ (1  ) @I
@Sd
)(m   n)| {z }
indirect knowledge spillover <0
+
@I
@xIJV
@xIJV
@pIJV

@pIJV
@IJV
(m   n) +
@pIJV
@Pu
@Pu
@pu
@pu
@Tu
(m   n)

| {z }
downstream demand linkage >0
+
@I
@xd
@xd
@pd

@pd
@Sd
(1  )(m   n) +
@pd
@PU
@Pu
@pu
@pu
@Tu
(m   n)

| {z }
downstream demand linkage >0
+

@I
@xIJV
@xIJV
@PD
+
@I
@xd
@xd
@PD

0BBBBBB@
@PD
@pd
24 @pd@Sd (1  )(m   n)
+ @pd
@PU
@Pu
@pu
@pu
@Tu
(m   n)
35
+ @PD
@pIJV
24 @pIJV@IJV (m   n)
+@pIJV
@PU
@Pu
@pu
@pu
@Tu
(m   n)
35
1CCCCCCA
| {z }
downstream price e¤ect <0
PE1  @xU
dPU
@Pu
@pu
@pu
@Tu
(m   n)
KT1   w [(Fm   Fu) + xu(m   n)]
Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting terms
yields the following expression for du=d:
du
d
=

wTuxu
   1 
 (nIJV + (1  )nd)
I
  w

| {z }
Term 1
(Fm   Fn)
+
wTuxu
   1
24 A1IJV + Tu (A1 + A2) PUPU+(1 )w + A2Sd (1  )
+(nIJV xIV + (1  )ndxd) + ITu
35
| {z }
Term 2
(m   n)
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where
A1  (nIJV IJV xIJV + ndSdxd)nIJV ("  )

pIJV
PD
1 "
  "(nIJV IJV xIJV )
A2  (nIJV IJV xIJV + ndSdxd)nd("  )

pd
PD
1 "
  "(ndSdxd)
In order to sign the derivative, note that the rst term in Term 1 is positive
and the second negative, so that Term 1 has an ambiguous sign. It can be
shown that A1 < 0 as follows:
A1 < 0() XnIJV ("  )

pIJV
PD
1 "
< "(nIJV IJV xIJV )
, "  
"
<
nIJV IJV xIJV P
1 "
D
XnIJV p
1 "
IJV
=
nIJV IJV p
 "
IJV Y P
" 
D P
1 "
D
XnIJV p
1 "
IJV
=
IJV Y P
1 
D
XpIJV
=
IJV Y P
1 
D
pIJV (nIJV IJV xIJV + nd
S
dxd)
=
IJV Y P
1 
D
pIJV Y P
" 
D (nIJV IJV p
 "
IJV + nd
S
dp
 "
d )
=
IJV P
1 "
D
pIJV (nIJV IJV p
 "
IJV + nd
S
dp
 "
d )
= 1
since pIJV = (IJV =
S
d )pd. Since " > , this condition will always hold, and
similarly for A2. Moreover, this also implies that A1 + A2 < 0: Indeed, we
have that:
A1 + A2 =  (nIJV IJV xIJV + ndSdxd) < 0
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Note that we can rewrite Term 2 as follows:24 A1IJV + Tu (A1 + A2) PUPU+(1 )w + A2Sd (1  )
+(nIJV xIV + (1  )ndxd) + ITu
35
=
(A1 + nIJV IJV xIJV )
IJV| {z }
<0
+
 [2 (A1 + A2)PU + I (PU + (1  )w)]
Tu (PU + (1  )w)
+(1  )
 
A2 + nd
S
dxd

Sd| {z }
<0
where the sign of the rst and last term follow from the fact that A1; A2 < 0.34
The sign of the second term is ambiguous however. We can derive a condition
under which this term (and hence the entire Term 2) is negative, which
obviously is the case if the numerator is negative:
2 (A1 + A2)PU + I (PU + (1  )w)

= 
8<: (nIJV IJV xIJV + nd
S
dxd) [(1  )PU + (1  )w]
+(PU + (1  )w)(nIJV FIJV + ndF Sd )
9=; < 0
For this condition to hold it is necessary to have:
(nIJV IJV xIJV + nd
S
dxd)
(nIJV FIJV + ndF Sd )
<  (1  )PU + (1  )w
PU + (1  )w
du=d if  = 1
If  = 1, Term 1 reduces to  w(Fm   Fn) > 0. Hence, a su¢ cient condition
for du=d > 0 then is:
(nIJV IJV xIJV + nd
S
dxd)
(nIJV FIJV + ndF Sd )
<  (1  )PU + (1  )w
PU + (1  )w
34Note that the condition in this case changes to ("   )=("   1) < 1 which still holds
since " >  > 1.
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du=d if  = 0
If  = 0, Term 1 is unambiguously positive and Term 2 unambiguously
negative.
du
d
=
wTuxu
   1
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(nIJV + nd)
I
(Fm   Fn)| {z }
<0
+

A1 + nIJV IJV xIJV
IJV
+
A2 + nd
S
dxd
Sd

(m   n)| {z }
>0
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
There is no concise su¢ cient or necessary condition which ensures du=d is
either positive or negative in this case.
B2 IJVs in the downstream sector - dd=d
The elements of dd=d are:
PE2  
S
d (PU + (1  )w)
("  1)
@xd
@PD24 @PD@pd h @pd@Sd [(1  )(m   d)] + @pd@PU h@PU@pu @pu@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d)ii
+ @PD
@pIJV
h
@pIJV
@IJV
(m   d) + @pIJV@PU
h
@PU
@pu
@pu
@Tu
(m   d)
ii
35
KS1   (Pu + (1  )w)(1  ) [(Fm   Fd) + xd(m   n)]
IDL1   (F Sd + Sdxd)
@PU
@pu
@pu
@Tu
(m   d)
Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting terms
yields the following expression for dd=d:
dd
d
= ("  )pd
"
xdP
" 1
D

p "d ndA3 + p
 "
IJV nIJVA4

(m   n)
 (PU + (1  )w)(1  ) [(Fm   Fd) + xd(m   n)]
 (F Sd + Sdxd)
PU
Tu
(m   n)
with
A3  pd
Sd
(1  ) + Sd 
"
"  1
PU
Tu
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A4  pIJV
IJV
(1  ) + Sd 
"
"  1
PU
Tu
Signing this derivative is not straightforward. Therefore, we consider its sign
under  = 1 and  = 0.
du=d if  = 1
If  = 1, dd=d reduces to:
dd
d
= 
PU
Tu
(m   n)

pdxdP
" 1
D 
S
d
("  )
"  1

p "d nd + p
 "
IJV nIJV
  (F Sd + Sdxd)
= 
PU
Tu
(m   n)

Sdxd

pdP
" 1
D
("  )
"  1

p "d nd + p
 "
IJV nIJV
  1  F Sd 
Note that a su¢ cient condition for dd=d to be positive is thus:
pdP
" 1
D
("  )
"  1

p "d nd + p
 "
IJV nIJV

< 1
"  
"  1 <
P 1 "D
pd

p "d nd + p
 "
IJV nIJV

"  
"  1 <

p1 "d nd + p
1 "
IJV nIJV

p1 "d nd + pdp
 "
IJV nIJV

Given that " >  > 1 the LHS of this condition < 1. Hence, if the RHS  1
the condition is always met. It can be shown that RHS  1 by noting that
we in this case we need that pd  pIJV :
pd  pIJV
() "
S
d (PU + (1  )w)
("  1) 
"IJV (PU + (1  )w)
("  1)
() Sd  IJV
() d + (1  )IJV  IJV
() d  n  IJV (since  = 1)
() n  m + (1  )n
Since we have assumed that m < n this condition is always met for for all
 2 [0; 1].
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du=d if  = 0
If  = 0, dd=d reduces to:
dd
d
= ("  )pd
"
xdP
" 1
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1 "
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Note that a su¢ cient condition for dd=d > 0 is:
("  )
("  1)

ndp
1 "
d
Sd
+
nIJV p
1 "
IJV
IJV

<
P 1 "D
Sd
If Sd = IJV this condition reduces to:
("  )
("  1)

ndp
1 "
d + nIJV p
1 "
IJV
Sd

<
P 1 "D
Sd
("  )
("  1)

P 1 "D
Sd

<
P 1 "D
Sd
("  )
("  1) < 1
which as we saw above is always the case. Given that Sd = d+(1 )IJV
and the fact that  = 0, we indeed have that Sd = IJV so that this condition
always holds.
B3 IJVs in upstream sector - du=d
First consider the elements of du=d:
IDL2 = 
wSu
(   1)
@xu
@I

@I
@F Td
(Fm   Fd) + @I
@Td
(m   d)

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PE3 =
wSu
(   1)
@xu
@PU
(m   d)

@PU
@pu
@pu
@Su
(1  ) + @PU
@pIJV
@pIJV
@IJV

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Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting
terms yields the following expression for du=d:
du
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= nd
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The elements of dd=d are:
PE4 =
pd
"
@xd
@PD
@PD
@pd
(m   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+ @pd
@PU

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Td xd + F
T
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Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting
terms yields the following expression for dd=d:
dd
d
=
xd
"
(m   n)
24  pdTd
+PU
"Td
(" 1)
w
 1 ((1  )nup u + nIJV p IJV )
35
 (PU + (1  )w) [(Fm   Fd) + xd(m   n)]
 

Td xd + F
T
d

(m   n)PU
w
   1((1  )nup
 
u + nIJV p
 
IJV )
It is clear that the rs two lines of this expression are positive, while the
third line is negative.
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du=d if  = 1
If  = 1 du=d reduces to:
du
d
= nd
pu

xu
I
[(Fm   Fn) + xd(m   n)]
+xupuP
 1
U (m   n)
w
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 
u + nIJV p
 
IJV

which is clearly negative. Hence if  = 1, du=d < 0.
du=d if  = 0
If  = 0 du=d reduces to:
du
d
= xupuP
 1
U (m   n)
w
   1
 
nup
 
u + nIJV p
 
IJV

 w [(Fm   Fd) + xu(m   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Hence, a su¢ cient and necessary condition to have that du=d > 0 in this
case is that:
puP
 1
U

   1
 
nup
 
u + nIJV p
 
IJV

<
[(Fm   Fd) + xu(m   n)]
xu(m   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
   1
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nup
1 
u + nIJV pup
 
IJV
 
nup1 u + nIJV p
1 
IJV
 < [(Fm   Fd) + xu(m   n)]
xu(m   n)
Given that  = 0 we have that IJV = 
S
u and hence that pu = pIJV i.e:

   1 <
[(Fm   Fd) + xu(m   n)]
xu(m   n)
Hence, the larger xed costs relative to marginal costs (or more precisely:
The more important the e¤ect of knowledge di¤usion on xed rather than
marginal costs), the more likely this condition is to hold, and hence, the more
likely it is that du=d > 0:
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B4 IJVs in the upstream sector - dd=d
The elements of dd=d are:
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"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Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting
terms yields the following expression for dd=d:
dd
d
=
xd
"
(m   n)
24  pdTd
+P U
"Td
(" 1)
w
 1((1  )nup u + nIJV p IJV )
35
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   Td xd + F Td  (m   n)P U w   1((1  )nup u + nIJV p IJV )
Clearly, the term in the rst line is negative whereas the terms in the second
and third lines are positive. From the analyses below it follows that " > 2 is
a su¢ cient condition for du=d to be positive.
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du=d if  = 1
If  = 1 dd=d reduces to:
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Hence, a su¢ cient condition for dd=d > 0 when  = 1 is " > 2.
du=d if  = 0
If  = 0 dd=d reduces to:
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w
   1(nup
 
u + nIJV p
 
IJV )(m   n) 
xd
T
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
Hence, a su¢ cient condition for dd=d > 0 when  = 0 is " > 2.
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Table A1: Sample countries and industries
Countries Industries
Australia Mining of coal
Austria Mining of metal ores
Belgium Food products and beverages
Canada Textiles
Denmark Wood and wood products
Finland Paper and paper products
France Coke, petroleum and fuel
Germany Chemicals and chemical products
Hong Kong Rubber and plastic products
Israel Other non-metallic and mineral products
Italy Basic metals
Japan Fabricated metal products
South Korea Machinery and equipment
Netherlands Electrical machinery and apparatus
Singapore Medical, precision and optical instruments
Spain Motor vehicles
Sweden Furniture
Switzerland Construction
United Kingdom
United States
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Chapter 4
Market orientation and
knowledge di¤usion from FDI
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter is was established that the extent of MNE ownership
over its foreign subsidiaries matters a great deal for the extent of intra and
inter-industry knowledge di¤usion. From the IJV prot function in (3.5)
it follows that we have assumed throughout the chapter that the MNEs
subsidiary locates production abroad to serve the foreign market. That is,
we have assumed that the FDI involved in this process was of the local
market-seeking type. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.3)
the literature on horizontal and vertical FDI suggests the market orientation
of MNEssubsidiaries might di¤er, and that such di¤erences by themselves
may be another relevant dimension of MNE heterogeneity, inuencing host-
country productivity e¤ects.
Horizontal FDI occurs when a MNE copies (parts of) its value chain in
a foreign subsidiary in order to serve the local market (cf. Markusen, 1984;
Markusen, 2001). As such, it has also been called market-seeking FDI. Ver-
tical FDI on the other hand occurs when a MNE slices up the value chain
and relocates di¤erent activities to those places where they can be under-
taken most e¢ ciently (cf. Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 2001). Accordingly,
this term has also been coined e¢ ciency-seeking FDI (for an overview of the
34Parts of this chapter are based on Beugelsdijk, Smeets and Zwinkels (2008) and
Smeets and Wei (2009).
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di¤erent types of FDI, see Section 2.5.3). Recent literature on endogenous
growth (Romer, 1991; Martin and Ottaviano, 1999; Baldwin, Braconier and
Forslid, 2005) suggests that these two di¤erent types of FDI may have di¤er-
ing productivity e¤ects as they have a di¤erent impact on industry learning
curves.
In this chapter we will consider the host-country productivity e¤ects of
horizontal and vertical FDI. Although the models that have been developed
to analyze these two FDI types are similar to the one we have used in Chap-
ter 3, a key di¤erence is that they include international trade, since MNE
subsidiaries have to ship (intermediate) products back to their home country
in case of vertical FDI. Hence, even though some of the model specications
and implications derived in the previous chapter still apply, we have to use
a somewhat di¤erent model setup.
Specically, we will utilize the model setup by Ekholm and Forslid (2001)
in adapting an industry learning curve suggested by Martin and Ottaviano
(1999) and accordingly derive the di¤erent productivity e¤ects of the two
FDI types. Using industry-level data on the foreign activities of US MNEs,
we will then empirically test whether the implied di¤erences indeed are borne
out by the data. Following this, we will also consider the moderating e¤ect
of Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) on the productivity e¤ects of the
two di¤erent FDI types, as both New Trade Theory (cf. Markusen, 2002) and
the literature on RIAs (Dunning, 2000; Buckley, Clegg, Forsans and Reilly,
2003) suggest that the presence or absence of regional integration may have
diverging e¤ects on the composition and amount of both FDI types, and
consequently on their host-country productivity e¤ects.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 dis-
cusses the potentially di¤erent productivity e¤ects of horizontal and vertical
FDI, and the way in which RIAs impact on them through trade costs. Sec-
tion 4.3 then discusses the data and variables that we employ to test the
theoretical predictions, as well as the system GMM estimator that we use to
do so. The empirical results are presented in Section 4.4. Finally, Section
4.5 discusses these results and concludes the chapter.
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4.2 Theory
4.2.1 A model of horizontal and vertical FDI
In the literature on FDI, MNEs and international trade, a well-established
distinction has been made between horizontal and vertical FDI (Markusen,
1984; Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 2001). Barba Navaretti and Venables
(2004) dene horizontal FDI as the duplication of a subset of a rms ac-
tivities in a foreign country, e.g. by setting up a foreign plant in addition
to a home plant for some part of the production process. Hence, in this
type of FDI, the same (horizontal) stage of the production process is dupli-
cated. Vertical FDI on the other hand refers to breaking up the value-added
chain, hence relocating separate (vertical) parts of this chain to those foreign
locations where they are conducted most e¢ ciently.
Other authors have used very similar denitions. According to Buckley
and Casson (1981), horizontal FDI arises as a substitute for exporting and a
desire to place production close to customers and thereby avoid trade costs,
being both transportation costs and trade barriers. Vertical FDI is tradi-
tionally related to the desire of MNEs to carry out unskilled-labor intensive
production activities in locations that are relatively abundant with unskilled
labor (Braconier et al. 2005; Markusen, 1995). Following textbook inter-
national economics, vertical MNEs arise to take advantage of international
factor-price di¤erences and geographically split up their production process
(Carr, Markusen and Maskus, 2001).
Ekholm and Forslid (2001) have formalized this distinction in a New
Economic Geography model. The model setup is similar to the one developed
in Chapter 3, although their analysis is conducted in general equilibrium.
Moreover, in order to introduce geography, they consider two regions and
iceberg transport costs for shipping goods between regions.35
Consider a two-country economy in which domestic rms (n), horizontal
MNEs (h) and vertical MNEs (v) are active in an industry X. Production
of X requires  units of labor (L) and one unit of variety-specic knowledge
capital (K). K in turn is produced with  units of L in the innovation sector
under perfect competition, so that it is priced at marginal costs.
Domestic rms produce in their home country and sell their products
35The name iceberg transport cost (  1) derives its name from the idea that part of
the goods that are shipped melt away in transit. Hence, to deliver an amount x, somewhat
more has to be shipped (  x).
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both at home (in country j) and abroad (in country k) through exports.
Exporting involves an iceberg transport cost, i.e. to sell x units abroad x
units have to be shipped ( > 1). This implies that prots for domestic rms
are given by:
n = pj(xjj + xjk)  [F + (xjj + xjk)]wj (4.1)
where pj is the price of good X in country j, pj = pk is the price of good
X in country k, xjk is the amount of good x produced in country j and sold
in country k, wj is the wage rate in country j, and F =  is the xed cost
for a unit of variety-specic knowledge capital.
Horizontal MNEs aim at serving both markets by establishing plants in
both countries. In this way, these rms save on trade costs on the one hand,
but forego plant-level economies of scale on the other hand (Brainard, 1997).
Prots for horizontal MNEs are accordingly given by:
h = pjxjj + pkxkk   (1 + )F
2
(wj + wk)  (xjjwj + xkkwk) (4.2)
where  > 0 reects the extent of the loss in plant-level economies of scale,
or equivalently, the additional xed costs of establishing a foreign subsidiary.
This formulation is based on Ekholm and Forslid (2001), who argue that xed
costs should be shared equally across the two production plants in order to
get rid of any vertical elements in the cost structure of the MNE.36
Vertical MNEs arise because of e¢ ciency seeking or resource seeking mo-
tives. In Ekholm and Forslid (2001), the vertical MNE splits up production
(associated with labor inputs L) from headquarter services (associated with
capital inputs K which in turn are produced using  = F units of L). Labor
costs for a vertical MNE with its production in country k and headquarters
in country j in this case are given by:
v = pk(xkj + xkk)  Fwj   (xkj + xkk)wk (4.3)
According to Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) vertical FDI is not af-
fected by loss of plant-level scale economies (since similar activities are still
concentrated in one location), but instead by diseconomies of integration, in
this case represented by the incurrence of transport costs  .
36That is, since xed costs are expressed in terms of labor, an asymmetric allocation of
xed costs in this case would imply that the MNE is exploiting lower wage costs in one of
the countries, which reects a vertical investment motive.
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If all three rm types exist simultaneously in country j, the total knowl-
edge capital stock is given by:37
Kj = nj + (hj + hk)
(1 + )
2
+ vj (4.4)
The expression for the knowledge stock in country k is isomorphic. This
knowledge stock is derived from the fact that all rms use one specic variety
of knowledge capital in production, as well as the fact that a vertical MNE
from country k has its headquarters and thus its knowledge capital  in
country k as well, thus not contributing to country js knowledge capital
stock.
The key to the di¤erent productivity e¤ects of horizontal and vertical
subsidiaries of MNEs lies exactly in this di¤ering contribution to a countrys
knowledge stock. In the endogenous growth literature, knowledge spillovers
have traditionally been modelled through so-called "learning curves" (Romer,
1990; Martin and Ottaviano, 1999; Baldwin et al., 2005). Such a learning
curve species the evolution of (marginal) production costs in the innovation
sector producing knowledge capital. Specically, in the New Economic Ge-
ography literature, the following learning curve has been proposed by Martin
and Ottaviano (1999):
Fj =
1
Kj + Kk
s.t. 0   < 1 (4.5)
This equation states that the production costs of knowledge capital F in
country j are inversely related to the total (i.e. world-wide) knowledge capital
stock. That is, the larger the existing knowledge capital stock, the smaller are
marginal production costs of an additional new variety of knowledge capital,
which thus denes the knowledge di¤usion e¤ect. However, the extent to
which the two di¤erent knowledge capital stocks contribute to this di¤usion
mechanism di¤ers. Specically, Kk contributes only  as much to learning
as Kj. As we saw already in Chapter 2, the reason for this is that knowledge
di¤usion has been found to be spatially bounded (Ja¤e et al., 1993; Audretsch
37For all three rms to exist simultaneously, it is neccesary that their Ricardian sur-
pluses are equivalent in equilibrium. The condition under which this is the case is derived
in the Appendix to this chapter and given in (A2). This occurs when (i) trade costs and
xed investment costs hold each other in perfect balance, and (ii) wage di¤erentials be-
tween the two countries are not too large, so that exporting from either country is equally
protable.
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and Feldman, 1996; Keller, 2001). Hence, the knowledge capital stock in
country k contributes less in terms of spillovers and transfers to country j
than the knowledge stock of country j itself. As such,  can be thought of
as a localization parameter.
Now consider the e¤ect of a change in the number of horizontal and
vertical MNEs from country k on Fj in (4.5):
dFj
dhk
=  (1 + )(1 + )
2 (Kj + Kk)
2 (4.6)
dFj
dvk
=   
(Kj + Kk)
2 (4.7)
Given the restrictions on  and , it is immediately clear that the decrease in
Fj due to an increase in hk is larger than that due to an increase in vk.38 The
intuition is also straightforward: The horizontal MNE employs knowledge
capital in both countries, whereas the vertical MNE only in its headquar-
ters in the foreign country. Moreover, only half of the horizontal MNEs
knowledge stock di¤usion e¤ect is spatially bounded through , whereas this
applies to the entire knowledge capital stock of the vertical MNE. Based on
this observation, we expect horizontal FDI to generate larger knowledge dif-
fusion e¤ects than vertical FDI, as the e¤ect on Fj will also increase nj-rm
prots in (4.1).
This theoretical derivation corresponds with studies that have found that
knowledge transfer and knowledge spillovers from FDI are most likely if
MNEs are well embedded in their host countries. Lall (1980) has identied
a number of conditions under which spillovers for local rms are maximized.
These all pertain to increasing the embeddedness of the MNEs a¢ liate in
the local economy, like help setting up production facilities, involving local
suppliers in the production process, and providing training to local suppliers
(see also Chen et al. 2004). Investors who are only looking for cheap labour
and are not interested in establishing local linkages typically operate in en-
claves(Singer, 1950), and as Kokko (1994) showed, spillovers are less likely
in industries with enclavecharacteristics where large technology gaps and
high foreign shares coincide.39
38That is, jdFj=dhkj > jdFj=dvkj , (1 + )(1 + ) > 2 which always holds since
0   < 1 and  > 0.
39Note that this only holds since we have modelled the industry-learning curve as
a¤ecting xed (knowledge capital) costs only (F ), whereas in Chapter 3 we also modelled
knowledge di¤usion to occur through marginal costs ().
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The distinction between vertical and horizontal FDI and the spillover
e¤ect is also related to the MNEs global strategy, being - in extreme cases
- either a strategy of global integration or local responsiveness (Prahalad
and Doz, 1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Given the nature of vertical
FDI as a critical input in the global production process, MNEs pursuing a
strategy of global integration create relatively few linkages with local partners
in order not to endanger the global production loop. Horizontal investments,
associated with a relatively higher need for local partners, and associated with
a strategy of local responsiveness, yield higher levels of local embeddedness
and are associated with a relatively larger potential for spillovers compared
with vertical FDI. In this context, Holm et al. (2003) have tested if the
autonomy granted to a subsidiary a¤ects the impact this FDI has on the local
(Swedish) economy. They nd that subsidiary impact on the host country
economy is positively related to the autonomy granted to this subsidiary,
supporting the view that those foreign a¢ liates that only serve as inputin
the production process (vertical FDI) have a relatively low impact on their
host economies. And those foreign a¢ liates still part of the global MNEs
production process but with a clear separate role for themselves, positively
a¤ect the host environment.
4.2.2 Regional Integration Agreements
The model that was discussed in the previous section suggests that the
amount and composition of FDI depends on transport or trade costs  . Con-
sequently, the existence of Regional Integration Agreements - usually set up
to establish free trade among the member nations - can have important ef-
fects on FDI and the accompanying productivity e¤ects. There is a relatively
elaborate literature on the e¤ects of Regional Economic Integration (REI) or
Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) on the amount and composition of
trade and FDI ows (Dunning, 2000; Buckley et al., 2003). However, to the
best of our knowledge, there is no study that analyzes the impact of RIAs
on productivity e¤ects of FDI.
Our sample of countries (cf. Table A.1 in the Appendix) allows us to
distinguish between two RIAs: The Canada United States Free Trade Agree-
ment (CUSFTA) and the European Union (EU). They di¤er in several no-
table respects: (1) CUSFTA only encompasses two countries, whereas the EU
includes (during our sample period) 15 countries; (2) The home country (i.e.
the US) is an insider in CUSFTA but an outsider to the EU; (3) CUSFTA
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allowed its members to pursue their individual third-country trade policies,
notably tari¤s, whereas the EU requires its members to harmonize their in-
dividual trade policies at the external border of the union; (4) The Internal
Market Program in the EU ensures free movement of (production) factors -
notably labor - between its member states, but this is not the case for CUS-
FTA. These aspects inuence the amount and composition of US outward
FDI into the member states of the two RIAs di¤erently, and consequently
di¤erent productivity e¤ects may arise.
Regarding the extent of horizontal FDI, new trade theory suggests that
RIAs will induce a substitution away from horizontal FDI and towards ex-
ports, since the RIA decreases the opportunity costs of exports by lowering
trade costs (Markusen, 1984; 2002). This is also known as the proximity-
concentration trade-o¤ (Brainard, 1997). Its e¤ect can be illustrated by
making use of condition (A2) in the Appendix. For horizontal FDI, we focus
on the rst two terms of this condition (i.e. the terms on the LHS and RHS
of the rst = sign). To make the condition less unwieldy, assume symmetry
across the two economies. Rearranging terms a bit, the condition becomes:
 =
1  
1 + 
(4.8)
where    1  2 [0; 1] is a freeness of trade parameter, and  > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution between two X sector varieties.  takes a value
of 0 when trade costs are prohibitive and 1 if trade is completely free. If
condition (4.8) is satised, it is equally protable to serve both markets
either as a horizontal MNE or as a domestic rm. If  > RHS, the loss
of scale economies when engaging in horizontal FDI is larger than the loss
due to transport costs when exporting as a domestic rm. Hence, we would
observe a substitution away from horizontal FDI and towards international
(arms length) trade when  increases.40
As mentioned, two crucial di¤erences between CUSFTA and the EU in
this respect are that the US is an insider to CUSFTA but an outsider to the
EU, and that the single market program in the EU only applies to member
countries, but not at the external border. In other words, even though US
rms benet from CUSFTA in terms of decreased (or zero) trade costs, this
40To see the e¤ect of a RIA on this condition, note that a RIA decreases trade costs  ,
which implies an increase in . This in turn lowers the RHS of (4.8), so that ceteris paribus
 > RHS. So indeed, we expect a RIA to induce a substitution away from horizontal FDI
towards international trade.
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does not apply (or less so) with respect to the EU. As such, we would expect
the extent of horizontal FDI and the associated productivity e¤ects to be
larger in the EU than in CUSFTA.41
Models of vertical FDI (Helpman, 1984) predict an increase in this type of
FDI as a consequence of RIA, since cross-border trade becomes cheaper. To
see this, consider condition (A2) again, but now focus on the nal two terms
(i.e. the terms on the LHS and RHS of the second = sign). If these terms
balance, it is equally protable to serve both markets either as a vertical
MNE or as a domestic rm. However, if the LHS is larger than the RHS,
it is more protable to do so through vertical FDI (with headquarters in j
and production in k).42 Hence, this induces a substitution away from arms
length international trade towards intra-rm international trade, i.e. vertical
FDI.
To see how a RIA impacts on this mechanism, consider the e¤ect of a
reduction in trade costs (i.e. an increase in ) on the RHS of this condition:
dRHS
d
=
1
1  
"
(YkP
 1
k )
2   (YjP  1j )2
D2
# 
1 
(4.9)
where D is the denominator of the RHS of condition (A2). Since  > 1, this
condition is negative as long as real GDP in economy k (Yj corrected by the
price index) is larger than real GDP in economy j. The reason is that it is
more protable to produce and export from the larger economy as a vertical
MNE with headquarters in country j and production in country k, than to
do so from country j, given the presence of positive trade costs. Hence, a
decrease in  (i.e. an increase in ) due to a RIA induces a substitution away
from arms length international trade and towards vertical FDI.
The crucial di¤erence between CUSFTA and the EU in this context is
again that the US is an insider to CUSFTA, but an outsider to the EU. This
would imply that the extent of vertical FDI from the US will surely increase
in CUSFTA, but not necessarily so in the EU. As such, we would expect the
41However, the EU could induce so-called export platform FDI by US MNEs (cf.
Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen, 2007), in which US MNEs set up an export platform
in one of the EU countries, and serve the others through exports from that platform. We
will consider this possibility in the empirical analysis.
42Note that an increase in the LHS could imply inter alia that the wage in country
j relative to the wage in country k has increased, making production in country k more
attractive.
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associated productivity e¤ects of vertical FDI to be larger in CUSFTA than
in the EU.
4.2.3 Other theoretical considerations
Next to the intra-industry knowledge di¤usion e¤ects analyzed above, the
analysis in Chapter 3 also indicates that we should take into account price
(and competition) e¤ects, and inter-industry e¤ects when analyzing net pro-
ductivity e¤ects. Regarding price e¤ects, the formulation of the price index
(A1) in the Appendix shows that the e¤ects of vertical and horizontal MNEs
from country k on price indices in country j are similar. Accordingly, in terms
of competition e¤ects, the entry of a horizontal MNE is also expected to have
similar competition e¤ects on domestic rms as the entry of a vertical MNE,
since the horizontal MNEs can serve markets in country k at similar prices
as vertical MNEs from k can. However, we note that our empirical analysis
below is not conducted at the rm-level, but at the industry-level, so that we
need to consider the e¤ects of increased competition on industry productiv-
ity. In this case, it can be expected that the least productive (domestic) rms
are the rst that cannot meet zero-prot conditions anymore, and hence have
to leave the market.43 As such, the average industry-productivity is expected
to increase due to increased competition e¤ects, which further reinforces the
superior productivity e¤ect of horizontal over vertical FDI.
Finally, regarding the inter-industry e¤ects, we have not considered these
formally in the analysis above. However, the denitions of horizontal and
vertical FDI given above suggest that horizontal FDI is more dependent on
external local suppliers than vertical FDI, since the latter is part of a global
MNE supply chain, and thus can depend on internal suppliers for interme-
diate goods. Accordingly, we thus expect backward productivity e¤ects to
be larger for horizontal than for vertical FDI. Similarly, forward productivity
e¤ects of horizontal FDI are also expected to outperform those of vertical
FDI, since horizontal FDI is again more embedded in the local host-country
economy in terms of local customers than vertical FDI. In fact, our proxies
for vertical FDI (see below) imply that there are no forward productivity
e¤ects of vertical FDI at all.44
43Note that our model does not explicitly consider heterogeneity in productivity across
rms (cf. Melitz, 2003 and Helpman et al., 2004).
44In this sense, the denition of vertical FDI (cf. Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004)
and our operation thereof diverges somewhat from the formalization based on Ekholm and
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As far as the inter-industry e¤ects in the two di¤erent RIAs are con-
cerned, the literature on the inuence of RIAs on sourcing patterns of MNEs
argues that foreign a¢ liates will source more of their inputs internation-
ally following a RIA, since importing inputs becomes cheaper (Tavares and
Young, 2006). This implies that the extent of local (intranational) backward
linkages and the related backward productivity e¤ects will decrease follow-
ing a RIA. As indicated in the previous subsection, due to its larger size and
larger (economic) di¤erences between its member states, the possibilities of
international input sourcing are wider and more diverse in the EU (Cantwell,
1989), so that we expect the local backward productivity e¤ects of all types
of FDI to be larger in CUSFTA than in the EU. A similar argument could be
applied regarding the forward productivity e¤ects of horizontal FDI: Since
the possibilities producing for a large and diverse international market un-
hampered by trade costs are larger in the EU than in CUSFTA, we would
also expect that the accompanying local forward productivity e¤ects in the
EU are smaller than in CUSFTA.
In sum, based on the foregoing we expect both the intra-industry as well
as the inter-industry productivity e¤ects of horizontal FDI to be larger than
those of vertical FDI. In addition, given the importance of transport costs
for these di¤erent types of FDI, we also expect an impact of RIAs on the
productivity e¤ects of these two FDI types. Specically, we expect that the
e¤ects of horizontal FDI are larger than those of vertical FDI in the EU,
whereas the opposite holds in CUSFTA. In the rest of this chapter, we will
investigate these issues empirically.
4.3 Data and methodology
4.3.1 Data
In constructing measures of horizontal and vertical FDI, we use industry-
level data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data
allow us to measure the activities of foreign a¢ liates of US MNEs in 13
Forslid (2001). According to the denition, vertical FDI only produces for and sells to other
parts of the MNE so that no local sales in the host-country market occur. However, the
formalization given above di¤ers from this denition, as the vertical MNE still sells output
in the host-country. This is a necessary assumption, since otherwise the decrease in vertical
MNE prots would be too large for all three rms to be able to co-exist simultaneously
(also see condition A2 the Appendix).
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OECD countries over the period 1987-2003 (for a list of industries and host-
countries used in this chapter, see Table A.1 in the Appendix). The BEA
provides data regarding the operations of foreign subsidiaries on inter alia
the amount of their annual sales, their net xed capital stocks, the number
of persons employed, and MNE R&D expenditures. The BEA data further
allow us to distinguish the share of foreign a¢ liate sales of US MNEs destined
for the local (host country) market. Accordingly, we proxy horizontal FDI
as:
Horizontal FDI =
local salesjkt
total salesjkt
 FDIjkt (4.10)
where j, k and t index industry, country and time respectively and FDI is a
proxy of foreign MNE presence. Specically, in reporting our results below,
we use three di¤erent proxies for FDI: (1) Subsidiary capital stocks, (2) sub-
sidiary employment, (3) subsidiary R&D stocks. Taking these three di¤erent
measures of MNE presence follows up on an observation by Görg and Strobl
(2001) that di¤erent measures yield di¤erent empirical results (cf. Section
2.2). Wei and Liu (2006) and Wei et al. (2008) argue that this may be due
to the fact that di¤erent measures relate to di¤erent di¤usion mechanisms.
Applying a proxy of foreign capital (our rst proxy), the positive spillover
e¤ect may simply indicate that the foreign presence produces a positive cap-
ital spillover e¤ect. In this case, the positive externalities are closely related
to the demonstration e¤ect of the suitability of the project, or the superior-
ity of machinery or equipment embodying updated technologies. Applying
a proxy of employment in foreign rms (our second proxy), the spillover ef-
fect may be closely associated with employee turnover or contagion between
employees in foreign and local rms. Finally, applying a proxy of R&D in
foreign rms (our third proxy), the spillover e¤ects are likely to be linked
with knowledge di¤usion of the superior product or knowledge acquisition
via reverse engineering of the product.
As mentioned in footnote 44, empirical proxies for vertical FDI generally
diverge from the formal approach outlined in the previous section, in the
sense that they only capture that part of production which is exported back
home (Barba- Navaretti and Venables, 2004; Braconier, Norbäck and Urban,
2005; Ekholm et al., 2007). Nonetheless, to proxy vertical FDI, we have
several options. If we follow the model as strictly as possible, we should only
consider the exports from the subsidiary back to the parent rm or home
country as a valid proxy for vertical FDI. However, given that MNEs slice
up their value-added chain in more than two pieces, it can reasonably be
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expected that subsidiaries will also export intermediates to each other, in
which case we should also include other intra-rm (a¢ liate-a¢ liate) exports
as a proxy for vertical FDI. Unfortunately, regarding intra-rm trade we
only have data on parent-subsidiary trade, and not on subsidiary-subsidiary
trade. Therefore, we employ several di¤erent computation methods. First,
we compute:
V ertical FDI =
exports to other countriesjkt
total salesjkt
 FDIjkt (4.11)
Since these exports to some extent also capture exports from subsidiaries
to una¢ liated parties (which does not belong to vertical FDI but instead can
be coined as export platform FDI), we split up this variable and also consider
the productivity e¤ects of:
Parent V ertical FDI =
exports to US parentjkt
total salesjkt
 FDIjkt (4.12)
Export FDI =
exports to third countriesjkt
total salesjkt
 FDIjkt (4.13)
In order to capture the inter-industry e¤ects, we employ a similar strategy
as in Chapter 3. Specically, in order to capture the forward productivity
e¤ects of horizontal FDI, we compute:
Forward Horizontal FDIjt =
X
j
 
jh Horizontal FDIht

(4.14)
s.t. j 6= h
where jh is the share of output supplied by industry h to industry j, not
including intra-industry supplies. Note that given our di¤erent proxies of
vertical FDI as dened above, by construction they do not generate any
local forward productivity e¤ects, since none of their output is destined for
the local market and hence they are not related to any local downstream
(customer) rms.
Backward productivity e¤ects in turn are captured by:
Backward Horizontal FDIjt =
X
j
(jh Horizontal FDIht) (4.15)
s.t. j 6= h
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where jh is the share of inputs purchased by industry h from industry j,
again not including intra-industry supplies. Similar backward measures are
also computed for V ertical FDI, Home V ertical FDI and Other V ertical
FDI. The input-output data were obtained from the OECD.45
4.3.2 Method
The model we wish to estimate resembles model (2.8) in Chapter 2 and takes
the following form:
!jkt = 0 + 1FDIjk;t 1 + 2Xjkt + j + k + t + "jkt (4.16)
where as before j, k and t index industry, country and time respectively, ! is
total factor productivity (TFP), FDI is a vector with measures of horizontal
and vertical FDI in period t  1 to take into account the lag between MNE
activity and productivity change (i.e. it takes time for FDI to have its full
impact on productivity), X is a vector of control variables, ,  and  are
xed e¤ects and " is an idiosyncratic error term. We use two control variables
in the vector X: (the log of) industry-level exports, measured in millions of
US dollars and also taken from the STAN database (Exports), and (the log
of) industry-level R&D stocks, computed from data on R&D expenditures
(from the OECD ANBERD database R&D) using the perpetual inventory
method and imposing a generic annual depreciation rate of 15% (Hall and
Mairesse, 1995).46 Since industry-level exports also contain the exports of
the US MNEs in our sample that we use in constructing the di¤erent FDI
types, we net out those exports from the industry aggregate.
As in Chapter 3, we rst derive TFP as the residuals from production
functions that we estimate for each industry separately. Specically, log
linearizing a Cobb-Douglas production function we estimate (with lower case
letters denoting logs):
yjkt = 0 + 1jljkt + 2jkjkt + !jkt (4.17)
45A couple of comments apply here. First, the sector denitions and levels of aggre-
gation of the OECD and BEA di¤er, we appropriately aggregated the OECD data before
constructing valid I-O shares. Second, for most OECD countries, I-O data are only avail-
able for 1995-2002. We therefore used the 1995 data for the years 1987-1995, and the 2002
data for the years 1996-2003. We have used alternative assignments and the qualitative
results remain.
46Logs of these variables are used since their distributions are rather skewed, with a
few industry-country pairs demonstrating very high levels of R&D stocks and exports.
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where y is value added, l are labor inputs and k are capital inputs. The
data for y and k are obtained from the OECD STAN database, and the
data on l from the Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC). y
and k are measured in millions of US dollars, and the latter are computed
from data on capital expenditures using the perpetual inventory method and
imposing a generic annual depreciation rate of 5% (Hall and Mairesse, 1995).
l is measured in (thousands) of hours worked. We estimate this production
function with Generalized Least Squares (GLS).47 All variables have been
deated using industry-level GDP deators.48 When appropriate, variables
measured in foreign currencies (in case of OECD data) have been transformed
into US dollars using 1995 PPP exchange rates.
We follow Girma and Görg (2007) and assume that (the log of) TFP fol-
lows and AR(1) process with xed e¤ects (already included in model (4.16)):
!jkt = !jk;t 1 + j + k + t + "jkt (4.18)
so that combining this process with model (4.16) yields the following empir-
ical model:
!jkt = 0 + !jk;t 1 + 1FDIjk;t 1 + 2Xjkt + j + k + t + "jkt (4.19)
This is the empirical model that will be estimated below.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the potential endogeneity of FDI is a well-
known problem: If foreign investors set up their subsidiaries in more produc-
tive countries, sectors or regions, any inferred productivity e¤ects from FDI
in model (4.19) will be spurious. Using lagged FDI variables could to some
extent address this problem, however, this solution is less suited in situations
where the series are persistent over time, which is the case here. Reverting to
instrumental variable (IV) regression analysis would provide an alternative
way out of this situation, but such an approach is not straightforward in
the present context: even though the gravity literature provides a number of
47Note that in Chapter 3, we used the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology to correct for
the fact that the variable inputs will be correlated with TFP in model (4.17). However,
as noted by Bitzer, Geishecker and Görg (2008), this is not neccesary when estimating
production functions at the industry level, since it could then be argued that output or
value added is stochastic, so that OLS or GLS leads to consistent coe¢ cient estimates.
48Although Kafouros and Buckley (2008) argue and demonstrate that the use of com-
mon deators is not appropriate when dealing with R&D expenditures, we are not aware
of more specic deators for these countries and sectors on the scale used in our sample.
As such, we use GDP deators for R&D as well.
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potentially exogenous instruments for FDI (cf. Frankel and Romer, 1999),
these mainly function at the country level rather than the industry level that
we explore in this paper.
Additionally, the lagged dependent variable !jk;t 1 captures dynamic ad-
justments of sectoral productivity. To the extent that productivity depends
on its past realizations (e.g. due to learning e¤ects or business cycles), its
inclusion is important to control for sluggish adjustment of the produc-
tivity and to obtain unbiased coe¢ cient estimates of the other explanatory
variables (Baum, 2006). However, it again induces endogeneity since !jk;t 1
is by denition correlated with the error term "jkt.
Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to revert to Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation (Baum, 2006; Roodman, 2006). One
specic estimator in this context is di¤erence-GMM by Arrelano and Bond
(1991) which transforms the model in (4.19) into rst di¤erences:
!jkt = !jk;t 1 + 1FDIjk;t 1 + 2Xjkt +t +"jkt (4.20)
This removes the country and industry-level xed e¤ects, but it does not
solve the endogeneity problem since !jk;t 1 in !jk;t 1 is now correlated
with "jk;t 1 in "jkt. However, under the assumptions that the error term is
not serially correlated and that explanatory variables are not correlated with
future realizations of the error term, deeper lags of the explanatory variables
are orthogonal to the error term, and hence may serve as proper instruments
(cf. Carkovic and Levine, 2005). Thus the following moment conditions are
used:
E(!jk;t s  ("jkt   "jk;t 1)) = 0 s.t. s  2; t = 3; ::; T (4.21)
E(FDIjk;t s  ("jkt   "jk;t 1)) = 0 s.t. s  2; t = 3; ::; T
However, to the extent that these explanatory variables are persistent
over time or close to a random walk, lagged levels contain little information
about future changes, and as such they will make weak instruments (Carkovic
and Levine, 2005; Roodman, 2006).
Blundell and Bond (1998) solve this problem by extending the outlined
approach to also include the levels equation in model (4.19), and using lagged
di¤erences i.e. !jk;t s and FDIjk;t s to instrument the endogenous
variables ! and FDI. These instruments are uncorrelated with the country
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and industry-level xed e¤ects, i.e.:
E((!jk;t s   !jk;t s 1)  (j + k + "jkt)) = 0 s.t. s  1 (4.22)
E((FDIjk;t s   FDIjk;t s 1)  (j + k + "jkt)) = 0 s.t. s  1
For estimation purposes, the Blundell-Bond estimator builds a system of
both models in (4.19) and (4.20) but treats them as a single-equation. As
such, this estimator is called the system-GMM estimator, and we adopt it
here as it exploits more information in the data than the di¤erence-GMM
estimator alone.
Given the relatively limited amount of observations in our sample (N
= 550 in the largest sample), we are forced to restrict the number of lags
used in instrumentation to avoid over-tting of the model (Roodman, 2006).
Following Dri¢ eld and Love (2007), we rst impose a maximum lag struc-
ture of 4 years. However, further inspection indicates that the error term in
model (4.19) is autocorrelated up to AR(4), which renders the rst four lags
of the instruments for the endogenous variables invalid (since they are not
exogenous). Hence, we use lags 5-8 to instrument the endogenous variables.
Moreover, we employ the one-step estimator. As Madariaga and Poncet
(2007) argue, although the two-step estimator is more e¢ cient, it is only
appropriate in relatively large samples, otherwise it heavily biases the coe¢ -
cient estimates. Finally, we utilize the small sample correction proposed by
Roodman (2006), include time dummies in order to minimize the occurrence
of contemporaneous (cross-section) correlation, and report robust standard
errors.49
Table 4.1 shows some summary statistics and pairwise correlations of the
di¤erent variables. There is a relatively high correlation between R&D and
exports (0.63). Even though we include both variables simultaneously in
the empirical specications below, running the regressions with either one of
them did not change the results much. In addition, there is a relatively high
degree of correlation between the backward variables of Horizontal FDI
on the one hand, and the backward variables of the vertical FDI types on
the other, which has led us not to include them in the model simultaneously.
Finally, the high correlation between the backward variables of V ertical FDI
49Although the denition of a "small sample" is somewhat arbitrary, the e¤ect of this
correction is that t-statistics instead of z-statistics are used to determine statistical signi-
cance, which seems appropriate given the maximum dimensions of our sample (N = 138
and T = 17).
111
Multinational Heterogeneity and Knowledge Di¤usion
T
able
4.1:
D
escriptive
statistics
and
pairw
ise
correlations
(N
=
547)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
1.
L
og
T
F
P
1.00
2.
L
og
lagged
T
F
P
0.92
1.00
3.
L
og
R
&
D
0.19
0.19
1.00
4.
L
og
E
xp
orts
-0.06
-0.09
0.63
1.00
5.
H
orizontal
F
D
I
-0.17
-0.13
0.32
0.19
1.00
6.
V
ertical
F
D
I
0.19
0.14
0.20
0.11
-0.43
1.00
7.
P
arent
V
ertical
F
D
I
0.22
0.19
-0.08
-0.16
0.00
0.34
1.00
8.
E
xp
ort
F
D
I
0.07
0.03
0.25
0.20
-0.45
0.83
-0.25
1.00
9.
B
ackw
ard
H
orizontal
F
D
I
-0.03
-0.02
0.04
0.08
0.16
-0.22
0.01
-0.23
1.00
10.
B
ackw
ard
V
ertical
F
D
I
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.05
-0.20
0.01
-0.21
0.82
1.00
11.
B
ackw
ard
P
arent
V
ertical
F
D
I
0.10
0.11
0.12
-0.05
0.10
-0.10
0.33
-0.30
0.50
0.56
1.00
12.
B
ackw
ard
E
xp
ort
F
D
I
-0.02
-0.03
-0.03
0.06
0.00
-0.17
-0.19
-0.06
0.68
0.86
0.08
1.00
13.
Forw
ard
H
orizontal
F
D
I
-0.11
-0.12
-0.39
0.32
0.25
0.13
0.29
-0.04
0.33
0.14
0.16
0.06
1.00
M
ean
0.13
0.10
8.20
9.35
3.59
2.77
0.55
2.22
0.40
0.26
0.07
0.20
0.93
standard
deviation
0.35
0.35
1.52
1.23
1.75
1.56
0.90
1.52
0.53
0.39
0.19
0.34
0.71
N
otes:
C
orrelations
>
|.08|
are
signicant
at
p<
.05.
112
4. Market orientation and knowledge di¤usion from FDI
and its two subtypes (Parent V ertical FDI and Export FDI) is not a
problem since they never enter the model simultaneously either.
4.4 Empirical results
Table 4.2 presents the empirical results with Horizontal FDI and V ertical
FDI as the variables of interest. Each group of three columns utilizes a
di¤erent proxy for FDI: capital stocks (columns 1, 4 and 7), employment
levels (columns 2, 5 and 8), and R&D stocks (columns 3, 6 and 9). Moreover,
all the FDI coe¢ cients reported in the tables below are standardized coef-
cients. The reason for reporting standardized coe¢ cients is that we want
to be able to meaningfully compare the marginal e¤ects of Horizontal FDI
and V ertical FDI. However, the summary statistics in Table 4.1 clearly
indicate that both the mean and standard deviation between these two FDI
types di¤er substantially, especially when splitting up V ertical FDI. As
such, comparing regular coe¢ cient estimates would be invalid, as di¤erences
in magnitude are partly a reection of the di¤erent within-sample distri-
butional properties of the di¤erent variables. In this case, comparing the
standardized coe¢ cients allows us to make meaningful inferences regarding
the di¤erent marginal impact e¤ects, as the within-sample distributions of
the variables are equalized.
First consider the results of columns (1)-(3), where only the intra-industry
e¤ects of the di¤erent FDI types are considered. Horizontal FDI is positive
and signicant only when capital stocks are used as the FDI proxy, and
insignicant in the other cases. V ertical FDI on the other hand is positive
and signicant for all FDI proxies. Moreover, when capital stocks are used,
the marginal e¤ect of V ertical FDI is larger than that of Horizontal FDI,
a results which is not in accordance with the expectations that we formulated
in Section 4.2.1. The other explanatory variables are all signicant and with
the expected sign. Finally, the bottom of the table provides the statistical
tests of the models. The Sargan-Hansen test statistics of overidentifying
restrictions are never signicant, suggesting that the null hypothesis of valid
(i.e. exogenous) instruments can be accepted. The AR statistics indicate
rst-order autocorrelation, as we would expect (given the inclusion of the
lagged dependent variable), but no serial correlation from AR(5) onwards,
conrming that our use of period 5-8 lagged instruments is valid (cf. Section
4.3.2).
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Columns (4)-(6) report results including backward and forward e¤ects
from Horizontal FDI, whereas columns (7)-(9) include backward e¤ects
from V ertical FDI. The results are similar as before: in column (4) we again
observe a positive and signicant intra-industry e¤ect of Horizontal FDI,
whereas V ertical FDI is positive and signicant in all cases. Once again,
the di¤erences in coe¢ cient sizes between Horizonta /l FDI and V ertical
FDI in column (4) are the opposite of what we would expect. Additionally,
the positive e¤ect of Horizontal FDI has disappeared completely in column
(7).
It seems that including the backward e¤ects of V ertical FDI inuences
the estimated intra-industry e¤ects of Horizontal FDI, even though in none
of the columns (7)-(9) the inter-industry e¤ects are signicant. As such, we
generally have most condence in the results of the rst three columns, indi-
cating that the e¤ects of Horizontal FDI are only positive and signicant
when capital stocks are used, whereas V ertical FDI has a positive and sig-
nicant e¤ect for all FDI proxies.
A possible explanation for the unexpected result that the coe¢ cient of
Horizontal FDI is smaller than that of V ertical FDI could be related to
the di¤erent components of V ertical FDI. As we discussed in Section 4.3.1,
V ertical FDI consists of exports back to parent companies (Parent V ertical
FDI) and exports to third countries (Export FDI), which largely resembles
export platform FDI. Since only Parent V ertical FDI corresponds closely
to the operationalization of vertical FDI in the model in Section 4.2.1, a
true test of the models implications should compare Horizontal FDI with
Parent V ertical FDI. To investigate this issue further, consider Table 4.3.
It has a similar setup as Table 4.2, but now we further disentangle V ertical
FDI into Parent V ertical FDI and Export FDI.
Similar to the results in Table 4.2, Horizontal FDI has a consistently
positive and signicant e¤ect only when capital stocks are used and the
backward e¤ects of Parent V ertical FDI and Export FDI are excluded.
However, comparing its coe¢ cient estimate with that of Parent V ertical
FDI in columns (1) and (4), it is clear that the e¤ect of Horizontal FDI is
indeed larger, as expected. Additionally, we now also nd a relatively con-
sistent negative forward productivity e¤ect of Horizontal FDI in columns
(4)-(6).
Next consider the e¤ects of Parent V ertical FDI. We nd consistently
positive and signicant e¤ects of this type of FDI and its coe¢ cient estimate
is consistently smaller than that of Horizontal FDI when capital stocks
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are used. Moreover, there are no consistent backward productivity e¤ects of
Parent V ertical FDI, even though they show up positively and signicantly
when R&D stocks are used to proxy FDI.
Finally, Export FDI is positive and signicant in all cases, and its co-
e¢ cient estimate is consistently larger than that of Parent V ertical FDI
and Horizontal FDI. This seems to indicate that the unexpected results
when comparing Horizontal FDI and V ertical FDI in Table 4.2 are mainly
driven by the substantially larger e¤ect of Export FDI. None of its inter-
industry productivity e¤ects are consistently signicant, although again there
is an indication of a negative backward e¤ect when a¢ liate R&D stocks are
used.
In sum, it appears that splitting up V ertical FDI into Parent V ertical
FDI and Export FDI yields results that are more consistent with our the-
oretical expectations, since in that case the e¤ect of Horizontal FDI is in-
deed larger than that of Parent V ertical FDI, at least when a¢ liate capital
stocks are used. However, as discussed in Section 4.2.2, given the importance
of trade costs for these di¤erent types of FDI, this may still not be the whole
story. In particular, our theoretical model leads us to expect di¤erent results
for the EU on the one hand and CUSFTA on the other.
Table 4.4 presents the results of the empirical analysis when accounting
for these two regions. The setup is the same as before: Columns (1)-(3) only
consider the intra-industry e¤ects of the di¤erent FDI types, columns (4)-(6)
add the backward and forward productivity e¤ects of Horizontal FDI and
columns (7)-(9) the backward productivity e¤ects of Parent V ertical FDI
and Export FDI. For reasons of space, we only report the coe¢ cient esti-
mates on the FDI variables. The coe¢ cient estimates of the control variables
are similar as before.
First consider the intra-industry e¤ects. In Section 4.2.2 we formulated
the expectation that the intra-industry e¤ects of horizontal FDI would be
larger than those of vertical FDI in the EU than in CUSFTA. In accordance
with the earlier results, for Horizontal FDI, we observe a positive signi-
cant e¤ect only when capital stocks are used in column (1), and indeed the
estimated coe¢ cient is (substantially) larger in the EU than in CUSFTA.
However, adding the inter-industry e¤ects of Horizontal FDI in columns
(4)-(6), the e¤ect in CUSFTA actually disappears. As before, adding the
backward e¤ects of Parent V ertical FDI and Export FDI in column (7),
all the e¤ects of Horizontal FDI disappear. In contrast to Table 4.3, the
forward productivity e¤ects of Horizontal FDI in columns (4)-(6) are no
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longer signicant.
Next consider the intra-industry e¤ects of Parent V ertical FDI: In all
but two models, this type of FDI has a positive and signicant e¤ect in both
CUSFTA and the EU. In line with the theoretical expectations formulated
in Section 4.2.2, the e¤ect of this type of FDI is generally larger in CUSFTA
than in the EU. The backward productivity e¤ects of Parent V ertical FDI
in columns (7)-(9) show no consistent pattern.
Finally, the intra-industry e¤ects of Export FDI are never signicant in
CUSFTA and always positive and signicant in the EU. Since Export FDI is
by denition directed towards parties in third countries, in CUSFTA it is by
denition directed to outsiders, whereas in the EU it is very possibly directed
to insiders. As such, CUSFTA does not change the conditions under which
US MNEs can leverage their Canadian export platforms. However, due to the
Single Market Program in the EU, export platforms are relatively attractive
to serve insider countries within the EU. As a consequence, we would expect
to see an increase in so-called hub-and-spokecongurations of US MNEs
a¢ liates in the EU, where production or research is concentrated in one or
a couple of large centers, which in turn supply several (sales) subsidiaries
in other (insider) countries. From such a viewpoint, the presence of positive
e¤ects ofExport FDI in the EU and its absence in CUSFTA is very plausible.
As before, there are no consistent backward e¤ects of this type of FDI in
columns (7)-(9).
4.5 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter is one of the rst contributions in this eld to consider the
market orientation of MNEs subsidiaries as a dimension of heterogeneity
that might a¤ect its productivity e¤ects. Specically, we distinguish not only
between horizontal and vertical FDI, but we also consider the destination of
vertical FDI as an important factor, i.e. whether it is directed to the parent
company (which closely resembles the theoretical setup) or whether it is
directed to parties in third countries (which mainly reects export platform
FDI). In addition, to the best of our knowledge we are also the rst to
consider the mediating impact of Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs)
on the associated productivity e¤ects of these di¤erent FDI types.
Our theoretical model yields two main predictions: First of all, we should
expect that the intra-industry e¤ects of horizontal FDI are larger than those
122
4. Market orientation and knowledge di¤usion from FDI
of vertical FDI, since horizontal FDI induces more industry-wide learning
e¤ects as it employs more (knowledge) capital abroad. Our empirical results
conrm this expectation, but only when we use a¢ liate capital stocks as the
FDI proxy and compare the results with vertical FDI directed at the parent
company. For the other FDI proxies (employment and R&D stocks), the
e¤ects of horizontal FDI are largely absent.
The second main prediction of our model relates to the e¤ect of trade
costs. Specically, we have formulated the expectation that the productivity
e¤ects of horizontal FDI will be larger in the EU, whereas those of vertical
FDI will be larger in CUSFTA. Our empirical results conrm both, although
the e¤ect of horizontal FDI is again only present when a¢ liate capital stocks
are used. Additionally, we nd a consistently positive and signicant e¤ect
of export platform FDI in the EU, but not in CUSFTA, which indicates that
it is indeed substantially di¤erent from the more traditional vertical FDI.
We explain this e¤ect by noting that CUSFTA does not change the condi-
tions under which US MNEs can leverage their Canadian export platforms,
whereas it does for their EU subsidiaries. That is, due to the Single Market
Program in the EU, export platform FDI becomes more attractive in the EU
than in CUSFTA, and hence its associated productivity e¤ects tend to be
larger as well.
We have also considered the inter-industry e¤ects of these di¤erent types
of FDI, but have found no consistent e¤ects. There is some slight indication
of negative forward productivity e¤ects of horizontal FDI, but this results is
very sensitive to the inclusion of other FDI types and whether or not the two
di¤erent RIAs are accounted for. A plausible explanation for the absence
of consistent vertical linkage e¤ects may be that the level of aggregation in
our industries is too large to properly disentangle horizontal and vertical
e¤ects. That is, what is captured now as horizontal e¤ects may very well
also include vertical e¤ects across industries at a lower level of aggregation.
This somewhat clouds the interpretation of our results, but they nonetheless
imply that at lower levels of aggregation either the horizontal or vertical
e¤ects still exist.
As a nal note, there might exist an alternative explanation to our nd-
ings regarding the productivity e¤ects of vertical FDI, and the di¤erences
between the two RIAs, which is not incorporated in the theoretical model.
This explanation is o¤ered by Keane and Feinberg (2007), who study the
determinants of increased intra-rm trade between US MNE parents and
their Canadian a¢ liates during the 1980s and part of the 1990s. They give
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a convincing and detailed account of the extent to which Just In Time (JIT)
logistics drastically reduced inventory costs in Canadian subsidiaries, thus de-
creasing the costs of intra-rm trade and hence drastically increasing the ex-
tent of parent-subsidiary trade. These managerial innovations in turn might
be a source of the observed productivity e¤ects of this type of FDI in CUS-
FTA. Moreover, other studies suggest that the documented improvement
in a¢ liate productivity or e¢ ciency and the resulting increase in intra-rm
trade is not necessarily limited to Canadian a¢ liates. Antràs and Helpman
(2004) demonstrate, in a model on outsourcing versus vertical integration de-
cisions by MNEs, that more productive parents are more likely to vertically
integrate intermediate suppliers. This is essentially due to the fact that their
opportunity costs of default by an outside supplier are larger (relative to less
productive rms). Using intra-rm trade data between US MNE parents and
their foreign a¢ liates in a number of host countries, Nunn and Treer (2007)
nd macroeconomic empirical evidence for this. Hence, this explanation may
also be applicable in the EU context that we have considered.
Appendix
In order to derive the condition under which all three rm types (n, h and v)
exist simultaneously, we rst have to extend the model. Specically, we have
to introduce consumers that consume the products produced by the di¤erent
rms. Specically, assume that intertemporal consumer utility is given by:
Z 1
t=s
e (t s) ln
 
CXC
1 
Z

where CX =
Z Nj+Nk
i=0
c
( 1)=
i
=( 1)
where CX and CZ denote consumption of X and Z, where Z is a good
produced under perfect competition and constant returns to scale, using
only labor L. Z is the numéraire good in the model. CX is a CES composite
of individual manufacturing varieties, ci is consumption of variety i,  > 1
is the constant elasticity of substitution and  > 0 is the subjective rate
of time preference.  denotes the share of total income Y that is spent on
manufacturing goods X and Nj and Nk are the total number of rms (of all
types) active in countries j and k.
Optimization of consumption yields the following solution for consump-
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tion of the individual manufacturing varieties:
cjj =
Yjp
 
j
P 1 j
; cjk =
Yk(pj)
 
P 1 k
Pj = ((nj + hj + hk + vk)p
1 
j + (nk + vj)(pj)
1 )1=(1 ) (A1)
Additionally, a share of  of Y is allocated to X, a share (1 ) to Z and the
Euler equation (Y = r ) is satised. Substituting the values cjj for xjj and
cjk for xjk in (X) and optimization yields the equilibrium pricing condition:
pj =
wj
   1
In order to determine which rm types will arise, we have to compare
present value Ricardian surpluses  (i.e. the rewards to K) across rm types.
In the present setup, these are equal to (the present value of) operating
prots (p   w)c = pc=, since this is what is left over to reward K, after
rewarding L. From the Euler equation, we know that in equilibrium the
optimal discount rate is equal to . Moreover, we assume that K grows
at rate g. Hence the discounted value of Ricardian surplus i is equal to
i = (+ g) where i = n; h or v. So we obtain:
n =
w1 j
(+ g)
	
"
Yj
P 1 j
+
Yk
P 1 k
#
h =

(+ g)
	
"
w1 j Yj
P 1 j
+
w1 k Yk
P 1 k
#
v =
w1 k
(+ g)
	
"
Yj
P 1 j
+
Yk
P 1 k
#
where 	  [=(   1)]1  and    1  2 [0; 1] is a freeness of trade
parameter, which takes values of 0 when trade costs are prohibitive and 1 if
trade is completely free.
In order for all three rm types to arise we require that their Ricardian
surpluses per unit of capital are equivalent. Otherwise, one rm type could
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always do better becoming another rm type. Equivalence of these three
expressions, divided by their relevant knowledge capital outlays implies:
"

 
YjP
1 
k
YkP
1 
j
!
+ ( + 1)
#1=(1 )
=
wj
wk
=
24 YjP 1 j + YkP 1 k
Yj
P 1 j
+ Yk
P 1 k
351=(1 ) (A2)
If this condition is satised, all three rm types exist simultaneously in equi-
librium.
Table A.1: Countries and industries
Countries Industries
Belgium Computers & electronic products
Canada Chemicals
Denmark Machinery
Finland Electrical equipment, appliances & components
France Transportation equipment
Germany Food & kindred products
Ireland Primary & fabricated metals
Italy Utilities
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
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Chapter 5
FDI Motives and productivity
e¤ects
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, it was established that both the extent of MNE
ownership over its foreign subsidiaries as well as the market orientation of
such subsidiaries matter a great deal for the extent of intra and inter-industry
knowledge di¤usion, and productivity e¤ects in general. Yet another dimen-
sion of FDI heterogeneity is that of di¤ering FDI motives. In Section 2.5.3
we mentioned the distinction between technology exploiting FDI (hereafter
TE FDI) on the one hand, and technology seeking FDI (hereafter: TS FDI)
on the other. The former is the more "traditional" type, which is aimed at
exploiting a rm-specic competitive asset abroad (Hymer, 1970; Dunning,
1977; Markusen, 2002). The latter, also known as strategic asset-seeking FDI
(Dunning and Narula, 1995), or home-base-augmenting (Kuemmerle, 1999;
Le Bas and Sierra, 2002), is instead aimed at acquiring external knowledge
which resides in foreign competitor rms, and which the seeking rm itself
is lacking.50
49Parts of this chapter are based on Smeets and Bosker (2008) and Cantwell and Smeets
(2008).
50To be precise, there exist some (subtle) di¤erences between these terms. Specically,
Le Bas and Sierra (2002) argue that technology seeking FDI is directed towards o¤setting
home country technological weaknesses, whereas home-base-augmenting FDI is aimed at
targeting technologies in which both the host and the home country are relatively strong,
so as to augment a rms existing stock of knowledge. In order to not introduce too many
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The theory behind technology seeking FDI has developed the following
intuition (Kogut and Chang, 1991; Fosfuri and Motta, 1999; Siotis, 1999):
rms which lack a competitive asset or technology themselves (usually re-
ferred to as laggard rms) may try to acquire this from a more advanced
foreign competitor (the leader) by capturing knowledge spillovers.51 Since
knowledge spillovers are spatially bounded (Ja¤e et al., 1993; Audretsch and
Feldman, 1996; Almeida and Kogut, 1999), the laggard has to engage in FDI
in the country of the competitor in order to benet from these knowledge
spillovers. The resulting type of FDI is called technology seeking FDI.
Many empirical papers have indeed demonstrated that laggard rms, or
rms from lagging industries or countries, are most likely to engage in TS
FDI (cf. Berry, 2006). For example, Kogut and Chang (1991) study 825
entries of Japanese rms in 165 US industries. They nd that Japanese Joint
Ventures (JVs) with US rms are most likely to occur when the industry-
level R&D intensity of the US is high relative to Japan. The authors take
this evidence to imply that Japanese-US JVs appear to be motivated by the
sourcing of US technology by lagging Japanese rms. Similarly, Neven and
Siotis (1996) nd that US and Japanese FDI in four large EU countries is
larger when the industry-level R&D intensity of the EU countries relative
to the US and Japan is higher. Almeida (1996) uses patent citations of
foreign subsidiaries in the US to US patents in order to track knowledge
ows, and shows that European and Korean rms seek technology in the
US to o¤set their home-country disadvantages. Chung and Alcácer (2002)
investigate 1,784 FDI transactions from OECD countries into the US. They
nd inter alia that rms from lagging country-industry pairs are attracted
to US states with larger R&D intensities, which they view as consistent with
their expectation of knowledge-seeking behavior by technical laggards. To
summarize this empirical evidence in their words: The conventional wisdom
is that knowledge seeking occurs mainly among technical laggards trying to
reduce their gap by investing abroad to acquire the needed knowledge(2002:
p. 1535).
Building on these theoretical and empirical insights, Girma (2005) and
Dri¢ eld and Love (2007) have argued that it can reasonably be expected that
these di¤erent types of FDI will also generate di¤erent extents of knowledge
di¤erent terms, we will use the term technology seeking FDI throughout the chapter,
although it can also refer to home-base-augmenting FDI in some instances.
51The fact that the leader is foreign implies that the laggard rm is also located in a
(relatively) lagging industry or country.
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di¤usion to local rms: laggard rms engaging in TS FDI do not have any
technology or knowledge to di¤use themselves, in sharp contrast to leader
rms engaging in TE FDI. Hence, the implication is that TE FDI will lead
to knowledge di¤usion, whereas TS FDI will not. Indeed, both these studies
nd empirical support for this proposition.
These empirical ndings notwithstanding, case-study evidence appears
to be telling a somewhat di¤erent story. For example, in 2000, British Tele-
com (BT) set up a stand-alone venture fund in Silicon Valley. The task of
this venture fund was to identify (start-up) companies with technologies and
business solutions that were of potential interest to BT. By 2002, it had de-
veloped into a full-edged technology scouting unit, with the task of actively
identifying external technologies. In 2006, similar operations were also begun
in China and Japan (Monteiro and Sull, 2006). Relatedly, Miller (1992) doc-
uments the high degree of internationalization of advanced engineering and
R&D facilities of General Motors, Ford and Volkswagen to monitor concepts
and ideas of foreign competitors and spot trends in foreign markets.
The rms mentioned in these examples hardly stem from lagging countries
or industries, and are hardly laggards themselves. On the contrary, GM, Ford
and Volkswagen are in the top-20 of the 2008 Global 500 companies list, and
BT is at position 166. Apparently, the theory and ndings in the academic
literature regarding TS FDI are somewhat at odds with business reality.
In particular, three questions arise: rst, why are the leaders and not the
laggards engaging in TS FDI? Second, what are the laggards doing instead
to compensate their lack of competitive assets or technology? And third -
and most importantly from the objective of this thesis - does this imply that
TS FDI leads to knowledge di¤usion after all?52
The aim of this chapter is to answer these three questions by developing
a theory of technology seeking strategies for leader and laggard rms. We do
this by taking a simple formal model developed by Siotis (1999), extending
it with some recent empirical insights regarding the di¤erences between lead-
ers and laggards (Berry, 2006) and alternative technology seeking strategies
(Salomon and Jin, 2008). Using this model, we then look at optimal (i.e.
equilibrium) strategies for both leader and laggard rms. Looking ahead a
little bit, we nd - consistent with much of the case-study evidence and re-
52Note that in a leader-laggard context, the term home-base-augmenting FDI may be
more suited for the leader, whereas the term technology seeking FDI seems more suited
for the laggard. As mentioned in footnote 50, we will use the term technology seeking FDI
in both cases, but we do not deny the di¤erence between the two concepts.
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cent econometric insights - that leaders engage both in TE FDI as well as TS
FDI. We then move on to empirically investigate the implications of these
ndings for the di¤erence between productivity e¤ects between TS FDI and
TE FDI, using industry-level data of the operations of US MNEs in 14 OECD
countries. Again, consistent with both earlier literature and our own model,
we indeed nd that both TS FDI and TE FDI lead to increased productivity
of local rms.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 5.2 we extend a
model by Siotis (1999) to analyze the relationship between di¤erent technol-
ogy seeking strategies and leader and laggard rms. We then simulate our
model in Section 5.3 to nd the equilibrium outcomes. Next, we confront
our theoretical results with evidence from case studies, recent econometric
analyses, and some exploratory industry-level analysis in Section 5.4. After
that, we move on to empirically investigate the productivity e¤ects of TE
FDI and TS FDI in Section 5.5. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Theory and model
We start by pursuing the rst two questions formulated above: Why are
leaders and not laggards engaging in TS FDI? And what are laggards doing
instead to compensate their lack of competitive assets or technology? This
rst calls for a description of leaders vis-à-vis laggards.
In the theory of TS FDI, a laggard rm is backward in terms of com-
petitive assets or technology relative to the leader. This translates into low
productivity for the laggard and high productivity for the leader (Fosfuri
and Motta, 1999; Siotis, 1999). However, Berry (2006) argues that two other
aspects should be taken into account: rst, it should be acknowledged that
laggards will generally possess less absorptive capacity than leaders, which
makes it harder for them to absorb knowledge spillovers. Second, when lag-
gards set up a foreign subsidiary, they are expected to have less intra-rm
technology transfer skills than leaders, which makes it more di¢ cult to trans-
fer knowledge across rm units. Hence, our description of a laggard rm in
this chapter is a rm which has lower productivity, lower absorptive capacity
and less intra-rm technology transfer skills relative to a leader.
Our second question (what are laggards doing instead of TS FDI) implies
that there are other strategies to seek external foreign knowledge. Here we
draw from a rather large literature on learning by exporting (Egan and Mody,
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1992; Hobday, 1995; Salomon and Jin, 2008), which argues that rms can
benet from their export relationships. Mechanisms that are often mentioned
in this respect are the pressure of having to compete with foreign competi-
tors and receiving various kinds of assistance (e.g. employee training, quality
control procedures and quality standard assistance) from foreign customers
(Hobday, 1995; Crespi, Criscuolo and Haskel, 2006). Hence, learning by ex-
porting might be an alternative strategy to seek external foreign technology.
Now, consider the following model (cf. Siotis, 1999): There are two
countries, North (N) and South (S), and two rms n (the leader) and s
(the laggard). Firm ns home-country is N and rm ss home-country is S.
Suppose that generic unit marginal cost functions are given by:
hi = c  ai (5.1)
where c is a (country-specic) per-unit xed cost and ai is the technology
parameter of rm i = n; s. Hence, ai can be thought of as the competitive or
technology asset of the rm. The larger is ai, the smaller are unit marginal
costs hi. Given the rst part of our denition of a laggard rm above and
the fact that s is the laggard, it is implied that an > as.
We also dene a variable z as follows: z  (ai=an); i = s; n. In line with
previous literature (cf. Blomström et al., 2000) we argue that z is related to
absorptive capacity: That is, the lower is z, the lower is absorptive capacity.
Note that this takes care of the second part of our denition of a laggard
rm, since absorptive capacity z is always lower for rm s than for rm n
given that an > as.53
The model entails two periods. In period 1, both rms have to choose an
internationalization strategy which allows them to seek technology abroad.
Each rm can choose between exports (e) or FDI (f). Hence, a rms strategy
set  in period 1 is given by  2 fe; fg.
If a rm decides to export its products abroad, it incurs an iceberg trans-
port cost of t  1.54 As explained above, the rm can learn from export-
ing, so that it obtains a knowledge spillover of magnitude  (0    1).
Knowledge spillovers enter the marginal cost function of rm n (s) as in
dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988):
hi = c  ai   zaj (5.2)
53That is, for the n rm z = 1, whereas for the s rm z < 1.
54The name iceberg transport cost derives its name from the idea that part of the goods
that are shipped melt away in transit. Hence, to deliver an amount q, somewhat more has
to be shipped (t q).
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such that i; j = n; s and i 6= j. Hence, by engaging in exports, a rm i
obtains a share  of its foreign competitors technology stock aj, regardless
of the strategy chosen by the competitor. However, the e¤ective knowledge
spillover also depends on the absorptive capacity z of the rm (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1989; Minbaeva, Pedersen, Björkman, Fey and Park, 2003; Berry,
2006). The lower z (i.e. the lower absorptive capacity), the lower are e¤ective
spillovers (cf. Blomström et al., 2000).
If a rm decides to engage in FDI in period 1, it incurs a xed setup
cost C which is country specic. In this case, it will capture a share  (0 
  1) of the other rms knowledge stock, again contingent on its absorptive
capacity z. Doing justice to the large literature on the spatiality of knowledge
spillovers (e.g. Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996;
Ja¤e et al., 1993; Keller, 2002), we assume that knowledge spillovers obtained
through exports will be lower than those obtained through FDI , i.e.  < .
In order to capture the third and nal part of our denition of a laggard
rm, we also introduce intra-rm technology transfer skills in the case of
FDI. Hence, any spillovers that are captured by the foreign subsidiary can be
transferred back to the parent rm at some cost. Specically, we assume that
a share  (0    1) of total spillovers captured by the foreign subsidiary
is successfully transferred back home. Also, technology transfer from the
parent rm to its subsidiary is costly: only a share  (0    1) of the
original knowledge stock is successfully transferred abroad.55 Hence, if rm
s engages in FDI, this results in the following unit marginal costs functions
(where asterisks denote values in country S):
hs = c  sas   zan (5.3)
hs = c
   as   zsan
Subscripting  and  by i = n; s takes care of the third part of our denition
of a laggard rm also being less skilled in transferring knowledge across rm
units than a leader (i.e. s < n and s < n).
56
55Note that we could also let , >1, which would imply that the subsidiary is not
just transferring knowledge but also creating knowledge of its own, using the external
knowledge it captures abroad (cf. Almeida and Phene, 2004; Cantwell and Mudambi,
2005; Phene and Almeida, 2008). However, since we are mainly interested in (di¤erences
in) technology transfer skill, the proposed upper boundary of 1 is more natural. Moreover,
below we normalize n (n) to 1 so that s (s) captures the technology transfer skill-gap
between the leader and the laggard. In this case, the boundaries on  and  are irrelevant.
56This way of modeling parent-subsidiary relationships and the resulting cost-structures
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The implications of all of the above for the di¤erent marginal cost func-
tions are summarized in Table 5.1 below.
Table 5.1: Marginal cost functions
n; s export n; s FDI n export, s FDI n FDI, s export
hn = c  an   as hn = c  an   nas hn = c  an   as hn = c  an   nas
hs = c   as   zan hs = c  sas   zan hs = c  sas   zan hs = c   as   zan
hn = c  an   as hn = c   nan   as hn = c  an   as hn = c   nan   as
hs = c   as   zan hs = c   as   zsan hs = c   as   zsan hs = c   as   zan
From the formulation of marginal costs it follows that rms do not receive
knowledge spillovers automatically. For example, if rm n engages in FDI and
rm s in exports, we assume that rm s only receives knowledge spillovers
through its own exporting activities, and not from rm ns foreign subsidiary
that is present in S. This implies that rm ss marginal cost in S are given
by hs = c
 as zan instead of hs = c as zan(+n). This assumption
is based on the fact that rms have to undertake explicit technology seeking
e¤orts to benet from knowledge spillovers. Consequently, if they export,
they will only benet from the related spillovers . Alternatively, if they
undertake FDI, they will only benet from knowledge spillovers in the host
country.57
In period 2, the two rms play Cournot and earn prots. The precise
formulation of the inverse demand functions that rms face depends on the
period 1-strategies chosen by them. If rm s (n) decides to engage in FDI,
is very similar to that employed in Mudambi and Navarra (2004) (specically Figure 1, p.
389 in that paper). One crucial di¤erence is that we do not consider internal knowledge
creation by the subsidiary in our model (cf. footnote 55).
57This way of modelling technology seeking e¤ort thus assumes that being spatially
proximate does not automatically generate spillovers . An alternative approach would
be to consider explicit R&D decentralization from the parent to the subsidiary as a nec-
essary condition for technology seeking through FDI (Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers,
2007). However, we would then have to model an additional R&D decentralization stage.
We prefer this simpler setup, since our main focus is on the technology seeking strategy
decision.
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inverse demand in N (S) is given by:58
p =   qn
SN
  qs
SN
(5.4)
p =   q

s
SS
  q

n
SS
where p denotes price,  is a demand parameter, qn (qs) denotes demand for
products by rm n (s) and SN (SS) measure market size in N (S). Asterisks
denote values in S. In case rm s (n) decides to export, inverse demand
functions become:
p =   qn
SN
  qs
SN=t
(5.5)
p =   q

s
SS
  q

n
SS=t
Prots for rm n, contingent on rm ss strategy s and its own strat-
egy n are denoted by nsn . They are derived from the fact that rms
strategies are best responses to each other, and that rms maximize prots
in equilibrium. This yields eight explicit prot functions, which are relegated
to the Appendix of this chapter
5.3 Equilibrium Strategies
5.3.1 Simulation results
In order to analyze the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of this game
we have to simulate the model, as it is not analytically solvable.59 Since we
are interested in the interplay between technology seeking (via spillovers)
and rm heterogeneity (via productivity di¤erences, absorptive capacity and
intra-rm technology transfer skill) and their consequences for equilibrium
58For a formal proof on the derivation of these demand curves, see Motta (1996).
59This is due to the strategic interaction in the model, which implies that both rms
choose their optimal strategies simultaneously. Using e.g. Stackelberg leadership as a
solution concept would give us closed form solutions (see Brojvatn and Eckel, 2006 for an
analysis in this context). Since rst-mover advantages are not our primary concern here,
we use SPNE as the solution concept.
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Figure 5.1: Perfect intra-rm technology transfer
strategies, we let these parameters vary and x the others.60 We will consider
two scenarios: First, we limit leader-laggard heterogeneity to their techno-
logical capabilities (i.e. productivity). Next, we will add imperfect intra-rm
technology transfer costs and absorptive capacity to the model to see how
extending rm heterogeneity along these lines alters the model outcomes.
Scenario 1: Perfect knowledge transfer & absorptive
capacity
Figure 5.1 sets i = i = 1 (i = n; s) and z = 1 in the MC functions in
Table 5.1. In the gure (n; s) denotes the SPNE in which rm n (s) plays
strategy n (s) in period 1, where  2 fe; fg.
If knowledge spillovers are relatively low, both rms prefer to export their
products abroad, regardless of the technology gap. In this way they do not
60In general, we require that all prots are nonnegative, i.e. that  > 2c c ai(2zj 
1)   aj(2   ) (see Appendix) and that market size Si is positive for i = N;S. In line
with this requirement (and Siotis (1999) simulated parameter settings) we set  = 5,
c = c = 2, an = 1,  = =4, t = 1:05, SN = SS = 100 and C = C = 20. Note that
z  as=an = as in this case. Values for t and C are chosen such that equilibrium results
are not solely determined by the usual proximity-concentration trade-o¤ (Brainard, 1997).
In this way, we can explicitly focus on the technology seeking motives of both rms.
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incur xed setup costs, while still beneting from spillovers, although these
are smaller than those obtained through FDI. Yet, as knowledge spillovers
increase, the laggard rm soon nds it more protable to seek technology
abroad via FDI, despite the xed costs: the increase in spillovers increases
the opportunity costs of exporting, since local spillovers  are by assumption
smaller (or have a smaller impact on marginal costs) than spillovers obtained
through FDI (). Since intra-rm technology transfer skills and absorptive
capacity are perfect, the technology gap between the leader and the laggard
is only to the laggards advantage: the larger the gap, the larger the relative
gain, both for the subsidiary as well as the parent.
A similar mechanism is at work for the leader, but the technology gap
has to decrease rst before the leader will nd it protable to engage in FDI.
The reason is that the technology gap initially works to the leaders disadvan-
tage: for a large technology gap, there is relatively little to gain by absorbing
spillovers from the laggard, but relatively a lot to lose by spilling over knowl-
edge to the laggard. Consequently, the benets from higher spillovers through
FDI are not su¢ cient to compensate xed costs of FDI if the technology gap
is too large.
From Figure 5.1 it follows that there still is a large range of combinations
for z and  in which both the laggard rm and the leader rm engage in
technology seeking FDI. This would imply that the two strands of empirical
literature on rm heterogeneity and technology seeking FDI, as discussed
in the introduction of this chapter, both have it right. However, thus far
we have assumed that leader-laggard heterogeneity is limited to productivity
(or technological capabilities). That is, we have assumed that intra-rm
technology transfer of the laggard is perfect, and that absorptive capacity
of the laggard is unlimited. In the next scenario, we will depart from these
assumptions.
Scenario 2: Imperfect knowledge transfer & absorptive
capacity
We retain the assumption that n = n = 1 so that s and s can be inter-
preted as the intra-rm technology transfer skill gap of the laggard relative
to the leader. The question is at what values we should calibrate s and
s. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any study that might give us some
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Figure 5.2: Asymmetric intra-rm technology transfer
clues on this issue.61 At this point, we choose the rather arbitrary values of
s = s = 0:5, i.e. the laggard possesses 50% of the intra-rm knowledge
transfer capabilities of the leader. We will investigate the sensitivity of the
results with respect to s and s below. Additionally, we also introduce im-
perfect absorptive capacity (i.e. z  1) of the laggard (cf. Table 5.1). Figure
5.2 gives the resulting equilibrium conguration.
The results change drastically in this case. For the laggard rm, we see
that it chooses to engage in exports for all parameter combinations. For
high technology gap (z), the laggard has too small absorptive capacity to
benet from the spillovers generated by the leader. Moreover, due to the
high intra-rm technology transfer costs, the opportunity costs of engaging
61There is a study by Fors (1997) who investigates the parent-rm rate of return on
R&D generated by its subsidiary and vice versa, in sample of 121 Swedish MNEs. He
nds that of the technology generated by a MNE parent, about one-fth is employed
in its foreign subsidiaries. Conversely, of the technology generated and acquired in the
subsidiaries, no signicant amount is re-employed in the parent. Accordingly, we could
calibrate the parameters as s=0 and s=0.2. However, one problem is that Forsstudy
does not only pertain to low-productivity rms, so that these values may not be applicable.
Second, with s=0, the technology seeking benet of FDI is restricted to the subsidiary,
as no amount of knowledge can be transferred back to the parents. This would already ex
ante induce any kind of rm interested in technology seeking to do so through exports,
which obviously rules out any interesting comparisons between exports and FDI.
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in FDI are simply too high for the laggard rm: on the one hand, technology
exploitation through FDI is di¢ cult due to s = 0:5. On the other hand,
technology seeking through FDI is of smaller benet to the parent since
s = 0:5. These e¤ects work regardless of the technology gap, so that it is
not benecial for the laggard to engage in FDI.
Starting from the left-axis of Figure 5.2, the leader rm initially also
chooses exports as a response to a similar strategy of the laggard. The
reason is that knowledge spillovers are very low and, consequently, the xed
setup costs in case of FDI outweigh the higher spillovers obtained through
technology seeking. However, if the extent of knowledge spillovers increases,
the leader will remain an exporter only for an increasingly larger technology
gap. Only in case of large technological distance do the benets of increased
spillovers from the laggard not compensate su¢ ciently for the xed setup
costs of FDI. Indeed, as soon as the technology gap reaches a (relatively low)
threshold level, the leader nds it optimal to engage in FDI and capture
larger spillovers.
Sensitivity analysis
The results in scenario 2 already illustrate the sensitivity of the simulation
results with respect to changes in s and s. A further decrease in s or s
would leave the results of Figure 5.2 unaltered, as the laggard rm is already
exporting for all possible parameter combinations. An increase in s or s
however would serve to decrease the (f; e) region, as the (f; f) region would
slowly enter from the North-East. In order to illustrate this latter point, as
well as to shed light on the di¤erences of increasing either s or s, Figure
5.3 presents two variations on Figure 5.2. In panel a, s is still xed at 0.5
but s is increased to 1 whereas in panel b s is xed at 0.5 an s increased
to 1.
Comparison of the two panels demonstrates that increasing s to 1 gives
a much larger ranger of equilibria in which the laggard engages in FDI than
when increasing s to 1. The implication of this result is that technology
exploitation is a much more dominant motive in a laggards international-
ization process than technology seeking. This can be seen by noting that
increasing s serves to increase the extent to which the parent-rm can ben-
et from the spillovers picked up by the subsidiary, whereas increasing s
allows the subsidiary to exploit the parents technology (Yang, Mudambi &
Meyer, 2008). From Figure 5.3 it follows that even if technology transfer
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Figure 5.3: Assymetric parent-subsidiary and subsidiary-parent technology
transfer
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skills from the subsidiary back to the parent are on a par with those of the
leader, the laggard will still opt for exports as a technology seeking strat-
egy for a large combination of parameter values, given that its technology
exploitation skills of FDI are less developed. This clearly demonstrates the
persistence of exports as a technology seeking strategy on behalf of laggard
rms. For the leader, equilibrium strategies remain the same as in scenario
2.
5.3.2 Analytical results
In order to get a more general avor regarding the relationship between
rm heterogeneity and technology seeking strategies and the inuence of
intra-rm technology transfer skills, we now turn to some comparative static
exercises. First consider the situation in which the leader exports (n = e).
We want to determine under which condition the laggard exports as well, i.e.
under which condition it holds that ees > 
ef
s (see Appendix). We normalize
an to 1 so that z  as=an = as. Furthermore, to keep the analysis tractable,
we assume c = c, SN = SS and normalize C to 0. Comparing the relevant
prot conditions and rearranging terms yields the following condition under
which ees > 
ef
s :
z < z1 =
(  c  1)(2 + )
2s + (1 + 2s)  (2 + )  2
(5.6)
where   p(1 + t)=t.62 z1 thus describes the locus which divides the
regions (e; e) and (e; f) in Figure 5.1. This condition states that once the
technological gap falls below a certain threshold level z1, the laggard rm
chooses to export instead of FDI, conditional on the leader exporting as well.
Note that z1 increases with a decrease in laggard technology transfer skills s
and s, i.e. dz1=ds < 0 and dz1=ds < 0 .
63 A decrease in s decreases the
extent to which rm js subsidiary can exploit its technological advantage,
so that a decrease in s has to be compensated by a su¢ cient increase in
relative technological ability z for FDI to still be protable. A decrease in s
depresses the benets of FDI since it allows less of the captured spillovers to
62Note that since by denition t  1,   p2 and that lim
t!1 = 1
63This holds under the assumption that the term (  c  1) in the numerator of (5.6)
is positive, which always holds under the assumption of nonnegative equilibrium prots
(cf. footnote 60). The same applies to (2  2c  i   1) in condition (5.7) below.
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be transferred back to the parent. Hence, a su¢ cient increase in absorptive
capacity z is required to o¤set this e¤ect and still make technology seeking
through FDI protable.
We can also derive the e¤ects of the other parameters on z1. An increase
in the extent of knowledge spillovers captured through exports  serves to
increase z1 (dz1=d > 0) since it decreases the opportunity costs of exports,
given . The opposite holds for an increase in  (dz1=d < 0), since this
increases the opportunity costs of exports, given . Finally, an increase in
transport costs t serves to decrease the threshold-level z1 (see the Appendix
for a derivation). The reason is that an increase in t makes exports less
attractive than FDI. This captures the well-known tari¤-jumping motive for
FDI.
Second, we investigate under which condition the laggard will export,
given that the leader engages in FDI. That is, we are now interested un-
der what condition fes > 
ff
s holds. Again comparing the relevant prot
functions in the Appendix and rearranging gives:
z < z2 =
(2  2c  n   1)(1 + )
2(1 + s) + 2(s + 1)  4(+ 1)  (n + 1)(1 + )
(5.7)
As before, decreases in s and s serve to increase z2 as well (dz2=ds < 0;
dz2=ds < 0), and the reasons are of course similar. Also, an increase in
 again decreases the opportunity costs of local technology sourcing, thus
increasing z2 (dz2=d > 0).
However, the e¤ect of an increase in the knowledge spillovers captured
through foreign technology sourcing  is ambiguous in this case. Specically,
sign dz2=d = sign [(1 + n)(1 + )  2(1 + s)]. Consider the case in which
transport costs are very high (i.e.  ! 1). In this case, dz2=d > 0 i¤
n > s. That is, if and only if the technology transfer skill of the leader
is higher than that of the laggard, an increase in knowledge spillovers  will
increase the range of technology gaps for which a laggard still engages in
exports. The reason is that in this case, not only are knowledge spillovers
increasing, but the leaders subsidiary is also better able to transfer the cap-
tured external knowledge back to its parent and hence increase competition
with rm s in country N as well. In order for FDI to still be benecial in this
case, the laggard needs su¢ cient absorptive capacity z to make up for the
technology transfer skill-gap. A decrease in transport costs (an increase in )
will obviously make this condition less restrictive, because the opportunity
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costs of exports decrease with a decrease in t:
Since we are assuming that rm n engages in FDI, we can also infer
the direct e¤ect of changing the leaders intra-rm technology transfer skills.
Note that an increase in n decreases z2 (dz2=dn < 0): the reason is that
due to the increase in n, the level of the leaders technology stock exploited
in its subsidiary increases, hence making rm n more competitive in country
S. As a consequence, rm s needs to capture larger knowledge spillovers
through FDI and become more competitive, for a larger range of technology
gaps z. The opposite holds for an increase in n as this serves to increase
the threshold-level z2 (dz2=dn > 0): in this case, the leader is better able to
transfer knowledge spillovers captured by its subsidiary back to the parent,
thus making rm n more competitive in country N . This in turn requires
a smaller technology gap (higher z) for the laggard in order to still be com-
petitive in country N as well, given that intra-rm technology transfer is
imperfect. Finally, as before, an increase in transport costs t unambiguously
decreases z2 (see the Appendix for a derivation).
The results derived above are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If countries are similar in terms of investment environment
(c = c) and market size (SN = SS), laggard rms will sooner choose exports
over FDI as a technology seeking strategy if:
a) Technology transfer skills of the laggard rm decrease, either from the
parent to its subsidiary (s) or from the subsidiary to the parent (s);
b) Technology transfer skills of the leader rm from the parent to its sub-
sidiary (n) decrease;
c) Technology transfer skills of the leader rm from the subsidiary to the
parent (n) increase;
d) Knowledge spillovers obtained through local technology sourcing ()
increase;
e) Knowledge spillovers obtained through foreign technology sourcing ()
decrease, given that n > [2s + (1 )] =(1 + ) in case n = f ;
f) Transport costs (t) decrease.
Taken together, these results enable us two answer the rst two ques-
tions that we set out to address: why do leaders and not laggards engage
in TS FDI, and what are laggards doing instead to compensate their lack of
competitive assets or technology? The answer to the rst question is that
apart from being more productive, leaders also benet from higher absorptive
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capacity and better intra-rm technology transfer skills than laggard rms.
As we saw above, these latter two factors make FDI a more attractive and
feasible strategy to seek external foreign technology for the leader than for
the laggard. The answer to the second question is that laggards instead use
exports as a channel to seek external foreign technology, since this strategy
better ts their laggard nature.
At this point, we would briey like to reiterate some of the crucial assump-
tions that lead to these results: rst of all, we have assumed that spillovers
obtained through FDI are larger than those obtained through exports, due
to the limited geographic scope of spillovers (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Au-
dretsch and Feldman, 1996). Second, we have assumed that in order to
benet from competitorsspillovers, an explicit technology seeking e¤ort has
to be made. That is, rms cannot benet from them automatically (Cantwell
and Mudambi, 2005; Marin and Bell, 2007; Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers,
2007). Third, the outcomes of scenario 2 are somewhat sensitive to changing
the extent of the laggards intra-rm technology transfer skills. As such, any
of the equilibrium results depicted in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 may still hold
in practice. Therefore, we now turn to review some of the existing empirical
evidence and see how our theoretical results hold up.
5.4 The empirical evidence
Although we believe that the assumptions we have made in our model are
fairly well-established in the existing literature, their validity and the out-
comes of our model are in the end still an empirical matter. In this section we
will rst give some case examples of leading and lagging companies and their
technology seeking strategies, and look at some recent econometric evidence
regarding this issue. Second, we will provide a preliminary and exploratory
illustration of our theoretical results using industry-level data in combination
with US patent-citations data.
5.4.1 Case examples and existing econometric evidence
Our most important theoretical results (from scenario 2) indicate that lead-
ers are more likely to engage in FDI to seek technology whereas laggards tend
to do so through exports. In the introduction we already mentioned British
Telecom (BT) as an example of a leader rm choosing FDI as a technology
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seeking strategy (Monteiro and Sull, 2006). Indeed, from its birth in 2000
the venture fund in Silicon Valley soon developed into a full-edged tech-
nology scouting unit. The local team had to posses a high degree of both
technical and communication skills in order to be able to identify useful ex-
ternal technologies. But the teams task went further than just pinpointing
interesting developments: They also had to translate them and their business
consequences into BT language.
On top of this, there were additional tasks and skill-requirements that
related to intra-rm technology transfer: the Silicon Valley team had to
continuously understand the real needs of the business lines of BT in the UK
and moreover, be able to sell the external technologies internally. Or, in
the words of BTs vice president of the external innovation unit: It takes
that kind of multi faceted approach to know the priorities in the company.
[. . . ]. Being able to identify the mapping of what you see with the various
interests is the challenge here(Monteiro and Sull, 2006: p. 11). So indeed,
it appears that the combination of BTs productivity leadership and high
absorptive capacity and technology-transfer skills of the technology scouting
team enabled it to seek technology through FDI, and to repeat this strategy
for China and India in 2006.
Hansen and Birkinshaw (2007) document a similar strategy undertaken
by Siemens, a top-50 2008 Global Fortune 500 company. This company
sited a 15-person technology scouting unit in Berkeley, California in 1999,
with the task of searching for potentially relevant external technologies, and
match these to specic Siemens businesses. The authors also stress the impor-
tance of intra-rm technology transfer skills when pursuing such a technology
seeking strategy: A complementary approach to generating new ideas from
outside companies is to build cross-unit networks inside organizations. After
all, employees who dont know one another cant collaborate on new ideas
(2007: p. 8).
Miller (1992) mentions GM, Ford and Volkswagen as examples of (global)
leaders in the automobile industry that engage in technology seeking FDI. In
the automobile industry, there is a crucial distinction between the under-
bodyand the upper-bodyof a car. The under-body is quite universal, so
that both its R&D and production can be concentrated in one or a couple
of locations. However, the upper-body is much more sensitive to (regional)
trends, which has led the leading manufacturers to set up scouting units
in e.g. Italy and California. On top of that, they also set up advanced
engineering units in so-called pockets of innovation such as Brussels (in
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Belgium) or Germany. Miller (1995) indeed mentions that to form a global
R&D network such as that of Ford, it is very important  but di¢ cult 
to have proper inter-unit coordination and communication, so that there is
su¢ cient intra-rm technology transfer. Moreover, he also mentions su¢ cient
production scale as another requirement to viably run foreign technology
seeking units. Indeed, minimum scale requirements would yet be another
reason why leaders are more likely to engage in TS FDI than laggards. Many
other instances of TS FDI on behalf of leader rms are documented in inter
alia Dalton and Serapio (1993) and Florida and Kenney (1994).
Regarding laggard rms that engage in technology seeking through ex-
ports, Hobday (1995) mentions numerous examples from the electronics in-
dustry in East Asia. Anam Industrial, a South Korean company specializing
in chip packaging, started its business in 1968. Even though the South Ko-
rean government by that time begun initiating policies to foster the develop-
ment of chaebols and stabilize the macroeconomic environment, wide-spread
market failures in the preceding decades had largely disconnected the country
from developments in advanced countries. Consequently, at its start, Anam
found itself to be lagging heavily in terms of e.g. assembly techniques, qual-
ity control and product development. Hobday (1995) documents how Anam
quickly after its start began exporting its products to US clients. Initially,
major US clients (such as Texas Instruments) provided inter alia engineer-
ing back-up and detailed product specications. In due course, they began
assisting Anam with in-house process work to ensure quality standards, pro-
ductivity and delivery. The author notes: To gain the skills [. . . ] Anam
invested heavily in engineering training and worked jointly with several of its
largest customers(1995: p. 75). All these e¤orts culminated into the set up
of an R&D department in 1984. By now, Anam is one of the worlds largest
chip packaging companies with net sales close to US $ 3 billion in 2007.
Koesmawan (1995) studies 19 Indonesian textile factories, which are heav-
ily lagging in terms of sales, capital intensity and labour productivity relative
to their foreign counterparts. He describes how factories that exported their
fabrics to Europe and the US signicantly gained in terms of quality con-
trol processes: they started to adhere to very specic quality benchmarks,
usually expressed in the maximum number of allowed defects per 100 yards
of cloth produced. Large US and European customers assisted with imple-
menting these quality control processes, ultimately of course to their own
benet. However, during interviews, representatives of these customer rms
also indicated the di¢ culties that they experienced in this process due to
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low absorptive capacity of the Indonesian workforce, stressing inter alia the
lack of technical knowledge and English language skills of the Indonesian
engineers.
Indeed, in an excellent study of processes of innovation development in
South-Korea, Kim (1997) repeatedly documents the necessity of su¢ cient ab-
sorptive capacity in order for rms to switch from an export-based technology
seeking strategy, to a FDI-based technology seeking strategy. For example,
in describing the process leading up to the establishment of Hyundais Amer-
ican Technical Center Inc. in Ann Arbor in 1986 set up to monitor tech-
nological change Kim notes the substantial e¤orts that Hyundai spent on
internal human capital development. Regarding the adoption of computer-
aided design/computer-aided manufacturing (CAD/CAM) he notes how the
company in 1979 assembled a team which [. . . ] collected literature and
catalogs on CAD/CAM and spent the next fourteen months internalizing
explicit literature into tacit knowledge. [. . . ] The team was then expanded
to include two or three representatives from each department that would be
a¤ected by the CAD/CAM system, socializingthe tacit knowledge of the
original members to the new members. During the next nineteen months
[the team] undertook a comprehensive study of available alternative software
packages(Kim, 1997: p. 118).
These case examples provide real-world evidence for our theoretical re-
sults. On the other hand, their implications are hard to generalize outside
their particular contexts. Fortunately, there are also some recent econometric
studies that tend to corroborate our theoretical results. The most appropri-
ate study in this respect is by Berry (2006). In a sample of 631 Japanese
manufacturing rms investing in OECD countries, she directly addresses the
question of technology seeking FDI by either leaders or laggards. She nds
that Japanese rms with R&D intensities (RDIs) above the OECD average
(i.e. leaders) are more likely to set up foreign R&D labs than those with
RDIs below the OECD average (i.e. laggards). Cantwell and Janne (1999)
demonstrate that rms from leading technical centers in Europe locate R&D
labs abroad in order to seek more diverse knowledge. Chung and Alcácer
(2002) also document evidence of technical leaders engaging in TS FDI in
the US pharmaceutical industry, although leadership is determined at the
country-industry level in their study.64
64Although not primarily concerned with TS FDI, in a study of patents by US sub-
sidiaries of foreign rms, Frost (2001) nds that increased technical leadership of a sub-
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On the part of laggard rms, we know of no study that investigates tech-
nology seeking (or learning) through exports at the rm level in this partic-
ular context (i.e. focusing on rm heterogeneity and learning by exporting).
However, Salomon and Jin (2008) do provide some evidence of our theoretical
results at the industry level. Using a panel of Spanish rms, they investigate
whether rms from leading or lagging industries stand to gain the most from
exports in terms of productivity increases. Their results demonstrate that
rms from lagging industries benet most from knowledge spillovers through
this activity. Although not all rms in lagging industries need to be laggards
themselves, these results are at least indicative of our theoretical outcomes.
5.4.2 Exploratory industry-level analysis
To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that empirically investigate
the relationship between rm heterogeneity - or more specically, leaders and
laggards - and technology seeking through FDI and exports. As a preliminary
and exploratory illustration of our models outcomes, we will present some
original industry-level empirical results. As mentioned by Shan and Song
(1998) and Berry (2006), and as indicated in the previous (sub)section, look-
ing at leadership and laggardship at the industry level veils a large amount
of rm-level heterogeneity. A large number of rms in on average leading in-
dustries could still be laggards, and vice versa for laggard industries. While
we acknowledge these objections, the lack of rm-level data, combined with
our desire to at least illustrate our theoretical propositions, leads us to briey
conduct some very exploratory analyses at the industry-level.
We employ the NBER patent citations database (Ja¤e and Trajtenberg,
2002) and consider those patents granted to rms from 27 non-US OECD
countries during the period 1987-1999 (see the Appendix for a list of coun-
tries). We then construct two variables at the patent-level: (1) citUS, mea-
suring the absolute number of citations made by each patent to a US patent;
(2) rel_citUS, measuring the relative share of citations made by each patent
to a US patent (i.e. the ratio of citations made to US patents over total
citations made). A positive value for each of these variables indicates some
degree of US knowledge seeking by the foreign rm to which the patent was
sidiary increases the extent to which the subsidiary seeks knowledge in its host location.
Although leadership in this study relates to the subsidiary (and therefore is an ex post
rather than an ex ante concept), these results are nonetheless illustrative of our theory.
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granted (Gri¢ th, Harrison and Van Reenen, 2006).65
We also use information about the country of rst inventor, mentioned on
each patent. In line with earlier studies (Almeida, 1996; Almeida and Kogut,
1999; Branstetter, 2006; Singh, 2007), we assume that if the country of rst
inventor is the US, the innovation or innovative process also took place in
the US. Similarly, if the country of rst inventor is the assignees (i.e. the
applying rms) home country, we assume that the rm applying for the US
patent conducted the innovation at home (Frost, 2001). Consequently, we
are able to assign each patent a value of 0 (at home) or 1 (within US). Con-
ditional on the fact that there is a positive number of citations to US patents
(i.e. citUS  1 and rel_citUS > 0), this binary variable is our dependent
variable Technology Seeking Strategy (TSS), and measures technology seek-
ing through FDI i.e. from within the US (TSS = 1) or from the rms
home country (TSS = 0).66
Using the ANBERD and STAN databases from the OECD, we collect
industry-level data on R&D stocks and value added (computed in millions
of constant 1995 PPP US $), and then construct relative R&D intensities
(RRDIs) as follows:
RRDIjkt =
(R&DStock=V alue Added)jkt
(R&DStock=V alue Added)jUSt
(5.8)
where j, k and t index sector, country and time respectively, the numerator
is the R&D intensity (RDI) in country k (i.e. one of the 27 non-US OECD
countries) and the denominator is the RDI in the US. In line with our de-
scription of a leader and a laggard rm, we interpret an increase in RRDI as
an increase in the leadership (or equivalently, a decrease in the laggardship)
of industry j in country k relative to the US.
65Many previous studies have used patent citations as an indicator of knowledge ows
(Ja¤e et al., 1993; Branstetter, 2006; Gri¢ th et al., 2006). However, Gittelman and
Alcácer (2006) demonstrate the substantial noise that is added through citations added
by patent examiners, and the resulting biases in statistical inference and interpretation.
Although we acknowledge this limitation in the data, we are not able to correct for citations
added by patent-examiners since this information is only available from 2001 onwards.
66Of course, the fact that a rm applies for a US patent in which it builds on prior
US knowledge from its home country does not necessarily mean that it is thus seeking
technology through exports, as is the case in our theoretical model. It could for example
also be benetting from US knowledge through its interaction with US rmssubsidiaries
present in its home country, or by using patent information which is available through the
internet (cf. Branstetter, Fisman and Foley, 2006). Unfortunately, our lack of rm level
data disables us to further explore this issue.
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Similar to the RRDI variable, we also compute labour productivity (de-
ned as value added per hour worked) of the industries in the 27 (non-US)
OECD countries relative to those in the US. This variable is denoted by RLP
(relative labour productivity). In line with the rm-level specications of our
model, we interpret an increase in RLP as an increase in the productivity of
industry j in country k relative to the US.67
Finally, in order to capture an asset or technology exploiting motive, we
add a variable capturing the market size (dened as sectoral value added) of
the industries in the 27 (non-US) OECD countries relative to those in the
US as a control variable, denoted by RMS (relative market size).68 A full
list of sectors that are incorporated in the analysis is provided in Table A.1
in the Appendix.69
We then estimate the following probit model:
P (TSSijkt = 1jcitUS;ijkt  1; rel_citUS;ijkt > 0) = (5.9)
(1RRDIjkt + 2RLPjkt + 3RMSjkt +Dj +Dt) + "ijkt
where i indexes patent and  is the standard normal distribution. RRDI
measures relative RDIs as dened in (5.8), RLP measures relative labour
productivity, RMS measures relative market size, and Dj, and Dt are sector
and time dummies respectively. 1 and 2 are the parameters of interest.
In line with our theoretical model, we expect that both 1 > 0 and 2 > 0.
That is, if absorptive capacity or productivity of sector j in country k relative
to the US increases indicating a relative increase in leadership of sector j
in country k relative to the US, according to our denition  we expect
an increased probability of technology seeking FDI (i.e. from within the
US). We further have a variance-covariance structure that allows for sectoral
autocorrelation (given our panel data setup) and heteroscedasticity.
67Ideally, we should also include a proxy for relative technology transfer skills, but the
OECD does not provide data that allow for such a proxy. However, in the regression
analysis we include industry dummies to inter alia control for industry-specic di¤erences
in intra-rm technology transfer costs.
68Although we did not explicitly single out the e¤ect of relative market size in our
model, the inverse demand functions and prot functions in the Appendix make clear that
a ceteris paribus increase in market size in country S relative to country N makes FDI by
rm s less likely relative to exports, since xed investment costs are less easily recouped.
69Even though all our variables include industry-level Value Added in their computa-
tion, the variation on R&D stocks and number of hours worked is su¢ cient to prevent
issues of multicollinearity. Table A.2 in the Appendix gives descriptive statistics and
pairwise correlations for the di¤erent subsamples.
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Our nal sample contains about 240,000 patents applied for by (and
granted to) non-US rms over the period 1988-1999, where about 3,350 of
those patents were applied for from within the US (i.e. for which the country
of rst inventor was the US).
Table 5.2 presents the estimation results of the model in (5.9). As we go
from left to right in the table, we increase the restrictiveness of both citUS
and rel_citUS, i.e. we increase the required extent of technology seeking by
the patents in the sample.
Column (1) in the table does not impose any technology seeking require-
ments. As can be seen, the coe¢ cient estimate for RRDI is positive but not
signicant, whereas the coe¢ cient on RLP is positive and highly signicant.
This indicates that without imposing any technology seeking requirements,
rms in relatively more productive industries are more likely to locate their
innovative activities in the US, which is consistent with the literature on the
internationalization of R&D (Cantwell & Janne, 1999; Miller, 1995).
More important from the perspective of our model are the results in
columns (2) through (10). From the table it follows that when increasing the
technology seeking requirement, not only does the RRDI coe¢ cient become
signicant, it also becomes larger in magnitude quite consistently when in-
creasing rel_citUS at each level of citUS. This is illustrative of our models
outcome that absorptive capacity is an important driver of technology seeking
through FDI. Second, the coe¢ cient on RLP is also positive and signicant,
consistent with our models prediction that high productivity is conducive
to technology seeking through FDI. However, for very restrictive denitions
of technology seeking (rel_citUS  0:5), RLP becomes insignicant at each
level of citUS. This result, in combination with the signicant e¤ect of RRDI,
illustrates the importance of absorptive capacity over productivity for tech-
nology seeking FDI, as captured by our extended denition of a laggard rm.
Finally, the coe¢ cient on RMS has the expected negative sign (cf. footnote
68).
These results should be considered as illustrative at the very most, since
they are based on industry-level rather than rm-level leader and laggard
characteristics. Nonetheless, they hint at the potential value of our theo-
retical model and its empirical implications. As such, they may provide a
stepping-stone for future rm-level empirical analysis.
Also note that, although we have not explicitly focused on the technol-
ogy or asset exploiting internationalization motive, it still is present in our
analysis. For both the leader and the laggard also exploit their own technol-
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ogy stocks through either exports or FDI, and eventually sell their products
abroad. In fact, our analysis shows that for the laggard rm, the seeking
motive of FDI is only of second-order importance (cf. Figure 5.3), since
technology transfer skills from the parent to the subsidiary  (which corre-
spond the a technology exploiting motive) are a more important driver of
FDI than those from the subsidiary to the parent . As indicated by Miller
(1995) as well as some of the case examples discussed below, only after a
minimum production scale has been achieved does technology seeking be-
come interesting, feasible and viable. This means that rather than seeing
technology exploitation and technology seeking as two distinct motives, they
are naturally intertwined.
5.5 Productivity e¤ects of TS FDI versus TE
FDI
In the foregoing we have answered two out of the three questions that we
set out to answer at the beginning of this chapter. First, we have asked why
leaders instead of laggards appear to be engaging in TS FDI. The answer
is that leaders seek technology through FDI, not mainly because they are
just more productive than laggards, but because they have higher absorptive
capacity and better intra-rm technology transfer skills. This better allows
the entire rm to benet from external knowledge, rather than just the foreign
subsidiary. As shown by Cantwell and Janne (1999), the purpose of this type
of FDI on behalf of leader rms is not primarily to catch-up, but rather to
seek more diverse knowledge or technology. Indeed, following Kuemmerle
(1999) and Le Bas and Sierra (2002), the term home-base-augmenting FDI
may be more suitable in this regard. Second, we have asked what laggards are
doing instead to catch up. The answer to this question is that laggards seek
technology through exports, by learning from exporting. This technology
seeking strategy requires less from the laggard rm in terms of intra-rm
technology transfer skills, and therefore better ts its laggard nature.
In this section we will try and answer the third question: What does this
imply for the productivity e¤ects of TS FDI and TE FDI? As mentioned in
the introduction of this chapter, Girma (2005) and Dri¢ eld and Love (2007)
have already studied the extent to which these di¤ering FDI motives gener-
ate di¤erent productivity e¤ects in the UK. In both studies, the distinction
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between technology exploiting and seeking FDI is based on inter alia rela-
tive home-host RDIs. It is argued that since FDI with a technology seeking
motive is aimed at seeking or sourcing technology in the host country which
the MNE is lacking, it can reasonably be expected that the RDI of the home
country-industry of the MNE is lower than that of the host country-industry.
In other words, following the extant literature in this eld, these studies also
identify technology seeking as a motive for FDI by laggard rms. Hence, if
the ratio of home country RDI over host country RDI is smaller than one,
FDI is dened to be of the technology seeking type. If it is larger than one,
it is termed technology exploiting FDI (cf. the discussion on (5.8) above).
Since TS FDI (by denition or assumption) originates from less R&D
intensive industries than where it ends up that is, since it is assumed to be
undertaken by laggard rms it is hypothesized that technology seeking FDI
will not induce any knowledge di¤usion. Technology exploiting FDI on the
other hand is assumed to be undertaken by leader rms, and is thus expected
to induce positive knowledge di¤usion. Both Girma (2005) and Dri¢ eld and
Love (2007) nd broad support for these hypothesized e¤ects.70
However, as we have demonstrated at length in the preceding analysis of
this chapter, laggard rms are generally speaking not the ones engaging in
FDI, regardless of the underlying motive. Following our analysis above, the
relative RDIs used by Girma (2005) and Dri¢ eld and Love (2007) may be
valid as indicators of leadership or laggardship, yet they cannot discriminate
between TE FDI and TS FDI since our analysis shows that laggards gen-
erally engage in none of these strategies, whereas leaders tend to engage in
both. Reasoning from this perspective, it is not at all obvious that TS FDI
should generate smaller productivity e¤ects on local rms than TE FDI. So
indeed, we have yet to nd an answer to the question what the di¤erences
in investment motives imply for the productivity e¤ects of TS FDI and TE
FDI.
In order to do so, we will use industry-level data of subsidiary activities
of US MNEs in 13 OECD countries over the period 1987-2003 (cf. Table
A.4 in the Appendix). We try to improve upon the analyses of Girma (2005)
and Dri¢ eld and Love (2007) in distinguishing between the two investment
70The study by Dri¢ eld and Love (2007) also makes an additional distinction based
on whether or not there is an e¢ ciency seeking motive for FDI involved. Essentially,
this e¢ ciency seeking motive is expected to depress any positive di¤usion e¤ects of FDI
because of the negative competition e¤ects (based on lower host-country labor costs) it
generates.
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motives, by combining data on market orientation and two di¤erent proxies
regarding subsidiary innovation. However, in order to compare our results
to those of Girma (2005) and Dri¢ eld and Love (2007), we will also consider
the relative RDIs between the US and the host countries and how it a¤ects
our empirical results. We elaborate on these contributions below.
5.5.1 FDI motives and market orientation
We use the same data as in Chapter 4 in order to measure the activities of
foreign a¢ liates of US MNEs, i.e. industry-level data from the US Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) (cf. Section 4.3.1). As explained above, both
Girma (2005) and Dri¢ eld and Love (2007) distinguish between technol-
ogy seeking and exploiting FDI by comparing industry-level relative RDIs
(RRDIs) between the home country (the US) and the host countries that
US MNEs invest in. Specically, they argue that FDI in industries with
home-host RRDIs smaller than one corresponds to TS FDI, whereas FDI in
industries with home-host RRDIs larger than one is of the TE type.
We expand on and alter this method in several ways. Specically, we will
use the market orientation of US MNEssubsidiaries, together with prox-
ies for their contribution to the innovative capabilities of the MNE, as a
means to distinguish between the TE and TS motive. In doing so we draw
from the literature on market seeking and e¢ ciency seeking FDI (Markusen,
1984; Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 2002). Market seeking (or horizontal) FDI
is aimed at generating sales in the host country market. Implicit therein
is the exploitation of some rm specic (technology) asset or competitive
advantage, since this is what gives the MNE an edge over its host country
competitors and allows it to sell its products in foreign markets. As we al-
ready saw in Section 4.3.1, the BEA data allow us to distinguish the share
of foreign a¢ liate sales of US MNEs destined for the local (host country)
market. Following the above line of reasoning, we might use this share as
a proxy for the extent of technology exploiting FDI of US MNEs foreign
a¢ liates. That is:
TE FDI =
local salesjkt
total salesjkt
 FDIjkt (5.10)
where as before, j, k and t index industry, country and time respectively,
and FDI is a measure of US MNE presence, proxied by the foreign a¢ liate
capital stocks.
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Next to this exploiting (or horizontal) type of FDI, we can also distinguish
e¢ ciency seeking (or vertical) FDI, which in general is aimed at globally
splitting up the value chain and relocating the various activities to those
places (countries) where they can be undertaken most e¢ ciently, or where
there are appropriate resources available (also see the model in Chapter 4).
Similar to our approach in Section 4.3.1, we compute two variables to proxy
parent seeking FDI (PS FDI) and other seeking FDI (OS FDI) as:
PS FDI =
exports to US parentjkt
total salesjkt
 FDIjkt (5.11)
OS FDI =
exports to third countriesjkt
total salesjkt
 FDIjkt
To see how these two proxies of e¢ ciency seeking FDI can contribute
to nding a proxy for TS FDI, note that both our home country (US) as
well as our sample of host countries (OECD) are highly developed. Hence,
the e¢ ciencies or resources that US MNEs are seeking in this context may
very well be related to technology (instead of the often mentioned low wages
or natural resources). That is, in the present context our two measures of
seeking FDI may (in many cases) very well be a proxy of technology seeking
FDI. In order to illustrate this argument, consider Table 5.3. Column (1)
shows the two measures of seeking FDI (PS and OS FDI) combined as
a share of total FDI (PS and OS FDI + TE FDI) in each sector. The
industries are ordered from high-tech (upper row) to low-tech (lower row),
based on the OECD classication.71
What becomes clear immediately from the table is that the share of seek-
ing FDI is close to (or sometimes even larger than) 50% of the total in
high-tech and medium-tech industries, whereas in the low-tech industries TS
FDI is clearly the minority type. The second and third column in Table
5.3 report PS FDI and OS FDI as a share of total FDI across industries.
Although the relative shares of specically PS FDI are clearly the minority
type, the overall inter-industry pattern in columns (2) and (3) is very similar
to that in column (1). So indeed, this illustrates that both PS FDI and OS
FDI might serve as proper proxies for TS FDI.
To further strengthen our use of these variables as proxies for TS FDI,
71The ordering of the industries in the table also corresponds to the median industry
RDI from high (computers & electronic industries) to low (utilities). We choose the median
RDI instead of the mean RDI because of some outliers in the distribution.
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Table 5.3: Industry distribution of TS FDI (N=547)
Tech Intensity Industry (1) Seeking FDI Of which:
(2) PS FDI (3) OS FDI
High Tech Computers
& electronics
0.47 0.08 0.40
Medium Tech Chemicals 0.45 0.05 0.40
Transportation
equipment
0.45 0.09 0.36
Electrical equip-
ment, appliances
& components
0.41 0.06 0.35
Machinery 0.51 0.08 0.43
Low Tech Primary & fabri-
cated metals
0.37 0.03 0.33
Food & kindred
products
0.25 0.01 0.23
Utilities 0.00 0.00 0.00
we complement them with two additional taxonomies.72 First of all, utiliz-
ing subsidiary-level data on technology license payments received by foreign
a¢ liates from their US parents, we are able to measure the extent to which
a subsidiary is responsible for generating or creating new (to the rm as a
whole) knowledge or technology. Specically, if such payments are positive,
we assume that a subsidiary has engaged in some degree of technology seeking
activities. Hence, if these positive payments are combined with our measures
of seeking FDI, we call it technology seeking FDI (TS FDI). If technology
payments are zero but FDI is still of the seeking type, we consider it as more
general e¢ ciency seeking FDI. In the case of TE FDI, it is predominantly
of the (technology) exploiting kind, regardless of the amount of technology
license payments.
Second, following our discussion of Table 5.3, we also consider a distinc-
72Or, following Dri¢ eld and Love (2007) and the analysis in Chapter 4, it could be
argued that the orientation of FDI is just related to the distinction between market-seeking
and e¢ ciency-seeking, and we need the additional characteristics discussed hereafter to
separate the latter into e¢ ciency seeking vis-à-vis technology seeking FDI.
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tion between high and medium-tech sectors on the one hand, and low-tech
sectors on the other hand in order to be able to relate the type of FDI to
technology intensity (or similarly, to industries with high versus low RDIs,
cf. footnote 71). Specically, if the type of FDI is seeking FDI and takes
place in high and medium tech industries, it will be predominantly of the
technology seeking type, whereas if it occurs in low-tech industries, it will
be searching for more general e¢ ciencies. If the type is TE FDI, it will be
predominantly (technology) exploiting FDI in all industry types.
In the light of the foregoing, we believe that our proxies for seeking FDI in
combination with these taxonomies are preferable to those of Girma (2005)
and Dri¢ eld and Love (2007), based on relative RDIs. However, in order
to enhance comparability between our results and theirs, we also compute
RRDIs in order to be able to apply their classication. RRDIs are calculated
as:
RRDIjkt =
(MNE_R&DStock=MNE_Capital Stock)jkt
(R&DStock=Capital Stock)jkt
(5.12)
where j, k, and t index industry, country and time respectively. Hence,
RRDI is the ratio of the R&D intensity of US MNEs active in industry j,
(host) country k and time t, over the R&D intensity of that host countrys
industry j at time t.73 This improves upon Girma (2005) and Dri¢ eld and
Love (2007), who use industry-level R&D intensities of the home country of
the MNE as the numerator of RRDI. Following their line of argumentation,
we classify both TE FDI and seeking FDI with an RRDI  1 (< 1) as
technology exploiting FDI (technology seeking FDI). Table 5.4 summarizes
this discussion, and presents the resulting taxonomy between technology ex-
ploiting and seeking FDI.
5.5.2 Variables and methodology
The model we wish to estimate is the same as that in Section 4.3.2 and takes
the following form:
!jkt = 0 + !jk;t 1 + 1FDIjk;t 1 + 2Xjkt + j + k + t + "jkt (5.13)
73We use capital stocks rather than value added or output as the denominator in both
RDIs (as we did in the previous section), since this is the only variable for which we have
observations for both MNEs as well as industries.
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Table 5.4: FDI taxonomies
Indicator TE FDI Seeking FDI
Technology license
payments
> 0 Technology exploit-
ing FDI
Technology
seeking FDI
= 0 Technology exploit-
ing FDI
E¢ ciency seek-
ing FDI
Industry classica-
tion
High& medium-
tech
Technology exploit-
ing FDI
Technology
seeking FDI
Low-tech Technology exploit-
ing FDI
E¢ ciency seek-
ing FDI
Home-Host RDI  1 Technology exploit-
ing FDI
Technology ex-
ploiting FDI
< 1 Technology seeking
FDI
Technology
seeking FDI
where as before j, k and t index industry, country and time respectively, ! is
total factor productivity (TFP), FDI is a vector with our di¤erent measures
of TE and TS FDI in period t  1 to take into account the lag between MNE
activity and productivity change (i.e. it takes time for FDI to have its full
impact on productivity), X is a vector of control variables, ,  and  are
xed e¤ects and " is an idiosyncratic error term. We use two control variables
in the vector X: (the log of) industry-level exports, measured in millions of
US dollars and also taken from the STAN database (Exports), and (the log
of) industry-level R&D stocks, computed from data on R&D expenditures
(from the OECD ANBERD database R&D) using the perpetual inventory
method and imposing a generic annual depreciation rate of 15% (Hall and
Mairesse, 1995).74 Since industry-level exports also contain the exports of
the US MNEs in our sample that we use in constructing the di¤erent FDI
types, we net out those exports from the industry aggregate.
The FDI vector contains both TE FDI and seeking FDI as dened above
(below we enter both PS and OS FDI combined as well as separately in the
regression models). In order to do justice to the taxonomy as shown in Table
5.4, the model in (5.13) is not only analyzed for our total sample, but also
74Logs of these variables are used since their distributions are rather skewed, with a
few industry-country pairs demonstrating very high levels of R&D stocks and exports.
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for di¤erent subsamples that correspond to the di¤erent taxonomies implied
by the rows in Table 5.4. Data on technology license payments and US MNE
R&D stocks were also taken from the BEA and measured in millions of US
dollars. R&D stocks were again computed from R&D expenditures, similar
to the method for industry-level R&D.
As in Chapter 4, we rst estimate industry-level Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion functions to derive estimates of !jkt, and we again employ the system
GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) to estimate model (5.13). Since
the dataset is similar as the one used in Chapter 4, the specications of the
GMM estimator are also the same, and the reader is referred to Section 4.3.2
for an elaborate discussion. The only crucial di¤erence is that we restrict the
lags used for instrumenting the endogenous variables (!jk;t 1 and the FDI
variables) to periods 4 and 5 when estimating model (5.13) for the di¤erent
subsamples: in the subsamples, the number of observations is signicantly re-
duced, so that using too many lagged realizations of the endogenous variables
as instruments could result in overtting of the model (Roodman, 2006).75
Table 5.5: Pairwise correlations (N=547)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1. Log TFP 1.00
2. Log lagged TFP 0.92 1.00
3. Log R&D 0.19 0.19 1.00
4. Log Exports -0.06 -0.09 0.63 1.00
5. TE FDI -0.17 -0.13 0.32 0.19 1.00
6. Seeking FDIa 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.11 -0.43 1.00
7. PS FDI 0.22 0.19 -0.08 -0.16 0.00 0.34 1.00
8. OS FDI 0.07 0.03 0.25 0.20 -0.45 0.83 -0.25 1.00
Mean 0.13 0.10 8.20 9.35 3.59 2.77 0.55 2.22
standard deviation 0.35 0.35 1.52 1.23 1.75 1.56 0.90 1.52
Notes: a) Seeking FDI is computed as PS FDI + OS FDI. Correlations >|.08|
are signicant at p<.05.
75After restricting the analysis to the di¤erent subsamples, the error term in (5.13) only
exhibits autocorrelation up to AR(3), so that realizations from the 4th lag onwards can
be used as a valid instruments.
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As mentioned above, our sample covers 13 OECD host countries and 8
manufacturing industries over the period 1987-2003 (cf. Table A.4 in the
Appendix). However, the panel is very unbalanced due to missing observa-
tions for many countries. Moreover, data on technology license payments
were only available from 1994 onward, so that those parts of the analyses
utilizing this variable use a limited sample. Table 5.5 presents some sum-
mary statistics and correlations for the variables in our model. There is a
relatively high correlation between R&D and exports (0.63). Even though we
include both variables simultaneously in the empirical specications below,
running the regressions with either one of them did not change the results
much. The high correlation between seeking FDI and OS FDI (0.83) is
not problematic, since these two variables are never included in the model
simultaneously.
5.5.3 Empirical results
Table 5.6 presents the results of the empirical model in (5.13), combined with
the taxonomies proposed in Table 5.4. This table considers the combined ef-
fect of PS FDI and OS FDI, depicted in the table as seeking FDI. The
rst column estimates the model for the full sample, the results of which
correspond to column (1) in Table 4.2, except for the fact that the FDI co-
e¢ cients are not standardized in this case. The coe¢ cients of the control
variables are all according to expectation, signicant and sensible in magni-
tude. The coe¢ cient on both TE FDI and seeking FDI are positive and
signicant, indicating positive productivity e¤ects of both FDI types.
The bottom of the table provides the statistical tests of the models. The
Sargan-Hansen test statistics of overidentifying restrictions are never signi-
cant, suggesting that the null hypothesis of valid (i.e. exogenous) instruments
can be accepted. The AR statistics indicate rst-order autocorrelation, as
we would expect (given the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable), but
no serial correlation from AR(4) or AR(5) onwards, conrming that our use
of period 5-8 (or 4-5) lagged instruments is valid
However, given the taxonomies proposed in Table 5.4, seeking FDI may
now be capturing both technology seeking as well as more general e¢ ciency
seeking FDI. In order to make a more nely grained distinction between these
two, the other columns in the table split up the sample in accordance with
the classications in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.6: Productivity e¤ects of TE and TS FDI
(1)
Total
Sample
(2)
Tech
License
Pay > 0
(3)
Tech
License
Pay = 0
(4)
High-
Tech
Indus-
tries
(5)
Low-
Tech
indus-
tries
(6)
RRDI
1
(7)
RRDI<1
Lagged
TFP
0.923
(.028)
0.928
(.034)
0.913
(.024)
0.875
(.045)
0.920
(.046)
0.952
(.027)
0.759
(.102)
R&D Stock 0.030
(.009)
0.031
(.009)
0.024
(.012)
0.040
(.012)
0.009
(.016)
0.015
(.009)
0.014
(.035)
Exports 0.021
(.008)
0.023
(.009)
0.006
(.020)
0.022
(.014)
0.013
(.018)
0.019
(.009)
0.050
(.050)
TE FDIa 0.017
(.018)
0.019
(.011)
0.011
(.009)
0.010
(.005)
0.017
(.010)
0.002
(.007)
-0.016
(.016)
Seeking
FDIa;b
0.027
(.009)
0.039
(.001)
0.031
(.008)
0.024
(.010)
0.034
(.013)
0.020
(.009)
0.000
(.018)
Constant 0.245
(.101)
0.050
(.097)
0.301
(.111)
0.271
(.073)
0.339
(.153)
0.055
(.075)
0.199
(.112)
Time Dum-
mies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 125.9 142.6 316.8 144.3 1018.9 233.5 600.1
AR(1) -4.96 -4.26 -2.38 -3.92 -2.73 -4.70 -2.51
AR(5) or
AR(4)
-1.01 -1.40 -0.43 -1.43 -0.39 -1.74 -0.52
Sargan-
Hansen
test
40.2 29.2 27.1 15.7 14.8 26.2 6.3
N 547 176 104 376 171 324 122
Notes: a) 1-period lagged values of the variables are used; b) Seeking FDI is computed as PS FDI + OS
FDI. Dependent variable is TFP. System GMM-estimates - One step robust estimator, lags 5-8 used for
endogenous variables in column (1), and lags 4-5 in all other columns. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 5.6 split up the sample according to whether
or not a foreign a¢ liate has received any technology license payments from
the parent company. Column (2) considers those cases in which there were
positive payments, whereas column (3) considers those where there were
no payments whatsoever. The coe¢ cient of TE FDI is only signicant in
column (2), whereas seeking FDI has a positive and signicant e¤ect in
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both columns. This implies that both TS FDI and general e¢ ciency seeking
FDI generate positive productivity e¤ects.
The taxonomy in columns (4) and (5) corroborates this nding. Here
the sample is split up between high-tech and low-tech industries (high-tech
including the high and medium-tech industries of Table 5.3). Again we nd
that in both samples, seeking FDI has a positive and signicant productivity
e¤ect, whereas TE FDI is only positive and signicant in the high-tech
sample. Again these results imply that both TS FDI and general e¢ ciency
seeking FDI generate positive productivity e¤ects.
Columns (6) and (7) split up the sample into those observations with
a RRDI (from equation (5.12)) bigger and smaller than 1 respectively, in
accordance with the approach undertaken by Girma (2005) and Dri¢ eld
and Love (2007). As can be seen, seeking FDI is signicant and positive
only in column (6), indicating that only technology exploiting FDI yields
positive productivity e¤ects, according to the classication of Girma (2005)
and Dri¢ eld and Love (2007).
Table 5.7 reruns the models of Table 5.6, now distinguishing between PS
FDI and OS FDI For TE FDI, the general picture that emerges from
Table 5.7 is that in all the subsamples, splitting up seeking FDI into PS
FDI and OS FDI renders its e¤ects insignicant (a result which is also
somewhat familiar from Chapter 4).
For PS FDI, we observe a consistently positive and signicant e¤ect
in all subsamples, whereas OS FDI is only positive and signicant in those
subsamples for which it proxies TS FDI (columns 2 and 4). Moreover, follow-
ing the taxonomy of Girma (2005) and Dri¢ eld and Love (2007), column (7)
shows that again none of the FDI types are positive and signicant, implying
that none of the TS FDI yields any signicant productivity e¤ects.
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Table 5.7: Productivity e¤ects of TE and TS FDI - Splitting up TS FDI
(1)
Total
Sample
(2)
Tech
License
Pay > 0
(3)
Tech
License
Pay = 0
(4)
High-
Tech
Indus-
tries
(5)
Low-
Tech
indus-
tries
(6)
RRDI
1
(7)
RRDI<1
Lagged
TFP
0.929
(.028)
0.915
(.031)
0.893
(.080)
0.881
(.044)
0.986
(.035)
0.927
(.028)
0.775
(.087)
R&D Stock 0.031
(.009)
0.027
(.009)
0.026
(.012)
0.036
(.010)
0.003
(.011)
0.022
(.011)
0.011
(.025)
Exports 0.019
(.009)
0.021
(.008)
0.019
(.020)
0.019
(.010)
0.007
(.014)
0.022
(.008)
0.045
(.034)
TE FDI 0.018
(.010)
0.009
(.010)
0.005
(.010)
0.008
(.005)
0.014
(.019)
0.003
(.007)
-0.022
(.022)
PS FDI 0.029
(.006)
0.042
(.010)
0.143
(.051)
0.028
(.008)
0.023
(.009)
0.021
(.007)
0.026
(.020)
OS FDI 0.031
(.010)
0.028
(.011)
0.007
(.009)
0.022
(.009)
0.022
(.014)
0.016
(.013)
-0.006
(.014)
Constant 0.184
(.096)
0.084
(.097)
0.213
(.102)
0.274
(.064)
0.022
(.128)
0.104
(.076)
0.269
(.093)
Time Dum-
mies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 153.6 160.0 103.6 242.6 676.7 303.4 362.0
AR(1) -5.05 -4.31 -2.62 -3.93 -2.50 4.74 -1.79
AR(4) or
AR(5)
-1.01 -1.37 -1.58 -1.42 -0.46 -1.02 -0.19
Hansen-test 49.2 24.0 26.9 19.4 17.4 19.8 18.0
N 547 176 104 376 171 324 109
Notes: a) 1-period lagged values of the variables are used. Dependent variable is TFP. System GMM-
estimates - One step robust estimator, lags 5-8 used for endogenous variables in column (1), and lags
4-5 in all other columns. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Taken together, applying our taxonomies these results demonstrate that
both TS FDI and more general e¢ ciency seeking FDI generate positive pro-
ductivity e¤ects (the latter result was also already clear from the analysis in
the previous chapter). At the same time, applying the taxonomy of Girma
(2005) and Dri¢ eld and Love (2007) we also nd empirical results which are
partly consistent with theirs. That is, we nd that at least PS FDI and
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OS FDI generate positive productivity e¤ects with RRDI  1. However, as
explained at length in the foregoing, this result should not come as a surprise
since it essentially demonstrates that leaders (or rms from leading sectors)
tend to generate productivity e¤ects when they engage in FDI. But since we
have argued that leaders can and will engage in both TE and TS FDI, such
a taxonomy is not suited for distinguishing between these two FDI types.
Finally, we have checked the robustness of our results when using a¢ liate
employment levels as the FDI proxy, instead of a¢ liate capital stocks (cf.
Chapter 4). Similar to the analyses in Section 4.4, the results for PS FDI
and OS FDI remained intact and comparable to those in Table 5.7, whereas
the results of TE FDI we again largely absent, also in the total sample. In
terms of the topic of this chapter, this means that the results regarding the
productivity enhancing e¤ects of TS FDI are robust to a change in the FDI
proxy.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we set out to answer three interrelated questions: rst, why
are leaders and not laggards engaging in technology seeking FDI, as evidenced
by real-world examples? Second, what are the laggards doing instead to
compensate their lack of competitive assets or technology? And third, does
this imply that technology seeking and technology exploiting FDI both lead
to knowledge di¤usion, even though recent econometric evidence begs to
di¤er?
The rst two questions we tackled by extending a simple model by Siotis
(1999) to encompass both a broader denition of the leader-laggard distinc-
tion, as well as incorporating two alternative technology seeking strategies:
FDI and exports. The answer to the rst question is that leaders seek tech-
nology through FDI, not mainly because they are just more productive than
laggards, but because they have higher absorptive capacity and better intra-
rm technology transfer skills. This better allows the entire rm to benet
from external knowledge, rather than just the foreign subsidiary. As shown
by Cantwell and Janne (1999), the purpose of this type of FDI on behalf
of leader rms is not primarily to catch-up, but rather to seek more diverse
knowledge or technology. Indeed, following Kuemmerle (1999) and Le Bas
and Sierra (2002), the term home-base-augmenting FDI may be more suited
in this regard.
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The answer to the second question is that laggards who are not only
less productive than leaders, but also have lower absorptive capacity and
are less skilled in transferring technology across rm units  seek technol-
ogy through exports, by learning from exporting. This technology seeking
strategy requires less from the laggard rm in terms of intra-rm technology
transfer skills, and therefore better ts its laggard nature. Confronting these
theoretical results with some case examples, recent econometric evidence and
some preliminary exploratory industry-level analysis, we nd broad overall
support.
This led us to our third question: if (high-productivity) leader rms are
engaging both in technology exploiting and technology seeking FDI, does this
mean that technology seeking FDI also (next to technology exploiting FDI)
induces knowledge di¤usion e¤ects? Using data on US MNEsforeign activi-
ties in 13 OECD countries and 8 industries over the period 1987-2003, we are
able to formulate an answer to our nal question: both types of FDI generate
positive productivity e¤ects in their host economies, although the positive
e¤ects of TE FDI are not very robust to a change in the model specica-
tion.76 These results are in stark contrast to the ndings of Grünfeld (2005)
and Dri¢ eld and Love (2007), who nd that only technology exploiting FDI
generates positive productivity e¤ects. In light of the foregoing, we would
argue that their methodology to distinguish these FDI types is not proxying
investment motives, but rather (industry-level) leadership and laggardship.
Instead, in this chapter we have used the market-orientation of US MNEs
subsidiaries in combination with data on technology license payments, and
high-tech versus medium and low-tech sectors to distinguish between tech-
nology seeking and exploiting FDI. Our results correspond well with the
theoretical intuition developed in this chapter. As such, we believe these
proxies to be more appropriate for inferring investment motives at the ag-
gregate (industry) level.
76We also have to note that the number of observations for the di¤erent regressions in
Section 5.5.3 is rather limited due to several sample restrictions, which could inuence the
results.
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Appendix
Equilibrium prot functions
If both rms export:
een =
(  2c+ c + an(2  z) + as(2  1))2(SN + SS=t)
9
ees =
(+ c  2c + an(2z  1) + as(2  ))2(SN=t+ SS)
9
If both rms engage in FDI:
ffn =
(  c+ an(2  z) + as(2n   s))2SN
9
+
(  c + an(2n   zs) + as(2  1))2SS
9
  C
ffs =
(  c+ an(2z  1) + as(2s   n))2SN
9
+
(  c + an(2zs   n) + as(2  ))2SS
9
  C
If n exports and s engages in FDI:
efn =
(  c+ an(2  z) + as(2  s))2SN
9
+
(  2c+ c + an(2  zs) + as(2  1))2SS
9t
efs =
(  c+ an(2z  1) + as(2s   ))2SN
9
+
(+ c  2c + an(2zs   1) + as(2  ))2SS
9
  C
If n engages in FDI and s exports:
fen =
(  2c+ c + an(2  z) + as(2n   1))2SN
9
+
(  c + an(2n   z) + as(2  1))2SS
9
  C
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fes =
(+ c  2c + an(2z  1) + as(2  n))2SN
9t
+
(  c + an(2z  n) + as(2  ))2SS
9
Derivation of dz=dt
First consider the e¤ect of transport costs t on z1:
dz1
dt
=
[D1 + (+)(2 + )] (  c  1)@=@t
D21
where D1 denotes the denominator in (5.6). Given our assumption of non-
negative prots (i.e. (  c  1) > 0) and the fact that @=@t < 0, it follows
that sign dz1=dt =   sign [D1 + (+)(2 + )]. Substituting D1 yields sign
dz1=dt =   sign

2j + (1 + 2j) + 
2

< 0.
The e¤ect of t on z2 is given by:
dz2
dt
=
[D2 + (1 + )(4(+ 1) + (i + 1))] (2  2c  i   1)@=@t
D22
where D2 denotes the denominator in (5.7). Again, given our assumption of
nonnegative prots (i.e. (2 2c i 1) > 0) and the fact that @=@t < 0, it
follows that sign dz2=dt =   sign [D2 + (1 + )(4  (i + 1))]. Substituting
D2 yields sign dz2=dt =   sign

2(1 + j) + 2(j + 1) + 4(+ 1)

< 0.
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Table A.1: Countries and industries for Probit model
Countries Industries
Austria Agriculture
Australia Mining and quarrying
Belgium Food and drinks
Canada Tobacco
Czech Republic Textiles
Denmark Clothing
Finland Leather and footwear
France Wood and products of wood and cork
Germany Pulp, paper and paper products
Great Britain Printing and publishing
Greece Mineral oil rening, coke and nuclear fusion
Hungary Chemicals
Ireland Rubber and plastics
Israel Non-metallic mineral products
Italy Basic metals
Japan Fabricated metal products
South Korea Mechanical engineering
Luxemburg O¢ ce machinery
Mexico Manufacture of electrical machinery, n.e.c.
Netherlands Radio, television and communication equipment
Norway Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments
New Zealand Motor vehicles
Poland Railroad and transport equipment
Portugal Miscellaneous manufacturing
Spain Electricity and gas
Sweden Construction
Switzerland Business activities
Slovak Republic Education
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for Probit model
Mean St. Dev. 1 2 3 4
citUS  1 1. TSS 0.02 0.12 1.00
2. RRDI 1.42 7.50 0.00 1.00
3. RLP 1.21 2.98 0.00 -0.01 1.00
4. RMS 0.69 0.54 -0.04 -0.03 0.27 1.00
citUS  2 1. TSS 0.02 0.13 1.00
2. RRDI 1.41 7.16 0.00 1.00
3. RLP 1.23 3.30 0.00 -0.01 1.00
4. RMS 0.69 0.55 -0.04 -0.03 0.29 1.00
citUS  3 1. TSS 0.03 0.15 1.00
2. RRDI 1.39 6.86 0.01 1.00
3. RLP 1.27 3.60 0.00 -0.01 1.00
4. RMS 0.68 0.56 -0.03 -0.03 0.31 1.00
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Table A.3: Countries and industries for GMM models
Countries Industries
Belgium Computers & electronic products
Canada Chemicals
Denmark Machinery
Finland Electrical equipment, appliances
& components
France Transportation equipment
Germany Food & kindred products
Ireland Primary & fabricated metals
Italy Utilities
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis has picked up a pressing issue in the FDI knowledge spillovers
literature, which is the generally acknowledged ambiguity of the empirical
evidence regarding the existence of such spillovers. The approach to this
problem in the preceding chapters has been to consider the role of multi-
national heterogeneity in this ambiguity, by looking at di¤erences in MNE
ownership shares in their foreign subsidiaries (Chapter 3), dissimilarities in
market orientations of MNEs subsidiaries (Chapter 4), and heterogeneity
in rm types and their consequent investment motives (Chapter 5). When
possible and relevant, the analyses also considered vertical linkages as di¤u-
sion channels (Chapters 3 and 4), and previously ignored mediating factors
such as Intellectual Property Rights Protection (Chapter 3) and Regional
Integration Agreements (Chapter 4).
This concluding chapter will rst briey recapitulate the main outcomes
and conclusions of the preceding chapters, followed by some policy implica-
tions and avenues for future research.
6.1 Taking stock
"In the face of di¢ culties associated with capturing spillover ef-
fects and the multitude of factors that can inuence the extent of
spillovers in each economy, we caution researchers about drawing
generalized conclusions about the existence of externalities asso-
ciated with FDI [...]." (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005: p. 47)
Opening Chapter 2 with this quote, we start out by presenting a review
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of the theoretical and empirical literature on knowledge spillovers from FDI.
Specically, this chapter organizes the recent literature on this topic around
three themes: Papers opening the black box of knowledge spillover mecha-
nisms (Section 2.3), studies investigating mediating factors in the spillover
process (Section 2.4), and nally, the literature on multinational heterogene-
ity (Section 2.5). We conclude that studies opening the black box are rather
conclusive in their results, and conrm the existence of positive productivity
e¤ects of FDI. Studies on mediating factors and MNE heterogeneity on the
other hand are less comparable due to inter alia di¤erences in methodological
approaches. Moreover, the literature on MNE heterogeneity seems to gener-
ate promising results, but there are still a number of aspects and di¤erent
forms of heterogeneity that remain unexplored. This observation underlies
the central theme of this thesis, which is the investigation of di¤erent dimen-
sions of MNE heterogeneity, and their e¤ects on knowledge di¤usion from
MNEs. Moreover, we also stress inter alia that researchers should make a
more careful distinction between unintended knowledge spillovers (externali-
ties) and intended knowledge transfers. We refer to the combination of these
knowledge ows as knowledge di¤usion.
Chapter 3 then begins by looking at di¤erences in MNE ownership shares
in their foreign subsidiaries, and its consequences for knowledge spillovers and
di¤usion. We rst extend a model in New Trade Theory by Markusen and
Venables (1999) to examine the intra-industry (horizontal) and inter-industry
(vertical) e¤ects of changes in MNE ownership over its foreign venture on
local host-country rms, making an explicit distinction between horizontal
knowledge spillovers, and vertical knowledge transfers. Although the total
e¤ects are somewhat ambiguous because of the opposing inuences of price
e¤ects, (indirect) demand linkages, and knowledge di¤usion (both spillovers
and transfers), we use the moderating e¤ect of Intellectual Property Rights
Protection (IPP) to derive conditions under which some of these e¤ects be-
come unambiguously positive. Using a sample of 1,549 rms in 20 countries
over the period 2000-2005, we nd inter alia that (i) the degree of MNE own-
ership indeed inuences the existence and extent of productivity e¤ects, (ii)
the relationship between MNE ownership and productivity e¤ects depends
on the direction of the e¤ects (horizontal or vertical), (iii) productivity e¤ects
are larger in high IPP countries, indicating that MNEs are more willing to
transfer knowledge vertically, which in turn may benet intra-industry local
rms through input and output linkages.
The literature on horizontal and vertical FDI (Helpman, 1984; Markusen,
172
6. Conclusion
1984; Markusen, 2002) suggests that market-orientation may also a¤ect the
existence and extent of knowledge di¤usion from MNEs. This leads to an
analysis of the e¤ects of di¤erences in market orientation of USMNEs on local
industries in 13 OECD host-countries over the period 1987-2003 in Chapter 4.
Extending a model of multinationals and endogenous growth to incorporate
both horizontal (local market-oriented) and vertical (parent-oriented) FDI,
we nd that horizontal FDI is expected to generate larger productivity e¤ects
through knowledge di¤usion than vertical FDI. The empirical results provide
general support for this nding, although the estimated e¤ect of horizontal
FDI is somewhat sensitive to the exact measure used. Finally, since New
Trade Theory suggests a mediating role of Regional Integration Agreements
(RIAs) on these e¤ects, we also compare the e¤ects between the Canada
United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and the European Union
(EU). Generally speaking, we nd that the intra-industry productivity e¤ects
of horizontal and export platform FDI in the EU are larger than those in
CUSFTA, whereas the reverse holds for vertical FDI.
An important aspect of the analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 is the assumption
that MNEs (and consequently also their foreign ventures) are more produc-
tive than the local host-country rms that are a¤ected by their investment,
since this assumption gives rise to all the distinguished e¤ects in the model.
Yet the literature on rm heterogeneity and motives for FDI has argued
with some credibility that also low-productivity (laggard) rms engage in
FDI, not to exploit their (technological) rm-specic assets, but rather to
seek or source such assets from foreign competitors by capturing knowledge
spillovers.
We pick up this issue in Chapter 5, and illustrate by means of some
case examples that not the laggard rms, but rather the (high-productivity)
leader rms are the ones seeking (and exploiting) technology abroad through
FDI. This in sharp contrast with some of the literature referred to above.
We then pose three questions, which we pursue throughout the rest of the
chapter: rst, why are the leaders and not the laggards engaging in technol-
ogy seeking FDI (TS FDI)? Using the insight that laggards are not only less
productive than leaders (which would essentially only work to their advan-
tage, as the relative gain from knowledge di¤usion would be larger), but also
have less absorptive capacity and lower intra-rm technology transfer skills,
we nd that laggards, as opposed to leaders, are simply not able to engage in
FDI, regardless of the motive. That is, leaders engage in (TS) FDI because
they can, whereas laggards cannot. Second, what are the laggards doing
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instead to compensate their lack of competitive assets or technology? Intro-
ducing exports as an alternative technology seeking strategy (linking to the
learning by exporting literature), we nd that this is the optimal strategy for
laggards, as it requires no intra-rm technology transfer skills, and less ab-
sorptive capacity in order to be successful. These results are corroborated by
case evidence, existing econometric evidence and novel industry-level analy-
sis. And third, does this imply that TS FDI leads to knowledge di¤usion after
all? Using industry-level data of US MNEsactivities in 13 host-countries
over the period 1987-2003, we nd  in contrast to recent work by Girma
(2005) and Dri¢ eld and Love (2007) that TS FDI generates productivity
e¤ects, although we cannot solely describe these to knowledge di¤usion.
In conclusion we can say that MNE heterogeneity indeed matters for
the existence and extent of productivity e¤ects in general, and knowledge
di¤usion in particular. However, it does so in di¤erent ways for di¤erent
dimensions of heterogeneity. Regarding MNE ownership, there exist optimal
and interior (i.e. between 0-100%) degrees of MNE ownership depending on
the absence or presence of a well-developed IPP system. Not distinguishing
along this dimension may generate biased results, in which conicting e¤ects
due to di¤erences in MNE ownership are lumped together in an averaged
productivity e¤ect. Further, although the superior productivity e¤ect of
horizontal over vertical FDI is mainly restricted to capital demonstration
e¤ects, we have also found that export-platform FDI generally yields very
high productivity e¤ects in the EU, thus potentially overstating the e¤ects
of the other two types when not properly distinguished empirically. Finally,
the motive for FDI being either technology seeking or exploiting does matter
somewhat for the existence of knowledge di¤usion, as we have found that
technology seeking FDI generally yields more consistent productivity e¤ects
than technology exploiting FDI. Hence, not accounting for these two di¤erent
motives empirically may yield biased results.
6.2 Policy implications
Given the results of this thesis, what should policy makers do to maximize the
benets of multinational investment for their local economy? As indicated
a number of times before, this should not be the primary question in this
debate. Instead, we should rst ask: is there a reason for government to act
and intervene in the rst place? That is, is there any kind of market failure
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which warrants government policy?
As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, a knowledge spillover indeed constitutes
a failure of markets as it is an externality. However, much of the existing
econometric analysis and evidence including the analyses presented in the
preceding chapters is not able to separate the pure knowledge spillover from
the price e¤ects, competition e¤ects, (indirect) demand linkage e¤ects and
knowledge transfer e¤ects, most of them not externalities, and all of them
together combined in the estimated total productivity e¤ects of MNEs on
local rms.
To illustrate this point, consider the estimated productivity e¤ect of tech-
nology exploiting and seeking FDI in column 1 of Table 5.6 in Section 5.5.3. A
one standard deviation increase in both FDI types in this sample induces an
increase in industry TFP of approximately 7.2% ([1.760.017+1.560.027]).
Taking the mean value of industry-level TFP in the sample (approximately
$ US 1.13 mln), this implies an increase of approximately $ US 82,000 in
industry TFP generated by local rms. However, as noted on several oc-
casions in this thesis, this is a combined productivity e¤ect, including not
only knowledge spillovers but also price e¤ects, competition e¤ects, indirect
demand linkages and possibly also knowledge transfer. Hence, the actual ex-
ternality is in fact a fraction of this amount, but it is not straightforward to
determine what fraction. Of course the analysis in Chapter 5 only considers
MNE activity from the US, so that the productivity e¤ects of total inward
FDI of both types will be considerably larger. Yet still, comparing the dollar-
value of these e¤ects with the example given at the start of Chapter 1, where
Renault was o¤ered up to $ US 300 mln in direct subsidies alone in order
to attract one of its subsidiaries into Brazil, it is clear that such amounts
cannot be justied on basis of knowledge spillover benets to productivity
alone. Of course, policy makers and politicians are not solely led by economic
reasoning, but also have to respond to political pressures and the lobby of
interest groups in society at large. In this process, the most often heard
argument for intervention is the potential for job creation or the prevention
of job loss (in case multinationals decide to relocate part of their production
elsewhere).77 Depending on the number of jobs created or saved, the large
77Indeed, at the time of writing several newspapers regularly report on the presidential
campain in the US, with the democractic candidate Barack Obama having made several
speeches, promising to bring back the jobs lost when American enterprises started to
massively relocate production to Asia and South-America in the 1990s. In fact, the Barack
Obama campain has formulated explicit policy measures in this spirit, e.g. cutting tax
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amounts of money spent on FDI policy are perhaps less striking, but since
they do not correct externalities they are essentially unwarranted.
These objections notwithstanding, if governments and policymakers choose
to engage in FDI-stimulating policies, the analyses in this thesis suggest some
guidelines that would at least increase the validity of such policy and increase
the probability of positive productivity e¤ects through knowledge spillovers.
Based on the results in Chapter 3, a rst recommendation would be to make
sure that a proper system of IPP is in place, as our theoretical and em-
pirical results demonstrate that this stimulates both vertical and horizontal
productivity e¤ects. For vertical productivity e¤ects, lower degrees of MNE
ownership  and hence, a partnership between a MNE and a local rm 
appear to be more appropriate, as the vertical linkages between the foreign
venture and local upstream and downstream rms tend to decrease with
MNE ownership. In general, since a large share of the horizontal e¤ects also
runs through indirect vertical linkages, supporting partnerships between local
rms and MNEs seems a good strategy.78
Our analysis of the impact of a¢ liatesmarket orientation in Chapter 4
suggests that policymakers especially in Canada should primarily seek
to ensure a minimum degree of inward vertical FDI, as this type of activity
generates the most consistent and positive productivity benets. Horizontal
FDI also appears to generate positive e¤ects, but mainly through capital
demonstration e¤ects. On the other end of the spectrum are the so-called
export platforms, which according to our analysis mainly generate positive
productivity e¤ects in the EU.79
breaks for companies relocating jobs overseas, and rewarding companies who support
American workers.
78Note that is not the same as saying that a government should impose a minimum of
equity ownership by a local rm as an entry requirement, a policy measure that was often
used in China and Eastern European countries (cf. Hoekman and Javorcik, 2005). Such
a measure could create an incentive for the MNE to not transfer its propietary knowledge
abroad, so that vertical (and horizontal) productivity e¤ects cannot be realized. Instead
of imposing such an arrangement, policy makers could use tax or subsidy instruments to
keep the incentives in place while persuading the MNE to engage in a parternship with a
local rm.
79This also puts the positive experiences of Ireland in a clear perspective, as it has
managed through the use of various incentive schemes to attract a bulk of FDI and
MNEs during the 1980s and 1990s. Many of these MNEs have used their Irish subsidiaries
as gateways to continental Europe and the UK. That is, a large part of Irish FDI is of the
export-platform type.
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The results in Chapter 5 suggest that the investment motive of MNEs is
also of some concern in order to ensure positive productivity e¤ects, since
technology seeking FDI generates more consistent positive productivity ef-
fects than technology exploiting FDI. This result also suggests avenues for
more indirect policy measures, since they imply that investing in a knowledge-
based economy, with high-quality workers, proper knowledge infrastructure
and well-functioning industry-science linkages is also likely to attract MNEs
that seek knowledge or technology abroad.
The results in this thesis also hint at some other possibilities for more in-
direct or moderating roles of government policy. We already mentioned the
example of establishing a well-functioning system of IPP, in order to accom-
modate knowledge transfer. Additionally, parts of our analyses in Chapters
3 and 4 show that establishing vertical linkages between MNEs and local in-
dustries can be of prime importance in securing local productivity e¤ects. As
such, governments might also intervene through industry policy, solidifying
inter-industry linkages or supporting intermediary agencies to bring together
local suppliers and customers on the one hand, and MNEs on the other.
6.3 Avenues for future research
From an academic point of view, again a pressing issue is our inability to
precisely pin-point the externality in the estimated productivity e¤ects. Es-
sentially, the methodology used in this thesis, combined with the type of
data that are usually used in this type of analyses prevent us from doing
so. As mentioned in Chapter 1, another strand of literature has used patent
citations to track knowledge spillovers, similar to the methodology that we
applied in Section 5.4.2. However, even a patent citation cannot be a measure
of an unintended knowledge spillover. That is, when an inventor applies for
a patent, he agrees to consciously transfer the knowledge to the public do-
main, for which he usually receives the monopoly right of commercialization
of the invention for a period of time. This monopoly right allows the inventor
to earn back (part of) the investment costs of his innovation, thus creating
incentives for innovation. Alternatively, one can think of the monopoly right
as (a future stream of) payments for knowledge the inventor has transferred
to the public domain. As such, the knowledge and its subsequent use by
others has been priced and paid for, and has consequently been internalized
by the inventor.
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Large scale econometric studies are not very likely to be able to resolve
these issues, as the data even at the rm or plant level do not allow the
researcher to separate the several e¤ects leading up to a total productivity
e¤ect. Specically, the knowledge transfer and knowledge spillover are hard
 but crucial (from a policy perspective)  to separate. However, recent
evidence from surveys (Javorcik, 2008) seems to be able to shed some more
light on the issue, as the relevant agents within rms can indicate in which
ways they have learned from foreign investors in their sectors, and which
factors were important in the process. Indeed, more qualitative evidence
 potentially also including in-depth multiple case studies  seems to be
invaluable in order to complement the econometric studies. Not only can
qualitative evidence lay bare the mechanisms that are important, it can also
directly distinguish knowledge spillovers on the one hand from knowledge
transfer, competitive e¤ects, and indirect demand and supply linkages on
the other hand. On top of that, it can directly shed light on the importance
of mediating factors such as geography and absorptive capacity.
On the other hand, maybe the extreme focus on knowledge spillovers as
the only externality in a host of other estimated e¤ects is a bit too restrictive.
As e.g. Blalock and Gertler (2008) and our analysis in Chapter 3 show, even
knowledge transfer can induce unforeseen externalities via indirect vertical
linkages and hence warrant government policy. From that perspective, esti-
mating productivity e¤ects may not be such an imperfect practice after all,
and the studies in this thesis demonstrate the importance of accounting for
(some forms of) multinational heterogeneity. However, as indicated in Chap-
ter 2, any further progress (away from the inconclusive studies leading up to
this thesis, and beyond the more detailed studies reviewed in Chapter 2 and
undertaken in this thesis) is most likely to come from combining as many
of these relevant aspects as possible. That is, we should start investigating
whether the mediating e¤ect of absorptive capacity and geography depend on
the spillover channels considered, and whether or not this in turn depends on
the market orientation of the MNE, which by itself may again be related to
the extent of MNE ownership. Of course, the research questions and results
become more complex in this case, but at least this will eventually better
inform policy makers about relevant conditions and aspects under which dif-
ferent policy measures are most warranted. Already there are studies that
are taking important steps in this direction (e.g. Wei and Liu, 2006; Liang,
2008).
Finally, what seems to be overlooked in this literature is the notion that
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a (tacit) knowledge spillover or transfer eventually, at the most basic level,
takes place between two or more individuals. When looking at the di¤erent
spillover channels, discussed in Section 2.3, it sometimes is easy to forget
that eventually, people are involved in these mechanisms. As such, the study
of knowledge spillovers and transfers, regardless of its context (FDI, trade,
geography, etc.) is eventually a study of conscious or unconscious learning
by one or more individuals from one or more others. An interesting future
development can indeed take research to the level of individual agents and
partly into the realm of psychology, where a lot of work on learning has
already been done. Incorporating research on individual learning into the
specic domain of MNEs could lead to interesting new insights.
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Summary (in Dutch)
Dit proefschrift gaat over multinationals en de mate waarin investeringen van
multinationals in het buitenland bijdragen aan productiviteitsontwikkeling
van lokale bedrijven aldaar. Eén van de centrale aspecten in dit proces is de
di¤usie van kennis en technologie naar lokale bedrijven. Deze di¤usie kan op
verschillende manieren tot stand komen: in hun relaties met lokale afnemers
en leveranciers kunnen de dochters van multinationals kennis over superieure
producten of productietechnieken overbrengen. Daarnaast kunnen er demon-
stratie e¤ecten optreden, doordat lokale bedrijven de meer geavanceerde pro-
ducten, managementtechnieken of marketingstrategieën van multinationals
gaan imiteren. Ook kan kennis over (productie)processen overgeheveld wor-
den via personeeltransfers tussen de dochteronderneming van de multina-
tional en lokale bedrijven.
Een belangrijk onderscheid in deze kennisdi¤usie is dat tussen bedoelde
en onbedoelde di¤usie. Bedoelde kennisdi¤usie treedt op wanneer een multi-
national bewust kennis overdraag naar bijvoorbeeld haar toeleveranciers. De
prikkel om dit te doen bestaat dan waarschijnlijk uit het feit dat betere
of kwalitatief hoogwaardigere inputs voor de multinational uiteindelijk ook
de kwaliteit van haar eigen producten verbetert. Zodoende wordt deze be-
doelde kennisoverdracht dan ook door de multinational geïnternaliseerd, dat
wil zeggen, de multinational is in staat om hier een (impliciete) prijs aan te
verbinden. Dit is niet het geval voor onbedoelde kennisdi¤usie. Deze komt
tot stand zonder dat de multinational dit heeft beoogd, bijvoorbeeld door-
dat lokale bedrijven in het buitenland producten van de dochteronderneming
imiteren of kopiëren. Vanzelfsprekend heeft de multinational hier geen baat
bij en zal ze zodoende wellicht besluiten om minder in kennisontwikkeling en
innovatie te investeren, aangezien een deel van de beloning hiervoor kosteloos
wegvloeit naar mogelijke concurrenten. Met andere woorden, onbedoelde
kennisdi¤usie wordt niet geïnternaliseerd en is daarom een externaliteit, ook
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wel een kennisspillover genoemd.
Vanuit een economische oogpunt is dit onderscheid zeer relevant: daar
waar een bedoelde kennisoverdracht (een kennistransfer genoemd) geen re-
den vormt tot overheidsingrijpen doet een kennisspillover dat wel. Immers,
de kennisspillover kan ertoe leiden dat een multinational minder dan opti-
maal (vanuit een maatschappelijk oogpunt) investeert in kennis en innovatie,
aangezien ze zich niet de volledige beloning hiervoor kan toe-eigenen. Hier
ligt een rol voor de overheid om de kloof tussen het privaat rendement en het
sociaal rendement van dergelijke investeringen te overbruggen, bijvoorbeeld
door subsidies te verstrekken. Daarnaast vormen kennis en kennisspillovers
de motor achter economische groei en ontwikkeling, waardoor het bestaan
en ontstaan ervan ook vanuit dit oogpunt belangrijk is. Zodoende dient
zich de vraag aan of de dochterondernemingen van multinationals ook wel
buitenlandse directe investeringen (BDI) genoemd  inderdaad leiden tot
kennisspillovers en of de grote sommen geld die overheden vaak besteden om
dergelijke investeringen aan te trekken (zie o.a. Hoofdstuk 1) wel geoorloofd
zijn.
Naar deze vraag is veel onderzoek gedaan en Hoofdstuk 2 in dit proef-
schrift geeft een uitgebreid overzicht van voorgaande studies op dit gebied.
Gedurende een lange tijd waren veel van deze studies niet erg consistent
in hun resultaten: sommige onderzoeken vonden inderdaad bewijs voor het
bestaan van kennisdi¤usie van de dochterondernemingen van multinationals,
terwijl andere studies geen bewijs vonden of zelfs negatieve e¤ecten op de
lokale economie documenteerden. Gedeeltelijk als een reactie op deze stand
van zaken zijn meer recente studies op zoek gegaan naar meer gedetailleerde
en genuanceerde aspecten binnen het kennisdi¤usie proces. Globaal zijn hi-
erbij drie stromingen te onderscheiden: op de eerste plaats zijn er in toene-
mende mate studies die één van de hierboven beschreven kanalen waarlangs
kennis zich kan verspreiden individueel en expliciet analyseren (zie Sectie
2.3). Dit type onderzoek lijkt meer te convergeren naar het resultaat dat
kennisdi¤usie van BDI inderdaad plaatsvindt. Op de tweede plaats zijn er
studies die kijken naar het e¤ect van mediërende factoren zoals het belang
van absorptiecapaciteit (de mate waarin lokale bedrijven in staat zijn om de
weggelekte kennis daadwerkelijk te absorberen) of geograsche afstand (zie
Sectie 2.4). Hoewel het belang van geograsche nabijheid voor het bestaan
van kennisdi¤usie in het algemeen wel is vastgesteld, geldt dit in mindere
mate voor kennisdi¤usie van BDI. Ook het belang van absorptiecapaciteit
komt niet éénduidig naar voren. Ten derde is er een zeer recente literatuur
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die kijkt naar de heterogeniteit van multinationals en de mate waarin dit
een e¤ect heeft op kennisdi¤usie van BDI (zie Sectie 2.5). Bij heterogen-
iteit valt bijvoorbeeld te denken aan verschillen in eigendomsstructuren in
de dochterondernemingen, verschillen in investeringsmotieven of verschillen
in moederlanden. Ook deze literatuur lijkt tot meer genuanceerde inzichten
te leiden. Het feit dat er op het gebied van deze derde stroming nog re-
latief weinig onderzoek is gedaan maakt deze invalshoek dan ook bijzonder
interessant en relevant voor verder onderzoek. De rest van dit proefschrift
analyseert dan ook het e¤ect van verschillende vormen van multinationale
heterogeniteit op kennisdi¤usie van BDI.
De eerste dimensie van multinationale heterogeniteit die in Hoofdstuk 3
aan de orde komt is het eigendomsaandeel van de moeder in haar buiten-
landse dochter. Dit aandeel kan variëren tussen de 0% en 100% en de vraag
die in dit hoofstuk wordt onderzocht is of verschillen hierin ook leiden tot ver-
schillen in kennisdi¤usie. De mogelijke verbanden worden eerst formeel the-
oretisch geanalyseerd, waarbij een onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen verti-
cale kennistransfers (kennisoverdracht van de dochteronderneming naar haar
leveranciers en afnemers) en horizontale kennisspillovers (kennisoverdracht
van de dochteronderneming naar haar concurrenten). Daarnaast worden ook
andere e¤ecten geanalyseerd, zoals e¤ecten op de lokale vraag naar inputs,
e¤ecten op het lokale aanbod van inputs en e¤ecten op de prijzen van lokale
ondernemingen. Op basis van de theorie komen er geen eenduidige e¤ecten
naar voren van verschillen in eigendomsaandelen op kennisdi¤usie. Desalni-
ettemin kunnen er een aantal condities afgeleid worden waaronder het e¤ect
van een toenemend eigendomsaandel positief is, mits er onderscheid wordt
gemaakt tussen landen met een goed versus slecht functionerend systeem van
intellectuele eigendomsrechten. Vervolgens worden de theoretische inzichten
empirisch onderzocht in een panel van 1549 grote bedrijven in 20 landen over
de periode 2000-2005. De resultaten wijzen op sterke niet-lineaire verbanden
tussen het eigendomsaandeel van de multinational en verticale kennistrans-
fers, waarbij er veelal een optimum tussen de 0% en 50% ligt. Voor hori-
zontale kennisspillovers is het verband overwegend positief, hoewel dit wel
conditioneel is op de kostenstructuur van de lokale ondernemingen: indien
de variabele kosten een relatief hoog aandeel vormen in de totale kosten is
de kans op positieve e¤ecten groter. Tot slot lijken de totale e¤ecten meer
positief in landen met een goed functionerend systeem ter bescherming van
het intellectuele eigendom dan in landen waar dit minder goed geregeld is.
In Hoofdstuk 4 analyseren we een tweede dimensie van multinationale
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heterogeniteit, te weten de marktoriëntatie van de dochteronderneming. Een
impliciete veronderstelling in Hoofdstuk 3 was namelijk dat de dochter alleen
voor de lokale markt produceert, maar in werkelijkheid zullen dochteron-
dernemingen een (substantieel) deel van hun productie weer terug exporteren
naar het moederland, of verder exporteren naar andere landen. Inzichten in
de nieuwe handelstheorie laten zien dat dergelijke verschillen in marktoriën-
tatie gepaard gaan met verschillen in de organisatie en compositie van buiten-
landse productie, wat op zijn beurt weer kan leiden tot verschillen in kennis-
di¤usie. Wederom worden deze relaties eerst formeel theoretisch onderzocht.
Hieruit blijkt dat kennisdi¤usie van dochters met een lokale marktoriëntatie
(ook wel horizontale BDI genoemd) groter is dan van dochters die (een deel
van) hun producten terug exporteren naar het moederland (ook wel verticale
BDI genoemd). We testen deze verwachtingen empirisch met een dataset
van de buitenlandse activiteiten van Amerikaanse multinationals gedurende
de periode 1987-2003 op sector niveau. De empirische resultaten zijn in-
derdaad in overeenstemming met de theoretische verwachtingen, maar zijn
relatief gevoelig voor veranderingen in de manier waarop buitenlandse ac-
tiviteit gemeten wordt. Daarnaast blijkt dat het e¤ect van dochters met een
marktoriëntatie naar andere landen (ook wel export-platform BDI genoemd)
positieve e¤ecten heeft die signicant groter zijn dan die van horizontale en
verticale BDI. Onze dataset stelt ons verder in staat om deze e¤ecten in twee
verschillende economische regios te bekijken: De Europese Unie (EU) en de
Canadian United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). In overeenstem-
ming met de theorie wijzen de empirische resultaten erop dat kennisdi¤usie
van horizontale BDI groter is in de EU dan in CUSFTA, terwijl het omge-
keerde geldt voor verticale BDI. Het e¤ect van export-platform BDI is enkel
waarneembaar in de EU.
Zowel in Hoofdstuk 3 als in Hoofdstuk 4 is een andere impliciete veron-
derstelling steeds dat de multinational en haar dochter superieur zijn (in
termen van kennis, productiviteit e.d.) aan de lokale ondernemingen in het
gastland. Hoewel deze veronderstelling strookt met de algemeen bekende
karakteristieken van multinationals, is er recentelijk een relatief grote lit-
eratuur ontstaan die beargumenteerd dat bedrijven met een lage produc-
tiviteit (zogenoemde achterblijvers) ook zullen investeren in het buitenland,
om zo de kennis van hun meer geavanceerde buitenlandse concurrenten op te
pikken. Het motief voor BDI is in dit geval het op zoek gaan naar buiten-
landse kennis (kennis verwervende BDI), in plaats van het meer gangbare
motief om de eigen kennis of het eigen concurrentievoordeel in het buiten-
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land te exploiteren (kennis exploiterende BDI). Wanneer dit inderdaad het
geval is zijn de veronderstelde kennisdi¤usie e¤ecten van kennis verwervende
BDI lang niet zo aannemelijk als die van kennis exploiterende BDI. Hoofd-
stuk 5 onderzoekt deze relatie tussen investeringsmotieven en kennisdi¤usie.
Eerst wordt er aan de hand van een formeel theoretisch model onderzocht óf
achterblijvers inderdaad willen proteren van kennisdi¤usie in het buitenland
en zo ja, op welke manier ze dat zullen doen. De bevindingen wijzen uit dat
ze dit inderdaad zullen proberen, maar eerder door te exporteren dan door
het opzetten van een buitenlandse dochteronderneming. Integendeel, het zijn
juist de bedrijven met een hoge productiviteit (de zogenoemde leiders) die
via BDI zullen trachten om in het buitenland zowel kennis te exploiteren als
kennis te verwerven. Anecdotisch en econometrisch bewijs bevestigen deze
uitkomsten. Deze resultaten lijken er dan ook op te wijzen dat beide typen
BDI zouden moeten leiden tot kennisdi¤usie in het gastland. Gebruikmakend
van dezelfde dataset als die in Hoofdstuk 4 wordt deze implicatie vervolgens
getoetst: de empirische resultaten wijzen erop dat kennis verwervende BDI
inderdaad ook leidt tot kennisdi¤usie en dat de e¤ecten vaak nog groter zijn
dan die van kennis exploiterende BDI.
Concluderend kan gesteld worden dat dit proefschrift laat zien dat ver-
schillende vormen van multinationale heterogeniteit inderdaad leiden tot ver-
schillende productiviteitse¤ecten op lokale ondernemingen in het gastland,
o.a. via kennisdi¤usie. Daarbij maakt deze thesis nog een aantal andere
contributies: op de eerste plaats is in de verschillende hoofdstukken het be-
langrijke onderscheid tussen kenisspillovers en kennistransfers aangehaald en
is er daarnaast gewezen op het feit dat BDI naast deze kennisdi¤usie ef-
fecten ook andere e¤ecten op lokale ondernemingen teweeg zal brengen, bi-
jvoorbeeld op het gebied van prijsinvloeden, concurrentie en als katalysator
van toeleverende sectoren. Empirisch (of econometrisch) kunnen deze ef-
fecten lastig of niet uit elkaar gehaald worden, waardoor de beleidsimplicaties
van de bevindingen in dit proefschrift met terughoudendheid moeten worden
getrokken. Daarnaast heeft dit proefschrift expliciet het belang van een goed
functionerend systeem ter bescherming van de intellectuele eigendom en ver-
schillen tussen economische regios voor de e¤ecten van BDI aangetoond,
waar dit in eerder onderzoek nog niet in deze mate is gebeurd.
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List of acronyms
AC Absorptive Capacity
AR Autoregressive
BEA Bureau of Economic Analysis
BT British Telecom
BW Backwardness
CES Constant Elasticity of Substitution
CUSFTA Canadian United States Free Trade Agreement
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FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GM General Motors
GMM Generalized Method of Moments
(I)JV (International) Joint Venture
IPP Intellectual Property Rights Protection
ISIC International Standard Industry Classi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IV Instrumental Variable
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JIT Just In Time
MC Marginal Costs
MNE Multinational Enterprise
NBER National Bureau of Economic Research
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OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
RDI Research and Development Intensity
REI Regional Economic Integration
RIA Regional Integration Agreement
RRDI Relative Research and Development Intensity
R&D Research and Development
SIC Standard Industry Classi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TE Technology Exploiting
TFP Total Factor Productivity
TS Technology Seeking
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US United States
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